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SUMMARY 
 
This research is about Brazil’s international development cooperation in agriculture. I take two 
cooperation programmes carried out by the Brazilian government in Mozambique – 
ProSAVANA and More Food International (MFI) – to analyse the processes whereby 
cooperation policy is formed and transformed. I ask how Brazil’s domestic politics interact with 
international affairs to shape agricultural cooperation with Mozambique. I consider the 
‘priests, technicians and traders’ of Brazilian cooperation, following a caricature used by one 
respondent to characterise disputes in ProSAVANA. This triadic portrayal captures the diversity 
of actors, interests and discourse of Brazilian cooperation. It is also analytically useful to 
investigate how actors relate to one another and how alliances, networks or coalitions, held 
together on the basis of convenience, shared beliefs or common narratives, emerge and 
evolve over time. My analytical approach places actors and interests in the context of 
institutional processes, but also against policy narratives that are the product of history, state-
society interactions and class-based struggles in Brazil. The latter are, in turn, at the root of 
those institutional processes and actors’ identities. Narratives may be used to pursue certain 
agendas but they also construct the agendas and the identity of the actors that articulate 
them. My research also emphasises the inter-spatial or travelling dimension of cooperation 
policy, with flows of influence occurring forwards and backwards. Brazilian actors, interests 
and discourse travel from Brazil to Mozambique, get interpreted and absorbed selectively and 
this has repercussions back to the point of origin. Finally, I argue that Brazil’s development 
encounters in Mozambique proved harder to manage than suggested by the presumed 
affinities and claims about horizontal relations in Brazilian cooperation. The experiences of 
ProSAVANA and MFI illustrate the challenges facing the Brazilian cooperation narrative and its 
governing principles. I discuss implications for the Brazilian ‘model’ and for the South-South 
paradigm. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In March 2014, I sat in a café in Nampula, a provincial city in the north of Mozambique, to 
interview a researcher from the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, Embrapa, one of 
Brazil’s leading brands in Africa. My interlocutor had been based in Nampula for about five 
months and had an office at the public agricultural experimentation station about 30 minutes 
outside the town. When not working at the station, he worked from home and suggested we 
met at a nearby café. We talked about life in Mozambique, local agriculture and working 
culture, Brazilian cooperation and Embrapa’s work, but mostly about ProSAVANA, a flagship 
programme of Brazilian agricultural cooperation whose research component he was 
responsible for. There had been protests against the programme led by civil society 
organisations, accusing it of opening the way for land grabs and threatening the livelihoods of 
local peasant communities. He dismissed the protests as having a thin evidence base and being 
driven by an out-dated ideology that opposed the technological modernisation offered by 
Embrapa. ‘I am a technician’, he claimed. ‘My contribution and that of Embrapa is to show that 
there is an alternative pathway to ensure food as well foreign exchange, and to keep soils 
productive for many generations. By keeping it the way it is, burning what there is without 
improving soils, misery will be perpetuated and in 100, 200 years, this will be turned into a 
Sahara’.1 ‘We are not priests’, he concluded referring to the protest campaigners, ‘we are 
technicians… sent by the traders’. He insisted on his technical credentials, while also 
acknowledging there were business interests behind his well-meaning scientific work. ‘It is 
obvious that any person with common sense knows that if we are here cooperating, we are 
also thinking in terms of long-term business, and opportunities for technicians to work here, 
too. Obviously, it is part of the business world’. His metaphor of priests, technicians and 
traders operating in Brazil’s agricultural cooperation in Mozambique was a sharp depiction of 
the diversity of interests, attitudes and narratives that I had been collecting throughout my 
research in Brazil and in Mozambique. This ‘triad’ would, in fact, guide me in making sense of 
the Brazilian development cooperation policy process. Before I dwell further on this framing, 
let me first go back to where I started, the time when Brazilian cooperation emerged as a 
topical subject of research and policy debate. 
                                                          
1 Interview with Embrapa researcher, Nampula, March 2014 (code: EMB#7). 
  
2 
1.1. Brazil’s development cooperation as a topical subject 
Brazilian development cooperation became a topical research subject from around the mid-to-
late 2000s. Two factors, at least, contributed to this. One was the growing interest by the 
international development community in the concept of South-South cooperation (SSC) 
(Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), 2008; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee OECD-DAC, 
2010; Rowlands, 2008). The other was the shift in Brazil’s foreign policy towards the South 
(Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007) and the ‘solidarity diplomacy’ of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
(henceforth referred to as Lula da Silva or Lula), elected in 2002, particularly towards Africa 
(Visentini, 2009; White, 2010). 
Although the notion of SSC is rooted in the mid 1950s,2 it became mainstream in the 
international aid system from around 2008, when it firmly entered the jargon of the ‘aid 
effectiveness’ agenda, a process led by the OECD-DAC to agree international standards for aid 
delivery.3 The aid effectiveness agenda developed around four high-profile events that took 
place between 2003 and 2011. One of these, the 2008 Accra High Level Forum, highlighted SSC 
as playing ‘an important role in international development co-operation’ and being a ‘valuable 
complement to North-South co-operation’ (OECD, 2008, p. 18). The succeeding 2011 Busan 
High Level Forum further emphasised the concept and recognised its distinction from aid as 
traditionally conceptualised and, therefore, the need to devise ‘differentiated commitments’ 
on aid effectiveness for SSC providers. The Busan Forum also announced the establishment of 
a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, thereby attempting to 
transform the aid effectiveness agenda into a process that included the non-DAC donors. This 
happened at a time when the traditional aid regime was facing a credibility crisis (Easterly, 
2006; Moyo, 2009) and alternatives were needed to restore its standing. Crucially, it reflected 
‘shifting geopolitical realities’ (Glennie, 2011) and the imperative of accommodating rising 
powers such as China, India and Brazil which, besides their growing economic strength, were 
once again becoming prominent actors in developing countries (Alden, 2007; Bräutigam, 2009; 
                                                          
2 The concept of cooperation among Southern countries emerged at the 1955 Bandung Conference, in Indonesia, where Asian and 
African nations came together around a common project of building a post-colonial world order (Herrera, 2005). Later, in 1978, a 
conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) was hosted by the UN in Buenos Aires, resulting in the 
adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for promoting and implementing TCDC, currently referred to as SSC. The Plan 
presented TCDC as a ‘vital force for initiating, designing, organizing and promoting co-operation among developing countries so 
that they can create, acquire, adapt, transfer and pool knowledge and experience for their mutual benefit and for achieving 
national and collective self-reliance, which are essential for their social and economic development’ (United Nations, 1978, p. 4). 
3 Amongst other, these standards, as initially framed back in 2005, concerned ways of relating to governments in aid recipient 
governments, respecting and promoting their ownership of the development process and their management systems, and ways of 
coordinating amongst donors to avoid duplication and explore complementarities (OECD-DAC, 2016). 
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Kragelund, 2008; Mawdsley, 2012). They challenged the hegemonic aid order and its standards 
through a ‘silent revolution’ that offered alternatives to aid recipients (Woods, 2008). 
Changes in the geopolitical order and the aid regime were also felt in Brazil (and were indeed 
also fed by developments in Brazil). Sustained economic growth during the first decade of the 
millennium granted Brazil a comfortable seat at the side of its fellow BRICs (The Economist, 
2009). By 2012, Brazil had overtaken the United Kingdom (UK) as the sixth largest world 
economy (Inman, 2012). Rising international prices for Brazil’s leading export commodities, 
including soybeans and iron ore, played a central role, with Chinese markets acting as a major 
source of demand and stimulus for the Brazilian economy (Goldfajn, 2015).  
Meanwhile, under President Lula da Silva (2003-10) and his Workers’ Party (PT)-led coalition, 
Brazil’s foreign policy had shifted towards the South, in a quest for autonomy through 
diversification away from traditional allies in Europe and North America (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 
2007). President Lula engaged very actively in foreign policy (Cason & Power, 2009) and 
championed an approach of ‘solidarity diplomacy’ towards South America and Africa (Amorim, 
2010; M. A. Garcia, 2003; Visentini, 2009) that was rooted in the PT’s worldview and ideology 
(Almeida, 2003, 2006; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007). 
By the end of Lula’s second term in office, in 2010, development cooperation had become a 
salient foreign policy instrument of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), known as 
Itamaraty (Amorim, 2010). Guided by the foreign policy principles of non-interference and 
respect for sovereignty of partner countries (Almeida, 2006), Brazilian cooperation was 
portrayed as driven by demands from partner countries rather than imposed by the Brazilian 
government and to be detached from commercial interests (Abreu, 2013a). It was framed as a 
‘cooperation among equals’ (Amorim, 2010, p. 231), or a horizontal relationship between 
partners based on a solidarity ethic (Abreu, 2013a) and the presumption of appropriateness of 
Brazilian solutions and ‘successes’ to address similar challenges faced by other developing 
countries (Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), 2013). 
Commitments for cooperation projects proliferated under Lula’s presidential diplomacy, and 
resources financing cooperation activities rose exponentially between 2005 and 2010 – 
bilateral cooperation is estimated to have increased from US$ 160 million to US$ 900 million 
during this period (Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) & ABC, 2010, 2013).4 The 
                                                          
4 These are modest figures but one should note that measuring Brazilian technical cooperation, one of the modalities of Brazilian 
cooperation included in the calculation, is only a tentative exercise given that much of it concerns in-kind knowledge transfers that 
are not quantified. Other modalities in the calculation on Brazilian cooperation are: contributions to international organisations, 
scholarships and other academic exchange programmes, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations – see Leite et al. 
(2014) for details. 
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volume of assistance was modest by international standards though, and the institutional 
framework and operational structures for managing cooperation remained poorly developed 
(Cabral & Weinstock, 2010). The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), formally mandated to 
coordinate cooperation, was not an agency as such but a department of MRE with little 
political influence and limited institutional capacity to lead and coordinate a portfolio of 
interventions carried out by a large number of governmental and non-governmental actors.5 
Decision-making in Brazilian cooperation was largely fragmented and informal (I. Leite, 
Suyama, & Waisbich, 2013). Yet, back in 2010 at least, there was the expectation that ABC, led 
by diplomat Marco Farani, would soon be reformed and given the status of a de facto 
coordinator of Brazil’s development cooperation (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010). 
Against this context, and fuelled by Lula’s persuasive rhetoric about a new SSC paradigm and a 
more balanced world order (Lula da Silva, 2006), there were growing expectations about the 
influence Brazil could have in international affairs and the dominant aid regime (Dauvergne & 
Farias, 2012). A Brazilian delegation attended the Busan High Level Forum on aid effectiveness, 
in 2011, in a sign of engagement with the international aid system. Yet, the Brazilian 
government insisted on maintaining an independent stance on development cooperation, 
based on the fundamental distinctiveness of SSC vis-à-vis North-South cooperation (Federal 
Republic of Brazil, 2011). This essentially normative distinction emphasised the horizontality 
and non-interfering nature of the Brazilian approach which, differently from North-South 
cooperation, was not hegemonic or paternalistic, but aimed to overcome the common 
challenges among developing countries. 
It was in this setting of an increasingly contested international aid system, growing popularity 
of the SSC proposition and vigorous Southern diplomacy in Brazil, nurtured by a flourishing 
economy, that the first studies on Brazil’s development cooperation appeared. 
1.2. First generation of studies and their foci 
Treating Brazilian cooperation as a case study of foreign policy, the first generation of studies 
on the subject was produced mainly by international relations scholars, seeking to explain the 
underlying motivations for Brazil’s Southern turn (Lima & Hirst, 2006; Malamud, 2011; Stolte, 
2012; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Visentini, 2009; White, 2010) and the deployment of the 
development cooperation tool, specifically (Abdenur, 2007; Lima, 2005; Pinheiro & Gaio, 
2013). There were also studies on the institutional structures, guiding principles and modalities 
                                                          
5 Ayllón Pino (2010) noted that more than 120 domestic institutions, including ministries, foundations universities, research 
centres, companies and non-governmental organisations were involved in development cooperation initiatives. 
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of Brazilian cooperation (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010; Costa Vaz & Inoue, 2007) and how it 
related to the international aid regime and the aid effectiveness agenda in particular (Cabral, 
Russo, & Weinstock, 2014). 
It emerged from some of this literature that Southern solidarity was an instrument to pursue a 
range of interests. Some stressed tactical geostrategic motivations, including affirming Brazil’s 
regional leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean through global recognition (Lima & 
Hirst, 2006; Malamud, 2011; Pinheiro & Gaio, 2013) as well as consolidating Brazil’s position as 
a ‘spokesman for developing countries’ in the international arena (Abdenur, 2007, p. 11). 
Others noted the ideological drive of the PT, pushing for cooperation with other developing 
nations to reduce economic and power asymmetries in the world order (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 
2007). The pursuit of trade and investment opportunities for Brazilian businesses abroad was 
also emphasised (Stolte, 2012; White, 2010). 
Visentini (2009) and White (2010) highlighted the combination of geostrategic intents, 
economic motives and solidarity objectives in foreign policy, particularly towards Africa, and 
White went as far as interpreting this as an indication of ‘refreshing coherence’ in the three-
pronged strategy of the Brazilian government (p. 239). Yet, others emphasised fragmentation 
and inconsistencies between objectives (Pinheiro & Milani, 2012). 
The blending of interests of a distinct and often competing nature is consistent with the 
argument on the pluralisation of actors in foreign policy and the rollback of Itamaraty from a 
monopolistic position in decision-making (Cason & Power, 2009). Pluralisation of foreign policy 
resulted, first of all, from Brazil’s historical process of political liberalisation (after the end of 
the military dictatorship in 1985) and the opening up of the economy that made Brazilian 
society more connected with and exposed to international issues (Lima, 2000; Sanchez, da 
Silva, Cardoso, & Spécie, 2006). Public awareness of international relations increased (Cason & 
Power, 2009) and dialogue between MRE and other governmental and nongovernmental 
agencies was broadened (Pinheiro & Milani, 2012). Furthermore, the changing stance of 
Itamaraty also resulted from the prominent role assumed by the Brazilian presidency in foreign 
affairs since Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and that intensified under Lula da Silva 
(Cason & Power, 2009). However, under Lula’s diplomacy specifically, the pluralisation of 
foreign policy reflected the president’s need to legitimate its PT-led coalition government, 
including by striking alliances with sectors of society representing interests and ideas very far 
from those of the PT ideology. Cason and Power note: 
It is of course ironic that a PT-led cabinet had the best connections to the exporting 
elite of any recent Brazilian government (…) the foreign policy troika of Minister Celso 
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Amorim, MRE secretary general Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, and long-time 
presidential advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia coexisted in a government that also featured 
heavyweights like Meirelles, Furlan, and Rodrigues. The latter group saw no reason to 
obstruct the progressive South-South agenda of the former group as long as it 
coincided with the outward-oriented business interests that they represented. (pp. 
128-129)6 
 
The pluralisation of foreign policy meant Itamaraty could no longer be regarded as 
autonomous and insulated. Making sense of Brazil’s international affairs and SSC specifically 
required taking into account domestic politics underlying the various agendas and ideas on 
internationalisation and cooperation. Pinheiro and Milani (2012) represented a milestone in 
Brazilian international relations scholarship, setting this new direction for the study of Brazil’s 
foreign policy and, within this, development cooperation. They proposed a move away from a 
focus on the strategies of a seemingly unitary actor (Itamaraty) and nation-state (Brazil) and 
towards a conceptualisation of Brazilian foreign affairs that acknowledged the diversity of 
domestic interests and the complexity of bureaucratic relations that lay under foreign policy 
decision-making. This proposition echoed the approach adopted by Lancaster (2007) in her 
study of the domestic politics of foreign aid. Lancaster’s conceptual framework distinguished 
between four categories of domestic political forces shaping foreign aid: ideas, the 
worldviews, beliefs and values about aid and aid giving; political institutions, concerning who 
decided, who had access to decision-making and who mediated interests; interests, the 
motivations of the various actors involved in the aid process, including government agencies, 
private organisations and informal networks; and the aid organisation, the way governments 
organise themselves to manage their aid. Looking at five donor countries, Lancaster analysed 
how each of these factors shapes aid decision-making.7 
In Brazil, the doctoral research by Leite (2013) offered a pioneering in-depth look at the 
domestic politics of cooperation, focusing on two leading cooperation actors, the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and Brazil’s National Service for Industrial 
Apprenticeship (SENAI). Drawing on Lancaster’s conceptualisation, Leite discussed the 
domestic and external forces driving these two actors into cooperation, the ideas about SSC 
and development that framed their engagements, the structures under which they operated, 
and their emancipation into a proactive stance whereby their own interests were pursued. 
                                                          
6 (Henrique) Meirelles was a former banking executive and the governor of the Central Bank, (Luiz Fernando) Furlan was the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce, and (Roberto) Rodrigues was the Minister of Agriculture. They were regarded as 
heavyweights of a neoliberal agenda in the PT-led cabinet. 
7 Lancaster looks at the cases of Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and the United States of America (USA). 
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In the meantime, another generation of studies on Brazilian cooperation was taking shape, 
focusing on specific projects and experiences in recipient countries. Early work mapped out 
the actors, cooperation projects, investments and other initiatives on the ground (Chichava et 
al., 2013; A. Garcia, Kato, & Fontes, 2013; Mukwereza, 2013; Russo, de Oliveira, Shankland, & 
Sitoe, 2014; Waldersee, n.d.). Gradually, research on Brazilian cooperation took on more 
specific interrogations, including the link between Brazilian SSC in Ghana and transnational 
networks of capital (Amanor, 2013), the political economy of the Brazilian investments in 
Angola (Gaio, 2014), and the interaction between cooperation workers in the context of 
trilateral cooperation projects in Mozambique (Fingermann, 2014). Furthermore, Brazil’s 
agricultural cooperation and investments in Mozambique specifically received considerable 
attention and this was largely driven by the high profile ProSAVANA programme, which had 
become the subject of much publicity and contestation, as mentioned in the prelude to this 
introduction and discussed in detail later. Studies on ProSAVANA have proliferated over the 
last few years, looking at issues such as land grabbing by Brazilian investors (Clements & 
Fernandes, 2013), competing models of agricultural development and their expected impact 
on local communities (Nogueira, 2013; Schlesinger, 2014), the local political economy of 
agribusiness penetration (Mosca & Bruna, 2015), and the landscape imaginaries shaping the 
debate between government and social movements (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016; Wolford & 
Nehring, 2015).  
Back in 2012, when I initiated my doctoral research project, the two generations of studies 
mentioned above remained largely separate from one another and there was limited 
communication and cross-fertilisation between international relations scholars analysing the 
politics of Brazil’s foreign policy and researchers and practitioners assessing interventions and 
their impacts in recipient countries. Also, the analysis of the domestic politics of Brazil’s 
internationalisation was poorly developed, with the exception of Leite (2013) that has since 
been published. My goal was precisely to build bridges across these different dimensions and 
perspectives on the Brazilian cooperation experiment – the international insertion of Brazilian 
interests and models, the domestic politics of foreign policy and the overseas development 
cooperation encounters of Brazilian actors in recipient countries. 
I was not alone in this intent but my doctoral research was inserted in a broader research 
project focused on ‘China and Brazil in African Agriculture’ (2012-15) that allowed me to work 
alongside researchers in four African countries (Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), 
in Brazil, in China and in the UK in exploring these various dimensions in detail, while 
benefiting from continuous stimulating interactions. 
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1.3. My research formulation and analytical scope 
As I started my research, my conceptual framing was inspired by the approach proposed by 
Lancaster (2007) and the latest insights on Brazilian foreign policy and cooperation (Cason & 
Power, 2009; Pinheiro & Milani, 2012). I wanted to understand the domestic politics that 
concerned actors’ interests, prevalent ideas or norms about cooperation and SSC in particular, 
the political institutions and the bureaucratic organisation of Brazilian cooperation. I also 
wondered how the pluralisation of actors in Brazil’s foreign policy and, specifically, the 
fragmentation and informality of decision-making in development cooperation impinged on 
cooperation practice. Additionally, I wanted to explore the discursively constructed nature of 
Brazilian SSC and unpack its narratives of success, Southern solidarity and horizontality. 
Furthermore, I was also interested in capturing the ways domestic politics spanned beyond 
national borders through the channel of cooperation and how Brazil’s domestic actors, their 
interests, ideas and norms travelled out to recipient countries and back to Brazil. I therefore 
considered Brazil’s development cooperation as a domain where international and domestic 
factors intertwined. Manning (1977) used the term ‘intermestic’ to refer to the overlap of 
international and domestic factors and influences in shaping foreign policy. From this 
standpoint, my aim was to make sense of how domestic influences occurred, permeated and 
intermingled with international relations to shape the conception and practice of Brazil’s 
development cooperation. 
Yet, Brazilian cooperation was somewhat distinct from the foreign aid providers reviewed by 
Lancaster and there was a gap in the literature on SSC regarding its domestic politics 
dimension. The fragmentation and informality of decision-making in Brazilian cooperation 
reflected the early stages of development of its political institutions and bureaucratic aid 
organisation where roles, responsibilities, strategies for cooperation remained relatively fluid 
(Cabral, 2011; Cabral & Weinstock, 2010; I. Leite et al., 2014, 2013; Mello, 2012). Brazil’s 
development cooperation was a nascent policy domain and the practice of cooperation by its 
actors was part of its formative process. This meant that, unlike Lancaster, I needed to 
understand how the different elements of the domestic politics of cooperation (actors, 
structures, interests and ideas) influenced and built on each other. I therefore sought to 
develop an analytical framework that allowed me to account for the interplay between actors’ 
interests, beliefs and ideas in the context of a changing institutional framework, as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2. I was particularly interested in making sense of the discursive 
manifestations of Brazilian agricultural cooperation in this formative process – examining, for 
instance, the function played by narratives such as Southern solidarity and, in relation to 
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Africa, claims of Brazil’s natural vocation and promises of suitable tropical recipes and 
technology (Dávila, 2010; World Bank, 2012). I also wanted to understand how these 
discursive constructions related to the motivations of actors for engaging with cooperation 
and, specifically, whether discourse was instrumentally used to the pursuit of certain agendas 
or it was itself the embodiment of actors’ identities and agendas. 
The fragmentation, informality and considerable degree of volatility that characterised the 
infant domain of Brazilian cooperation policy meant relevant actors, policy spaces and rules of 
the game were rather difficult to pin down. The boundaries of decision-making and influence 
were far from being clearly defined. To make the analysis more manageable, therefore, I 
narrowed down my analytical scope to the sub-domain of agricultural cooperation in Africa. 
On this basis, I identified my field of enquiry at the confluence of three distinct but intersecting 
policy areas: development cooperation, agricultural policy, and Brazil-Africa relations 
(pertaining to but also extending beyond cooperation). 
The choices of Africa and agriculture were not random. Africa was central to President Lula’s 
solidarity diplomacy and agriculture one of the leading areas of Brazil’s engagements on the 
continent – between 2003 and 2012, it accounted for 26% of the portfolio of Brazilian 
technical cooperation in Africa, ahead of education and health cooperation (Abreu, 2013b). 
For these reasons, Brazilian agricultural cooperation in Africa had already been the focus of my 
previous work and I had, therefore, a basis of research from which to build (Cabral, 2011; 
Cabral, Shankland, Favareto, & Costa Vaz, 2013). Also, agricultural engagements in Africa by 
Brazil as well as other rising powers were starting to generate contrasting views and debate 
about SSC principles and rhetoric (Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2009; Cheru & Modi, 2013; Gabas & 
Goulet, 2013; Patriota & Pierri, 2013), making them a particularly interesting focus of my 
enquiry.  
I further reduced the scope of my analysis geographically and settled for Brazil’s agricultural 
cooperation initiatives in Mozambique, informed to a large extent by a preceding mapping 
exercise (Cabral et al., 2013; Chichava et al., 2013). Mozambique was the top recipient African 
country of Brazilian cooperation and, alongside other Portuguese-speaking African countries, a 
long-running priority of Brazilian diplomacy on the continent. 
With this analytical scope, I formulated my overarching research question as: how do Brazil’s 
domestic politics interact with international affairs to shape agricultural development 
cooperation with Mozambique? The research I proposed to carry out put the emphasis on the 
Brazilian side of cooperation with Mozambique and looked at the dynamics of the policy 
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process in a policy domain where domestic and international dimensions intermingled. I also 
asked: how did Brazil’s domestic agricultural politics travel to Mozambique through the 
channel of cooperation and, on the basis of that experience, feed back to Brazil’s domestic 
context? 
I selected two cases studies of Brazilian agricultural cooperation as the focus for my in-depth 
enquiry: ProSAVANA and More Food International (MFI). This choice was, again, informed by 
my previous assessment of the agricultural portfolio in Mozambique and, crucially, by Brazil’s 
domestic context of agricultural policy. On the latter, I considered the argument about dualism 
of Brazilian agriculture, defined in terms of the divide between agribusiness and family farming 
(Pierri, 2013). 
Although the definition of the terms is contested, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
agribusiness typically stands for large-scale, highly capitalised and export-oriented farms 
focused on high-earning commodities, whereas family farming is often equated with small to 
medium scale farming and a predominant orientation towards domestic markets and food 
production. Furthermore, Brazil’s dualism is defined in institutional, political and ideological 
terms.8 Institutionally, dualism is represented in the bureaucratic organisation of government, 
where two agricultural ministries coexisted to serve seemingly distinct farming groups: the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) supports agribusinesses and the 
Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) supports family farmers. The division is also 
connected to party-politics in that different political parties in Brazil’s heterogeneous 
governing coalitions have traditionally led the two ministries. 9 The division is also ideological. 
Market integration is an essential element of agribusiness, a term tightly associated with a 
modern capitalistic conceptualisation of agriculture. The family farming narrative, by contrast, 
tends to emphasise social reproduction, job creation and food production and is often critical 
of the capitalism system and the social inequalities it generates (Fernandes, Welch, & 
Gonçalves, 2012). Although the notion of dualism is to a large extent discursively constructed 
and politically motivated, it reflects, as I will discuss ahead, long-standing geographical and 
class-based divisions in the Brazilian countryside. 
These two categories and their intrinsic ideological and historical baggage were explicitly 
represented in the original narrative formulations about ProSAVANA and MFI – ProSAVANA 
was set to replicate the agribusiness expansion of the Brazilian Cerrado (Brazil’s savannah-like 
                                                          
8 Interview with MDA official, Brasília, November 2013 (MDA#1). 
9 MAPA has been traditionally led by the Brazilian Democratic Movement’s Party (PMDB) and MDA by the PT and, specifically, by 
the PT’s Social Democracy (Democracia Socialista) current. Social Democracy is a Marxist current inside the PT that has maintained 
an opposition to majority forces inside the party but has managed to secure some top seats at the municipal and federal level.  
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biome) and open up business opportunities in export markets, whereas MFI aimed to 
strengthen family farming. Furthermore, two leading figures of Brazil’s institutional dualism – 
Embrapa, the champion of Brazil’s agribusiness transformation of the Cerrado, and MDA, the 
patron of family farming – were involved in the programmes’ implementation. Embrapa led 
the research component of ProSAVANA and was, at the start, the most visible government 
actor in the programme. MDA led MFI and proposed to replicate abroad its domestic ‘More 
Food’ programme, a credit mechanism supporting family farmers in the mechanisation of their 
farms. 
By taking these two examples of Brazilian development cooperation in Mozambique, I 
therefore proposed to analyse the workings of Brazil’s agricultural politics in the international 
domain of cooperation relationships in Mozambique. Also, the two cases offered an 
illustration of the intermingling of agendas in Brazilian cooperation. ProSAVANA and MFI did 
not just mobilise Embrapa and MDA into altruistic technological sharing, but a range of other 
Brazilian actors connected to various interests and perspectives on agriculture, cooperation 
and development. 
1.4. Priests, technicians and traders as guiding thread 
The depiction of ProSAVANA’s ‘priests, technicians and traders’ by my Embrapa respondent 
suggested, indeed, the profusion of interests and perspectives within development 
cooperation.  Traders, seeking to explore profit-generating opportunities, had sent the 
technicians ahead to clear the way for business. Although brought in by traders, technicians 
were moved by the impulse of transferring modern technology and, to some extent, a 
solidarity ethic of sharing knowledge. Priests opposed them, contesting modernisation and 
what they perceived as the co-optation by corporate business of a development cooperation 
agenda rooted in a particular ideological perspective on Southern solidarity. Priests also 
symbolised the permeation of Brazil’s domestic agrarian dualism dispute into the international 
development cooperation realm, to the extent that family farming was proposed as an 
alternative to harmful agribusiness. I will analyse these dynamics in Chapter 5 when 
considering the ProSAVANA case study in detail. 
Although the Embrapa researcher’s triadic portrait referred specifically to ProSAVANA, a 
similar caricature could be made in relation to MFI, as examined in Chapter 6. In contrast to 
ProSAVANA, however, MFI was a programme where priests and traders travelled to Africa side 
by side – where priests offered to strengthen Africa’s family farming, while traders aimed to 
sell farming machinery as they had been doing under the domestic More Food programme. 
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The role of technicians was less salient in this programme, although, as I will discuss, they 
emerged later on in the process in alliance with priests and as part of a political manoeuvre 
rooted in Brazil’s domestic politics. 
To determine who these priests, technicians and traders were exactly and their history and 
connections, and before embarking on an in-depth analysis of the two case study programmes, 
I will situate the priests, technicians and traders of Brazilian agricultural cooperation in their 
domestic (agricultural) setting (Chapter 3) and consider their insertion in the process of 
internationalisation of Brazilian actors and politics, by reference to the Mozambican context 
(Chapter 4). 
In Chapter 3, I will focus specifically on Brazil’s agricultural context. I will situate priests, 
technicians and traders by mapping out key actors, policies and policy spaces, and by outlining 
the dominant paradigms of agricultural development. To understand this setting better, I will 
provide a historical perspective of Brazil’s agricultural policy and specifically how the concepts 
of agribusiness and family farming emerged and developed. My chronological account will 
start from around the 1960s, the moment when the birth of Brazil’s modern farming is usually 
located. Two major and largely separate policy trajectories will be considered. One concerns 
the development of modern agriculture (since the days of the transformation of the Cerrado) 
that became the foundation for the ProSAVANA narrative. The other, unfolding since 2003 (the 
year of arrival of the PT in government), concerns the institutionalisation of family farming and 
public policies to support this group of producers, including the More Food programme, the 
template for MFI. 
In Chapter 4, I will introduce Brazil’s agricultural engagements in Mozambique, placing these 
against the framework of South-South relations as well as the internationalisation of Brazilian 
agriculture. After contextualising the Brazil-Mozambique ‘solidarity diplomacy’ relationship 
and identifying key actors, channels and instruments, I will look closely at the agricultural 
cooperation portfolio, describing institutions involved, themes covered and resources 
deployed. I will discuss how it mirrors a trend in Brazilian agricultural cooperation of growing 
diversification and, specifically, a progression from a focus on technology adaptation and 
training, with Embrapa as the leading and virtually solo actor, into a more complex package of 
initiatives. I will also discuss how development cooperation is only one aspect of a broader set 
of diplomatic and business affairs between Brazil and Mozambique, where the presence of 
Brazil’s mining giant, Vale, and several large construction companies, such as Odebrecht, 
stands out. Having illustrated the diversification of the agricultural portfolio and its growing 
association with business, I will then discuss its connection with the process of 
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internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture. I will consider: (i) business entrepreneurs investing 
in African agriculture, either as merchants or farmers; (ii) government bureaucrats and civil 
society activists advocating for family farming in international fora; and (iii) researchers 
engaged in adaptive research and seeking international exposure. 
Priests, technicians and traders will therefore be the guiding thread to my analysis, helping me 
in working out the political economy of development cooperation – in terms of actors, actor-
networks, competing interests and power struggles. I will also interrogate this triadic portrayal 
as a discursive construction in that the categorisation of actors (as in priests, technicians and 
traders) and the framing of the debate as polarised (as in dualism) are manifestations of a 
policy process where battles for meaning are also fought and give rise to distinct discourse-
based coalitions. Furthermore, I will argue that visible argumentative battles mask fractures in 
competing narratives – about family farming and agribusiness – suggesting hidden divisions 
that have not yet come to the surface. In Chapter 7, I will bring these different dimensions – 
material and discursive, visible and hidden – of the Brazilian agricultural cooperation policy 
process together and highlight the need for a conceptual framing that recognises the various 
dynamics and multiple expressions of the policy process that occur at particular points in time. 
I will conclude by showing that Brazilian agricultural cooperation is a policy domain in motion, 
shaped by both action and inaction and by both material resources and immaterial discursive 
interplay. The three-pronged strategy that may have illuminated Lula’s original drive towards 
Africa (Visentini, 2009; White, 2010) has been challenged by practices on the ground and the 
competition between actors, networks and coalitions. The implications for Brazilian 
cooperation and the South-South paradigm will be discussed in Chapter 8. This is a particularly 
opportune discussion to have at a time when Brazil’s domestic politics and internationalisation 
process may have reached a critical turning point in history. 
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Chapter 2. The discourse-politics of Brazilian cooperation: theory and methods 
Any story about policymaking is bound to start by introducing the characters that take part in 
it, i.e. the policy actors. Indeed, priests, technicians and traders are the central characters in 
this policy drama. One of my first exercises in thinking about how to operationalise my 
research, and before the Embrapa researcher had confronted me with the triad, was to draw a 
map of ‘who was who’ in the field I had set to explore. With that in mind, I first located Brazil’s 
agricultural cooperation in Mozambique at the intersection of three overlapping policy areas 
concerning policymaking in Brazil: development cooperation, agriculture and Brazil-Africa 
relations, this latter encompassing both economic relations and diplomatic affairs. By so doing, 
I was starting my approach to the subject matter from an institutional perspective on the 
policymaking process, a perspective about formal roles, rules and procedures concerning the 
themes of relevance to my enquiry. 
Yet, based on my understanding of the subject area, I could think of at least three factors that 
muddled the institutional space circumscribed by the three intersecting policy areas. One was 
that development cooperation was a policy domain in the making with a loosely defined and 
fragmented institutional framework. Although ABC nominally oversaw technical cooperation 
projects, its role was one of formal intermediation with counterparts in recipient government 
and of project administration. The substance of cooperation projects – their focus, objectives 
and operational details – was defined by sectoral or theme-specific entities. These were mostly 
ministerial departments with sectoral or thematic remits and occasionally organisations from 
outside or at the margins of the public sector.10 For agricultural development cooperation 
projects in Africa alone, the number of participants was estimated to be above 20 different 
entities (Cabral & Shankland, 2013). Although, in most cases, ABC administered these projects, 
the agency was not at the centre of decision-making despite its formal coordination mandate. 
Furthermore, on some occasions the implementing entities established direct connections 
with recipient countries’ governments and managed the programmes outside the institutional 
framework of ABC (I. Leite et al., 2014). The decision-making process hence spread beyond the 
remit of ABC and indeed the domain of foreign policy that formally oversaw cooperation.  
Another characteristic of Brazilian cooperation was that it offered assistance, in the form of 
knowledge and technology, based on Brazil’s own experiences. Implementing actors drew 
                                                          
10 The professional education and vocational training company SENAI, analysed by Leite (2013), is an example of a hybrid state-
backed private provider in Brazilian cooperation. 
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directly on their work at home (whether on policy design, research or training) and shared this 
with their counterparts in partner countries. For agriculture specifically, what the diverse 
participating entities delivered was far from a unified package but a menu of policies and 
practices originating from distinct and not wholly consensual trajectories of Brazilian 
agriculture. Expertise inspired in the agricultural modernisation of the Brazilian Cerrado 
contrasted with policy recipes concerning state support to the family farming sector (cf. 
Chapter 3). Adaptive research on Brazil’s modern crop varieties contrasted with the promotion 
of agro-ecological farming techniques or native seed conservation. These contrasts and their 
inherent tensions reflected agricultural politics in Brazil that inevitably travelled alongside the 
knowledge and technology provided by Brazilian actors.  To fully appreciate what was on offer, 
I asked questions about the origins of the policies and practices on the menu and the baggage 
of intervening actors. I therefore focused on the context of Brazil’s agricultural policy, its 
history and the actors’ position in that history. 
A third relevant aspect concerned a degree of ambiguity with regards to the scope of 
development cooperation. The narrative on Brazil’s SSC emphasised solidarity, but it also 
talked about mutual benefit (ABC, 2011a; Abreu, 2013a; Amorim, 2010). President Lula praised 
the altruistic sharing of Brazilian institutions’ expertise with their African counterparts, while 
being an effective broker of Brazilian business interests in Africa. This questions how far 
cooperation extended beyond in-kind technical assistance and the extent it overlapped with 
business promotion and, besides aiming to transfer a particular form of knowledge or policy 
template, what other agendas, ideas and interests shaped cooperation policy and practice. 
One thing looked certain – a standard institutional map would not do justice to the complexity 
of the field I was about to investigate. Inside my map of three intersecting bubbles, I started 
noting the names of government ministries and departments, multi-stakeholder policy 
councils, civil society organisations and movements, private companies, politicians, academics 
and influential individuals (Figure 1). Some of these were directly involved in agricultural 
cooperation or business pursuits in Mozambique. Some were not, but they had a stake in one 
or more of the policy areas I had identified as key and they were names widely talked about. 
There were, among many others: Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula’s foreign policy architect who 
pushed the diplomatic agenda towards the South; Roberto Rodrigues and Kátia Abreu, two 
leading names of the agribusiness lobby in Brazil; Instituto Lula, the think tank through which 
Lula sustained its diplomatic activism across Africa; Fátima Mello, a vocal activist engaging with 
a growing civil society network mobilising against the penetration of corporate interests in 
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governmental cooperation; and Vale, the mining company that had just established in 
Mozambique its largest overseas investment. 
Figure 1. Who is who in Brazilian agricultural cooperation? 
 
 
In my mind, I started picturing arrows connecting these names. They were related on the basis 
of a range of different factors: their institutional affiliation and whether they were part of the 
state, civil society or the private sector; their involvement in some form of initiative in 
Mozambique (either technical cooperation, research, business, diplomacy or advocacy); their 
ideological or party allegiances; their connection to particular agricultural policy networks; and 
so on. The priests, technicians and traders framing would, in fact, be a form of establishing 
connections and identifying affinities across the multiple actors, as I will discuss later. 
In the following section, I discuss a range of concepts and debates regarding the policymaking 
process and derive my own framework for the analysis of the complex politics of Brazilian 
cooperation. This is an integrative framework building on various theoretical propositions 
(Section 2.2). I then describe my research methodology and conclude with some reflections on 
my research journey and positionality (Section 2.3). 
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2.1. Conceptualisations of the policy process 
2.1.1 Conceptual remarks on studying the policy process 
Policy analysis can focus on a range of aspects. Emphasis may be put on the technical content 
of policies, on the outcomes and impact of policy, on information used for policymaking, on 
advocacy activities or on the decision-making process.11 Gordon, Lewis and Young (1997) 
suggest a continuum of analytical types from analyses of policy or analyses for policy. The first 
category comprises mainly studies concerned with the how policy develops, why, when and 
for whom. Analyses for policy include those research or knowledge-related activities that are 
part of the policy generation process itself, by supplying evidence, assessing results or 
mobilising ideas and interests through advocacy. Whereas the first tends to be reflective, the 
latter tends to be prescriptive. My research is located within the first category of policy 
analysis in that it is primarily concerned with understanding the mechanics of policy formation. 
Therefore, my research does not ask what models or practices of agricultural cooperation are 
more effective or beneficial for Mozambique’s development, but aims at understanding the 
processes, whereby the various models and practices have been generated as well as the 
arguments about the relative superiority of one vis-à-vis the other. Yet, the idea of a 
continuum rightly suggests the difficulty of separating the two broad types of analytical 
orientation. The analysis of policy is never a neutral act and can ultimately be related, either 
consciously or unconsciously, to a statement of political positioning, as I will further discuss in 
Section 2.2 with regards to my positionality. 
Another remark worth making is that the notion ‘policy process’ should not be equated to an 
orderly and bureaucratised protocol of decision-making that would only very narrowly convey 
the ways in which policies emerge (or remain concealed). Hill and Ham (1997) argue that 
policymaking is not simply about a single and concrete course of action, such a legislative act, 
but often about a set of interrelated decisions or occurrences, where linkages may not always 
be immediately obvious and where a predictable sequence will hardly be in place. It can also 
be about more elusive manifestations of power, such as an articulated point of view or even 
inaction, such as resistance to change or the removal of certain topics or actors from the policy 
debate (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). Nowadays, policymaking is widely perceived as a 
multidimensional phenomenon and the view of a linear and sequential policy process is 
conventionally regarded as dated, although the deterministic rationale underlying such view 
remains influential (Fischer, 2003b). 
                                                          
11 Hill and Ham (1997), for example, distinguish seven different varieties of policy analysis: studies of policy content, studies of the 
policy process, studies of policy outputs, evaluation studies, information for policymaking, process advocacy and policy advocacy. 
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My third remark concerns the scope of my notion of policy. Policy typically refers to the realm 
of the state and the term is often used as shorthand for ‘public policy’. Taking policy as 
manifestations pertaining exclusively to state institutions defined by a particular context (such 
as legislative, executive and judicial bodies and the systems and structures associated with 
them) is, however, unsatisfactory, given the boundaries of the state are often far from settled. 
Contestation about state legitimacy and roles of the state, manifestations of citizenship and 
the growing scope for civil society participation in policy suggest the sphere of public action 
has no clear borderlines.  A sufficiently malleable notion of ‘public policy’ is therefore required 
to reflect the dynamic nature of state-citizen-society or public-private interaction.  
The public policy process my research is concerned with is indeed a contested and constructed 
site that, despite being related to the state, cannot be reduced to concrete (time or space-
bounded) manifestations of statehood, as the notion of statehood is, itself, being constantly 
redefined. The political character of public policy – where political is used borrowing Mouffe’s 
notion of ‘space of power, conflict and antagonism’ (2005, p. 9) – emerges hence as a central 
feature of the policy process of interest to my research. 
This notion of public policy process may be somewhat elusive but it is fundamental to 
approach the subject of research, an elusive matter in its own right. For example, Brazil’s has 
rather fluid public-private and state-society interfaces, both at the level of economic relations 
and governance. At the level of economic relations, Brazil’s ‘visible hand’ of state-capitalism 
blends the powers of the state (picking winners and promoting growth) with the powers of 
capitalism (listing state-owned companies in the stock market and embracing globalisation) 
(The Economist, 2012). At the governance level, democratic Brazil has witnessed the 
emergence of a particular dynamic of state interaction with social groups and movements – 
such as forms of ‘institutional hosting’ of social movements by the government apparatus 
(Houtzager, 2000) – that has intensified since the arrival of the PT in power in 2003 (Cornwall, 
Romano, & Shankland, 2008). 
Furthermore, a broad notion of the public character of policy is also required in the light of the 
degree of maturity of Brazilian development cooperation. This is not yet a fully 
institutionalised policy domain in Brazilian politics, with a regulatory framework, a publicly 
stated policy orientation, a clear scope or indeed an identifiable constituency. It may never 
reach that state of being a recognisable policy domain as far as bureaucratic structures and 
systems are concerned, but this does not mean there are no development cooperation policy 
manifestations at play. There is certainly an ensemble of decisions (including inertia vis-à-vis 
regulatory and policy gaps), articulation of viewpoints, debates and occurrences that make 
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what we may call the Brazilian development cooperation policy process. Such manifestations 
occur both at the level of geopolitics (for example, in decisions around partner country 
selection and in how Brazil relates to the international aid effectiveness debate), at the level of 
national policymaking (for example, budgetary allocations to promote Brazilian cooperation, 
assignment of roles across Brazilian institutions as cooperation actors) and at the micro level of 
cooperation activities and interactions in the field.  
It is with such a broad view of the public policy process that I embark on a review of 
theoretical frameworks and concepts for analysing how such process operates, drawing on a 
selection of theories that emphasise the workings of policy networks, advocacy coalitions and 
discourse coalitions in shaping policy, as well as the hegemonic struggles in discourse 
formation and domination. The roles of actors, interests and discourse in framing policymaking 
are highlighted. 
2.1.2 Policy networks 
For the reasons presented above, thinking in terms of the institutional setting of formally 
established roles and policy spaces is insufficient to represent the ways in which the multitude 
of Brazilian actors operate, relate to one another and shape agricultural cooperation, an area 
found at the juncture of at least three distinct policy arenas. As argued by John (1998, p. 65), 
institutions may help us understand how the choices of decision-makers are constrained but 
they are less useful in explaining how those preferences are shaped in the first place, as they 
neglect the broader political and social context that influences the ways in which institutions 
operate. 
Compared to institutional interpretations of the policy process – centred on the influence of 
bureaucrats, the executive, or legislators12 – an expanded view on how policy actors shape 
decision-making and policy change is proposed by a family of perspectives emphasising the 
significance of relationships between actors – from inside and outside the formal structures of 
governance and power – forming networks of influence in particular policy areas or 
subsystems. These policy network perspectives highlight the informality and fluidity of 
decision-making (John, 1998) and take the focus beyond rules, mandates and formal policy 
spaces and beyond state-centred or society-centred accounts (Keeley & Scoones, 2003). They 
also emphasise the influence of groups of actors within specific policy areas or subsystems – 
                                                          
12 John (1998, pp. 38-65) offers a review of institutional approaches to policymaking emphasising the roles played by political 
organisations, laws and rules that affect the distribution of power and constrain the ways decision-makers behave. 
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indeed, the early key concept in the North American literature was that of ‘sub-governments’ 
that paralleled formal governance structures, as discussed by Jordan (1990). 
Policy networks come in various shapes and sizes, and scholars have formulated distinct ideal 
types based on, for example, the number of participants in the network, the distribution of 
power and stability of the network. The term ‘iron triangles’ was commonly used in the 1970s 
to describe policy networks in the USA involving a relatively small number of participants 
composed of three types of actor: interest groups in the private domain, executive agencies or 
public bureaus and congressional committees (John, 1998). These iron triangles were found 
across a number of policy areas or subsystems, including agriculture. They were relatively 
stable networks of influence where power was disaggregated across its participants but 
consensus prevailed (Jordan, 1981).13 The seminal work by Heclo (1978) on policy networks in 
the USA also challenged this perspective on stable and confined triangles of power, however. 
He argued that the increasing fragmentation of US politics since the 1970s led to the 
emergence of wider and fragmented ‘issue networks’ composed of loose, open and shifting 
constellations of actors. Heclo’s work highlights the absence of authoritative decision-makers 
in a context of increasingly complex policymaking where demands on the state expanded, 
issues became more specialised and inter-related, and the range of influential players 
(including lobbies, experts and analysts) became wider. Building on this early work, Jordan 
(1981) describes iron triangles and issue networks in the UK and USA and argues that in any 
one political system, a combination of network types can co-exist for different policy 
subsystems.  
The British literature on policy networks further expands the analysis by thinking through a 
typology of networks based on a range of attributes found across policy areas, including the 
distribution of power, resources and the basis for consensus (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). A key 
contribution is the concept of ‘policy community’ that highlights the idea of consensus formed 
on the basis of a shared belief system within the network. The UK agricultural policy network, 
discussed by Smith (1992), is described as a closed community dominated by two actors (the 
sectoral ministry and farmers union) who share a belief in state intervention in agricultural 
policy. This policy community is also underpinned by a set of institutional structures that 
exclude groups and issues from the policy agenda that would challenge the dominant belief 
system. 
                                                          
13 That power is disaggregated across participants in the triangle rather than being centralised by the state is one of the key 
differences between iron triangles and corporatism, a form of group perspective on policymaking. In the latter, there is a hierarchy 
of power and state agencies have the monopoly of power in policy areas represented by the private sector and trade unions 
(Jordan, 1981). 
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Brazil’s agricultural policy setting could be framed in terms of policy networks. The subsystem 
focused on agribusiness could be regarded as an iron triangle of relatively stable actors, 
comprising the Ministry of Agriculture, the agribusiness lobby in Congress (known as bancada 
ruralista) and farmers’ representative bodies, particularly the National Agricultural 
Confederation (CNA). The concepts of issue networks and policy communities seem, on the 
other hand, more applicable to the family farming policy subsystem, overseen by MDA, and 
populated by a myriad of state (most notably the Ministry of Social Development), social 
movements, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and peasant farmers’ representatives, 
bound together by a shared narrative of family farming and a certain view of the role of the 
state in agriculture. I will discuss the context of agricultural policy in Brazil further in Chapter 3. 
Policy network perspectives have been criticized for failing to provide an explanatory model of 
policy change and being instead descriptive of relationships in politics: ‘the concept is hard to 
use as the foundation for an explanation unless the investigator incorporates other factors, 
such as interests, ideas and institutions which determine how networks function’ (John, 1998, 
p. 85). It is therefore the attributes of components within the network (such as actors’ beliefs, 
distribution of resources and power) rather than the network per se that have the explanatory 
power. 
Highlighting some of the key explanatory variables in network analysis, Howlett and Ramesh 
(1998) suggest the distinction between interest-driven policy networks and knowledge-driven 
policy communities:  
[t]he main advantage of distinguishing between policy networks and policy 
communities lies in the manner in which it integrates the analysis of two different sets 
of motivations guiding the actions of those involved in policy formulation: knowledge 
(or expertise) and interests (p. 469). 
 
The Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF), developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) to 
interpret environmental and energy policymaking in the US context, could be regarded as a 
conceptualisation of knowledge-driven networks and is the perspective I now turn to before 
introducing an alternative framing that puts the emphasis on the politics of knowledge and 
discourse interplay. 
2.1.3 Advocacy and discourse coalitions 
Besides expanding on the policy community perspective and extending the range of 
participants in the policy process further (to include also researchers, intellectuals, journalists, 
among others), the work by Sabatier and colleagues on advocacy coalitions is relevant for its 
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focus on the role of expert knowledge and scientific debate in shaping policy. The intimate 
relation between knowledge and discourse, drawing on Foucault’s thinking (Foucault & 
Gordon, 1980), makes ACF a key reference for my discourse analysis of Brazilian cooperation, 
particularly when ACF is contrasted with other conceptual understandings of knowledge 
formation, such as Hajer’s competing Discourse Coalitions Approach (1993, 1997). This section 
therefore puts the focus on the issues of knowledge, discourse and knowledge/discourse-
based interplay between actors and actor-networks in the policy process. 
The ACF sets out three ‘foundation stones’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Two of these derive 
directly from policy network thinking and focus on policy subsystems as the locus of 
policymaking, and the idea that the multiplicity of relevant policy actors aggregates around 
collectives, designated ‘advocacy coalitions’. A third element concerns a micro-level model of 
the individual that builds normative beliefs into human behaviour.14 The advocacy coalition is 
the framework’s key political actor, made up of individuals brought together by shared beliefs. 
Knowledge plays a central role in the framework. Policymaking is seen as increasingly complex, 
specialised and mobilising a range of participants. Rather than institutions or large players such 
as those in ‘iron triangles’, the emphasis is on individuals holding particular beliefs and on their 
motivations to see them translated into policy. Yet, it is the researcher that is singled out 
because of her knowledge endowments and capacity to influence and facilitate learning: 
[b]ecause the ACF assumes that scientific and technical information plays an important 
role in modifying the beliefs of policy participants, it correspondingly assumes that 
researchers (university scientists, policy analysts, consultants, etc.) are among the 
central players in the policy process. (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 192) 
 
The policy process is then seen as a struggle between coalitions that ‘involves negotiations 
among specialists’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193). Negotiated agreements between 
competition advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem can drive policy change.15 
The ACF focuses heavily on the interaction between policy elites and has had little application 
beyond the world of science, expert knowledge, and formal legal authority (the latter seen as a 
major resource for a coalition). Social movements or civil society activists and advocates are 
                                                          
14 ACF proposes a three-tier belief system. A deep core of fundamental normative beliefs defines a person’s political philosophy 
and comprises, for example, ontological assumptions about human nature, the role of state versus market at a general level or 
perspectives on participation in government policy. Policy core beliefs are linked to particular policy subsystems but draw directly 
on the deep core beliefs; they reflect the translation of the person’s political philosophy into a particular policy issue. Secondary 
beliefs comprise positions on rules or procedures related to implementation of a specific policy issue. These beliefs are claimed to 
be a priori defined and hence empirically verifiable (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
15 Policy change in the ACF can also result from: external shocks to the policy subsystem (such as socioeconomic conditions, 
regime change, outputs from other subsystems or disasters); internal shocks within the subsystem (that changes the resources of 
the coalition for example); and changes in policy beliefs, referred as policy-oriented learning. 
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never mentioned. Yet, there have been several extensions to the framework and one worth 
highlighting establishes a parallelism between ACF and social movement theory (Kübler, 2001). 
The purpose of this particular theoretical association was not to study advocacy coalitions 
within or across social movements, but rather to fill some gaps in the ACF formulation and 
apply the adjusted model to the analysis of Swiss drug policy. For my own purposes, Kübler’s 
framing is an illustration of possible applications of an advocacy coalition perspective to 
patterns of social mobilisation around policy. 
Kübler (2001) notes that social movement research, much in the same way as ACF, seeks to 
provide an answer for social change focusing on the agency of collective actors and without 
assuming that formal organisations and institutions play a central role. It also emphasises 
collective processes of interpretation and the importance that ideas, beliefs and cultural 
elements play in individual mobilisation and group coalescence. However, it adds two 
dimensions that the author argues are useful complements to ACF.16 These are taken from the 
synthesis of social movement theory by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), and are: the 
mobilising structure and the political opportunity structure. The mobilising structure concerns 
the informal and formal means of social organisation available to insurgents, which explain the 
emergence and persistence of a coalition. Collective settings, where social networks and forms 
or social organisation exist, encourage mobilisation. For example, these collective forms 
usually provide resources (such as leadership, knowledge or communication technologies) for 
turning convictions into political action. The political opportunity structure refers to the 
opportunities and constraints that the institutional and macro-political context presents to 
social movements in their collective mobilisation, such as the degree of decentralisation, the 
level of fragmentation of the political system or the formalisation of access to policymaking. 
In Brazil, the process of re-democratisation unfolding since the end of the military dictatorship 
has witnessed the proliferation of civil society organisations and networks and a new dynamic 
in the interaction between the state and society, such as forms of ‘institutional hosting’ of 
social movements by the government apparatus (Houtzager, 2000).17 National Conferences 
and Councils on public policy are examples of this process of increasing engagement of civil 
society actors in the policy process and hence an enlarged political opportunity structure, 
particularly since 2003 (Cornwall et al., 2008). For the policy subsystems of relevance to my 
                                                          
16 Kübler argues that ACF has an insufficiently developed theorisation on the context where coalitions operate and this makes it ill 
suited for analyses outside the world of US politics. This is a criticism acknowledged and addressed somewhat by the ACF 
proponents (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
17 Houtzager (2000) defines institutional hosting as those ‘instances where elites go beyond the role of movement allies and in 
effect organise new actors and thereby seek to remake the political cleavages and re-orient political contestation’ (p. 63). 
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study it is worth mentioning the national councils for rural development and family farming 
and for food security, CONDRAF and CONSEA, respectively, that were strengthened in the 
post-200318; and as I will later discuss, the internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture and 
agricultural cooperation have been on these councils’ agendas. Furthermore, and with regards 
particularly to foreign policy, there has been a recent push from civil society actors for the 
creation of a dedicated council to put an end to the insulation of policymaking from society 
concerning international affairs and cooperation specifically (Mello, 2012). Civil society 
organisations, social movements and activists have therefore become increasingly mobilised in 
the fields of foreign policy and development cooperation and are hence key players to 
consider across policy networks and in the formation of ideas and mediation of knowledge 
about cooperation. 
On the issue of knowledge specifically, and returning to the ACF, the framework has been 
criticised for its theorisation of knowledge. Its assumption that policymaking participants need 
to be highly specialised to be able to influence policy within a particular subsystem ignores the 
political nature of knowledge (Fischer, 2003a). As argued by Edelman (1985) in his analysis of 
political language, the deployment of technical and specialised language is used to reinforce 
established social inequalities, minimising public attention and maximising bargaining among 
insiders. Furthermore, the ACF’s idea that the scientific debate can bring about consensus on 
policy matters as long as political aspects can be avoided contrasts with the view that 
knowledge is socially constructed and scientific debates are themselves intermingled with 
political debates and ideological positions (Fischer, 2003a). 
Hajer’s Discourse Coalitions Approach proposes a different take on coalitions, based on a 
contrasting epistemological perspective on knowledge in policymaking processes.19 Taking the 
case of the acid rain controversy in Britain in the 1970s and 80s,20 he develops a discourse-
analytical framework that has discourse coalitions as the key policy actor in shaping policy 
(Hajer, 1993, 1997). Policy change is driven by the argumentative struggles between rival 
discourse coalitions that seek to frame problems and solutions in particular ways. 
Hajer’s discourse coalitions are quite distinct from Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions in that they 
emerge on the basis of common discourse and without having to coordinate their actions or 
                                                          
18 CONDRAF is the National Council for Rural Development and Family Farming and CONSEA is the National Council for Food 
Security. They are multi-stakeholder policy fora that institutionalised the participation of civil society actors in the public policy 
processes for their respective thematic areas. 
19 Fischer (2003a) discusses the difference between advocacy and discourse coalitions in detail and uses Hajer’s framework as a 
counterpoint to the ACF. 
20 The acid rain controversy concerned a dispute emerging in the early 1970s on whether the observed acidification of fresh water 
lakes in Sweden was caused by sulphur dioxide emissions from Europe and coal-fired power stations in Britain in particular. 
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share values and beliefs. Hajer argues that individuals do not hold stable values but have 
vaguely defined and often contradictory values that do not have a straightforward translation 
into policy positions. People’s positions (their beliefs and values or, rather, how they talk about 
them) may differ significantly, depending on the policy debate or practice in which they 
engage. The interaction between coalitions is also different as, in Hajer’s formulation, there is 
no place for a neutral broker in the policy debate. Instead, argumentation is a struggle for 
signification where language is not a neutral means for conveying knowledge but can create 
new meanings and identities (Hajer, 1997). 
Discourse and narrative storylines are key concepts in Hajer’s framework. Discourse is the 
‘ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and 
social realities’ (Hajer, 1997, p. 44). Narrative storylines are the discursive translation of policy 
issues into language that people can easily recognise, reproduce and ascribe a particular 
interpretation, through the use of metaphors, analogies and clichés. They are the ‘condensed 
statements summarizing complex narratives, used by people as ‘short hand’ in discussions’ 
(Hajer, 2005, p. 302). They are, in short, the glue that holds coalitions together. The multi-
interpretability of the storyline is argued to be more important than its consistency as it gets 
its strength from providing a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding, 
regardless of whether it actually exists. 
Discourse coalitions are therefore conceived as the collection of ‘a set of story lines, the actors 
that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organized 
around a discourse’ (Hajer, 1993. p. 47). These coalitions are not defined in relation to 
individual actors but rather to the storylines that actors help reproduce in the context of 
specific practices. Hajer’s study on the acid rain controversy in Britain between the ‘ecological 
modernization’ and the ‘traditional pragmatism’ coalitions illustrates that at times, the same 
individual actor may have expressed contradictory discursive positions and helped reproduce 
different discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1997).21 
                                                          
21 In Hajer’s analysis, whereas the ‘ecological modernization’ discourse was about taking an encompassing view on the 
environment and seeking integrated approaches to environmental problems, the ‘traditional pragmatism’ saw the environment as 
subordinate sectoral concern. The former viewed acid rain as an environmental threat facing the industrial world, was sceptical 
about inconclusive scientific evidence available, and emphasised the risks of environmental mismanagement. The latter viewed it 
as a pollution incident that should be addressed by pragmatic fixes based on scientific evidence that measured the costs and 
benefits of interventions. Although the ‘ecological modernization’ discourse was mostly associated with the UK Environment 
Committee and environmentalist NGOs, it was at times reproduced by less obvious actors, including those typically adherent to 
the rival discourse, such as industrialists concerned with the cost implications of remedial solutions and becoming attracted to the 
idea of integrating environmental concerns into industry restructuring (Hajer, 1997). This happened because discursive interplay 
led actors to reconsider their interests and reframe their arguments. 
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According to the framework, a discourse coalition dominates the policy space if it dominates 
the discursive space – i.e. ‘central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical 
power of a new discourse’ – and the ideas associated with the discourse are reflected in the 
institutional practices of the particular policy domain (Hajer, 1993, p. 48).22 
For my Brazilian cooperation analysis, and on the basis of this perspective, I set out to ask 
questions about relevant actor coalitions, about discernible argumentative disputes and about 
dominant discourse and narrative storylines used in the debate. I also wanted to investigate 
whether actors’ positioning coalesced around shared beliefs (advocacy coalitions) or around 
common discourse (discourse coalitions) and, indeed, whether these two perspectives were 
mutually exclusive. Yet, Hajer’s approach needed to be complemented with a broader 
perspective of power in discourse that allowed me to better situate the narrative storylines 
deployed by actors. 
2.1.4 Hegemony, social antagonism and power in discourse  
The Discourse Coalitions Approach puts the emphasis on argumentative interplay as the locus 
of discursive production, which occurs when disputes over a particular policy issue emerge in 
the public realm. The focus is on the ‘practices of ‘micro-power’’ in rhetorical interplay, as 
illustrated by the acid rain debate and the argumentative clash that surfaced in parliamentary 
hearings, committee reports and other spoken and written statements produced on the topic 
(Hajer, 1997, 2005). The Brazil case, however, makes me want to question what happens when 
discursive fractures and competing storylines remain concealed and do not materialise into 
the public domain. As argued by Lukes, ‘power is at its most effective when least observable’ 
(2005, p. 1). In Chapter 3, I will highlight fractures in debates on dualism, and within the 
notions of agribusiness and family farming specifically, as an illustration of the hidden 
dimension of politics. A broader consideration of power politics in discourse interplay is also 
required to understand how Brazilian development cooperation, a nascent policy domain, is 
being constructed. Practices, allegiances and argumentation on Brazilian development 
cooperation are still in the making – and hence the sites of discursive confrontation, or 
‘argumentative interplay’, may not yet be explicit.  
Political discourse theory offers a complementary perspective for analysing discourse 
formation that puts the focus on wider power relations in society (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; 
                                                          
22 In the acid rain case, the ‘ecological modernization’ coalition came to influence the debate in Britain from the 1990s, changing 
the ways environmental problems were perceived and environmental policymaking operated (Hajer, 1997). 
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Torfing, 1999; Torfing & Howarth, 2005). 23 Although the Discourse Coalitions Framework has 
much in common with this perspective (Hajer, 2005; Torfing & Howarth, 2005), political 
discourse theory brings out a broader socio-political dimension to explain the formation and 
domination of discourse. 
Hence, the distinction I wish to emphasise between Hajer’s framework and discourse theory 
concerns the level of conceptualisation of power in discourse production, noting the common 
understanding of discourse, however. The concept to highlight is that of ‘hegemonic struggles’ 
that ‘aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of 
meaning and identity’ (Torfing, 2005, p. 15). This concept draws on work by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe (Laclau, 1989; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2005), in turn derived from the 
concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘discourse’ developed by Gramsci, Foucault and Derrida (Torfing, 
1999). Discourse construction, or the ‘articulation of meaning’, is regarded as a political 
process that reflects struggles for domination between conflicting stances or ideologies in 
society. Each side of the struggle puts forward a point of view that suppresses the other. This 
process is referred to as ‘social antagonism’ (Torfing, 2005) or ‘logic of hegemony’ (Howarth, 
2005). Politics is the struggle over what and who is included and excluded from hegemonic 
discourses. 
Social antagonism does not equate to class struggles in the classical Marxist sense, as 
discussed by John (1998, pp. 93-100). Political discourse theory proposes a revision of the 
Marxist premise that social classes have a pre-given class identity and interests, defined by 
where they are located within the capitalist system. It puts the emphasis on the discursive 
character of class and class struggles, by regarding class identity as the result of the 
‘hegemonization (…) of discursive positions’ rather than an embodiment of pre-given interests 
(Torfing, 1999, p. 42).24 
Power is an implicit concept in this theoretical framing and is considered in a broad 
poststructuralist sense, based on Foucault’s conceptualisation and therefore tightly linked to 
discourse. Power is not about what people possess and exercise over others, as in Lukes’ 
conceptualisation25, but about ‘that which produces the social’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 
                                                          
23 Differences between contrasting discourse analytical theories and frameworks are discussed by Glynos, Howarth, Norval, & 
Speed (2009) and by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002). Detailed reviews of political discourse theory and its concepts and propositions 
are provided by Glynos, Howarth, Norval, & Speed (2009), Torfing & Howarth (2005), Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) and Torfing 
(1999). 
24 Torfing (1999) concedes, however, that class struggles may continue playing a role in the distribution of resources in society, but 
argues they have less of a role in providing a primary explanation for the political struggle. I presume political is meant here in the 
immaterial sense of ideological, linked to political identity. 
25 Lukes (2005) proposes a three-dimensional view of power, comprising: (i) overt power of A over B; (i) hidden power, and (iii) 
invisible power or false consciousness, where people do not realise they are being manipulated by the powerful. 
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37). Hence rather than emphasising the agency of actors and the power struggles of social 
classes, the emphasis is put on how actors, social structures and power are constituted 
through discourse. 
Hegemonic discourse is dislocated when ‘confronted by new events that it cannot explain, 
represent, or in other ways domesticate’ (Torfing, 2005, p. 16). 26 ‘Floating signifiers’, i.e. 
concepts or ideas that can be granted different interpretations, proliferate during dislocation 
and before the new hegemonic discursive order is established and meaning becomes 
temporarily fixed again. 
By drawing on political discourse theory my aim was therefore to make space for a 
conceptualisation of discourse politics dynamics at a broader scale, where long-standing 
ideological and class-based hegemonic struggles (even if discursively constituted rather that 
pre-determined in a Marxist sense) play a role and help to see through more confined 
argumentative interplay, which can itself be regarded as discursively constructed. This is 
relevant for the study of Brazilian agricultural cooperation where, as will become clearer as I 
develop this thesis, some argumentative interplay – such as the family farming-versus-
agribusiness dualism – is often taken for granted as an undisputable feature of the political 
economy (Pierri, 2013; Zanella & Milhorance, 2016) rather than problematised as a social 
construct, both instrumentally used by actors but also constitutive of the actors reproducing it. 
2.2. An integrative ‘discourse-politics’ framework 
The section above laid out the core theoretical concepts that will guide my analysis of Brazil’s 
agricultural cooperation policy process. I discussed the informality of processes and 
juxtaposition of roles and remits that muddled the institutional setting, and actors operating 
through networks and moved either by interests, beliefs or discourse. I emphasised discourse 
and how it is used to pursue certain pre-determined interests and beliefs, but also how it 
constructs those interests, beliefs and the actors that hold them. Discursive interplay may be 
power in action, but power struggles may also remain concealed by discourse articulations. 
Overall, my guiding framework brings together elements from different theoretical 
understandings of the politics of policy. It is therefore an integrative or synthesis framework 
that echoes the approach followed by many scholars across subject areas (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993; John, 1998; Keeley & Scoones, 1999, 2003; Scoones, 1999) and is particularly 
                                                          
26 Hajer’s analysis described the adherence to the ‘ecological modernization’ discourse by actors previously supportive of 
‘traditional pragmatism’ in the face of the permeation of a narrative on environment mainstreaming in society. 
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fitting for the inherently multidisciplinary field of Development Studies where this research is 
situated and for Brazil’s development cooperation case, as this thesis will illustrate.  
The need for integrative frameworks has been justified on the basis of failure of single 
approaches to offer more than partial accounts on the complex and multidimensional 
character of the policy process (John, 1998). Keeley and Scoones (2003, 1999), for example, 
drawing on a detailed literature review on the policy process, highlight the continuous 
interplay of discourse, interests and the agency of multiple actors and actor-networks, all of 
which are relevant to my enquiry. Their synthesis framework leads to questions about who is 
involved and how they are connected, what the underlying power dynamics are, what 
narratives are deployed and how they are framed through science and research. More than a 
paradigm, this synthesis perspective offers a menu of the relevant issues and questions that 
can be asked about policymaking (Wolmer et al., 2006).  
Yet, because they draw on contributions from a range of disciplines and, sometimes, divergent 
ontological premises, integrative frameworks often have their theoretical coherence 
questioned. John (1998) warns of the danger of producing an ‘unreflective amalgam of 
different approaches’ that combines conflicting assumption and results on ‘an ‘over-
determined’ set of explanations’ (p. 168). This criticism can be addressed, he suggests, by 
distinguishing between constraints on action and causes of action.27  
Certainly, not all concepts and propositions are valid at the same time and for the same 
analytical purpose. Policy processes are sometimes better interpreted from one perspective, 
whereas other times such a perspective is insufficient and another becomes more 
enlightening. My emphasis on discourse is not meant to reduce all Brazilian cooperation 
policymaking to intangible articulation – although I will make the case that narrative storylines 
and their symbolic and performative character are central to Brazilian cooperation and its 
framing of South-South solidarity and transferrable successes. Besides the significance of 
discourse, Brazilian cooperation is also shaped by existing institutions (such as those 
concerning international relations or agricultural policymaking) that set boundaries for action. 
Furthermore, concrete interests – such as enlarging the size and influence of the bureau, 
pursuing business deals, or seeking personal enrichment – prompt actors into action; indeed, 
the importance of political and commercial drivers in leading Brazilian actors into Africa can 
hardly be denied (cf. Chapter 4). However, in daily practice, actors encounter new actors, ideas 
and interests. Networks and policy spaces change. They get larger or narrower and become 
                                                          
27 His argument is that institutions, socio-economic structures, interest groups and networks work as limits to agency. Individual 
actors are the drivers of change and ideas give them purposes and means to express their interests (John, 1998). 
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subject to other influences. New ideas affect the perception of interests and construct new 
interests. Social identities and class struggles also get reinterpreted. 
Overall, there is a three-dimensional realm that my conceptual framework seeks to capture: (i) 
the realm of tangible structures, actors, networks and interests from across policy subsystems; 
(ii) the immaterial field of discourse and argumentation; and (iii) the realm of underlying 
societal struggles that are often concealed in the policy debate and political discourse theory 
helps to unveil. 
By calling it a ‘discourse-politics’ framework, I want to signal first my primary focus on 
discourse and the framing of reality through discourse. Yet, I connect it to the world of politics 
that is often framed in more essentialist terms of pre-given and stable identities, ideologies, 
values and interests. The iteration between these two ontologies was a constant source of 
interrogation throughout my research. 
2.3. Research methodology 
2.3.1 Research components and questions 
On the basis of the conceptual framework outlined above, I identified three components that 
would help me operationalise my research and answer my overarching question on how 
Brazilian domestic politics impinged on cooperation policy and practices abroad.  
The first component concerned mapping the actors, structures (such as policies, projects and 
institutional roles) and practices across the policy areas of relevance to the study of 
agricultural development cooperation: development cooperation, agriculture and Brazil-Africa 
relations.28 This entailed identifying ‘who was who’, but also analysing how they fit in the 
historical trajectories of Brazilian cooperation, foreign affairs and agricultural policy, so as to 
understand where they came from and what baggage (in terms of interests, allegiances, 
beliefs) they carried into cooperation practices. Chapters 3 and 4 will provide an analysis of the 
actors, policies, historical trajectories and underlying struggles in relation to Brazilian 
agriculture and agricultural cooperation in Mozambique, respectively. 
The second component was about the constructed meaning of agricultural development 
cooperation towards Africa and, specifically, identifying competing narrative storylines in 
relation to: (i) Brazil’s agricultural models and experiences on offer to Africa (and Mozambique 
specifically); (ii) the suitability of these models and experiences to local challenges and needs; 
                                                          
28 Development cooperation may be seen as a subset of foreign policy but, as suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the 
sectoralisation of development cooperation is extending this subsystem beyond what was traditionally territory overseen by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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and (iii) the transfer and adaptation of Brazilian models to the Mozambican through 
development cooperation. Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss these in detail for the two case studies 
and identify patterns of change over time and space – how they travelled between Brazil and 
Mozambique. 
The third component entailed clustering narrative storylines and actors’ positions, identifying 
alliances, networks or coalitions, and analysing the basis of their formation and the different 
roles played by interests, beliefs and discourse. Chapter 7 will provide this analysis. 
The following subsidiary questions guided my enquiry across the three components: 
 Who are the relevant actors, what roles do they play and what interests do they 
pursue? 
 What institutional practices bring these actors together, or set them apart? 
 How is development cooperation and agricultural development policy discursively 
framed by the actors, or what narratives are discernible? 
 How do these narratives travel between Brazil and Mozambique? 
 How do actors come together around narratives of cooperation? 
 What makes certain narratives dominate at particular points in time? 
 What are the hegemonic forces at play and what are the underlying social battles? 
2.3.2 Case study selection 
As discussed in Chapter 1, I selected two cases of Brazilian agricultural cooperation in 
Mozambique as the focus of an in-depth enquiry: ProSAVANA and MFI. Previous work on 
Brazil’s agricultural cooperation (Cabral & Shankland, 2013; Cabral et al., 2013) had shed light 
onto the dualistic dimension of Brazilian agriculture, where agribusiness and family farming 
modes of production seemingly confronted each other and were reflected in the institutional 
setting of agricultural governance and politics, as also discussed by Pierri (2013). This dualism 
was represented in the two programmes’ broad official narratives: ProSAVANA was set to 
replicate the agribusiness expansion in the Brazilian Cerrado and MFI derived from a family 
farming policy framework that had gained strength in Brazil since 2003. 
As I discuss in Chapter 3, dualism not only accounts for institutional setting, but also for the 
polarisation of the policy debate, reflecting competing interests and ideas on agricultural 
development within Brazilian politics. By focusing on ProSAVANA and MFI, which I 
provisionally took as symbolic representations of dualism, I could hence ask questions about 
the role of institutions, interests and discourse in the Brazilian agricultural cooperation policy 
process. In addition, I also came to question dualism itself as one particular framing of the 
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dispute. The evolution of the programmes would indeed reveal that political struggles around 
the two programmes were more complex and intertwined than suggested by the conventional 
family farming-agribusiness dualism. 
2.3.3 Research sites, respondents and data collection instruments 
Focusing on ProSAVANA and MFI, I started by considering the actors taking part in those 
programmes and the spaces where they operated, both in Brazil and in Mozambique. From 
there, I zoomed out into the broader field covered by my three policy areas to build into my 
analysis the wider processes that provided the backdrop for the two projects. I considered the 
interaction between Brazilian and Mozambican actors beyond development cooperation, 
including engagements by the private sector and civil society actors. I also considered the 
internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture in its various dimensions, including trade, 
investment and advocacy. Furthermore, I followed the relevant Brazilian policy processes from 
their domestic context to Mozambique and considered repercussions back in the domestic 
sphere. Aiming to capture these spaces and flows of influence, I carried out multi-sited and 
mixed-methods research process.  
In Brazil, I conducted fieldwork in five locations, where I interviewed key informants and 
participated at relevant events. My main interview sites were Brasília, São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro and the two additional locations for participant observation were Fortaleza and 
Goiânia. The events attended comprised: (i) the 2014 Brazil-Africa Forum, held in Fortaleza and 
focused on business opportunities and diplomatic relations between Brazil and African 
countries; (ii) the 52nd Conference of the Brazilian Society for Rural Economy, Administration 
and Sociology (SOBER), in Goiânia, where a number of studies on Brazilian agricultural policy 
were discussed, including policy instruments that have been included in the menu of 
cooperation, such as the Food Purchase Programme (PAA); and (iii) two events on Brazilian 
cooperation – one in Brasília organised by Embrapa and the other in Rio de Janeiro organised 
by the BRICS Policy Centre, a Brazilian think tank focused on studying BRICS.29 In the latter two 
events, I was also one of the speakers and therefore took a more active participant-
observation role, allowing me to engage with the debate and probe my own analytical 
framework. In Mozambique, my interview sites were Maputo and Nampula, the latter being a 
hub for the management of ProSAVANA.  
Following a stratified purposive sampling methodology (Patton, 2002), my selection of 
respondents was based on the relationship they bore with the three policy subsystems and the 
                                                          
29 Appendix I provides further details on these events. 
  
33 
two selected programmes. This was extended through snowball sampling of recommended 
respondents,30 and opportunistic sampling emerging from opportunities arising during 
fieldwork.31 My aim was not to produce a representative sample of the field of agricultural 
cooperation, but rather to generate diversity and contrast in viewpoints and discourse – for 
example, capturing competing storylines on Brazil’s agricultural success stories and on suitable 
models to be transferred into the African context. Although diversity was of interest, so was 
convergence, particularly for the purpose of identifying actor-networks and coalitions.  
Overall, I interviewed 105 people in Brazil and in Mozambique.32 This comprised a variety of 
social categories, including: politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, farmer union representatives, 
business people, NGO professionals, social movement activists, practitioners, researchers and 
lobbyists. More than two thirds of my respondents (75) were based in Brazil and the bulk of 
these (42) worked for governmental agencies, mostly Embrapa, MDA, MRE and ABC. 33 
I conducted a combination of individual and group interviews.34 Most were semi-structured in 
that I followed a list of pre-defined topics.35 These interviews aimed to identify narrative 
storylines on Brazilian agricultural cooperation (the second component of my research 
framework) and understand the institutional and political setting for cooperation, actors and 
their identities in Brazil and in Mozambique (first component). I also carried out several in-
depth interviews with Embrapa researchers involved in field-level cooperation practices, with 
the aim of exploring in further depth their background, their field experiences in Mozambique 
and their personal reflections of those experiences (Seidman, 1998), including what policy 
narratives these reflections reproduced. 
The bulk of my semi-structured and in-depth interviews were formal in that my respondents 
signed informed consent forms and they took place in a commonly agreed setting (typically 
the office of the person or group of people interviewed). 36 In most of my formal interviews, 
recording of the conversation was authorised. I also carried out several informal interviews on 
those occasions when I met relevant people at events and other sites or when people I 
approached for interviews preferred talking in a more casual setting. 
                                                          
30 Such as when one respondent suggested other names or offered to put me in touch with other people. 
31 Such as when I met new people at events and identified them as relevant informants. 
32 Appendix II provides the full list of respondents with details on their institutional affiliation as well as date and place of 
interview. It also includes an individual code for respondents from organisations where more than one individual was interviewed. 
33 Appendix III provides a more detailed profile of my respondents. 
34 Most of my interviews were face-to-face, although on six occasions they were conducted via Skype. 
35 A sample interview guide, with a list of topics used as guide for one of the interviews, is provided in Appendix IV. 
36 Appendix V provides the template of the informed consent form in Portuguese. 
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2.3.4 Discourse analysis as method 
In my research framework, discourse analysis is not only a family of theoretical approaches for 
the conceptualisation of policymaking, but also a methodological tool for data collection and 
analysis (Howarth, 2005; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). In fact, I first approached discourse 
analysis as a method that would allow me to cope with the paucity of evidence on actual 
cooperation practices (as it was a new domain operating through ad hoc mechanisms with 
scarce data recording) and the profusion of verbal pronouncements on intents and 
interpretations of those intents. Since I had to rely heavily on what people said about 
agricultural cooperation, I thought I would use their discursive articulations as data. Hence, my 
data collection method rested significantly on collecting from my respondents, or from sites 
where ethnographic research was conducted, narrative accounts on relevant issues concerning 
Brazilian agricultural cooperation in Mozambique. 
In addition to the primary data generated by interviews and participant observation, my 
discourse analytical method also drew on secondary sources, including published and 
unpublished documents from relevant actors, media coverage of relevant events, and images 
and photographs that conveyed certain narratives and revealed actor-networks and coalitions 
at work (this thesis includes several illustrations of these). Hence my analysis combined 
linguistic (texts) and non-linguistic data (videos, images, observed practices) as well as 
‘reactive’ (interview responses, observed practices and debates) and ‘non-reactive’ 
(documents, speeches) material (Howarth, 2005). 
My approach to discourse analysis as a method also connected two levels of discourse 
conceptualisation: the micro-level analysis of discourse articulations or language in use and the 
macro-level analysis of the context where articulations were generated.37 Micro-level analyses 
of discourse are about identifying patterns of discourse and the mechanisms of linguistic 
articulation of meaning, such as the use of metaphors (such as the ‘miracle of the Cerrado’), 
analogies (such as the Cerrado-Savannah parallel) or recurrent terms with context-specific 
framings (such as ‘family farming’). However, ‘subjectivities are constructed in and through 
text’ (Howarth, 2005: 343) and it is therefore important to consider not only the discursive 
statement (what is said), but also the act of enunciation (how it is said and with what 
intention, and what is omitted). The latter requires going beyond the text and reconstructing 
the (historical, sociological and institutional) background against which actors’ utterances can 
                                                          
37 Vivien Burr, in her book on social constructionism, refers to this distinction as one between micro social constructionism and 
macro social constructionism. The former is focused on social construction taking place in ‘everyday discourse between people in 
interaction’ (Burr, 2003, p. 18), whereas the latter sees discourse as derived from ‘material or social structures, social relations and 
institutionalised practices’ (p. 22).  
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be interpreted. Macro-level analyses of discourse set the micro-level articulations against the 
context where they are produced, by considering the institutional processes, power relations 
and historical trajectories that provide the backdrop for individual storylines. This links my 
discourse analytical method back to discourse analysis as theory. 
The coding of my data reflected the iteration between the two levels of discourse analysis: 
specific storylines on the subject matter of agricultural cooperation, on the one hand, and the 
broader setting, on the other. My coding tree hence constituted the schematic assemblage of 
issues emerging from my primary data analysis.38 It comprised both elements of actors’ 
storylines concerning agricultural cooperation and cooperation practices in Mozambique as 
well as elements characterising the broader institutional, historical and social setting.39 
2.3.5 Reflections on my research journey and positionality 
When I started this research at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), in September 2012, 
I had already completed two years of study on the subject of Brazilian cooperation. I had 
therefore an extensive understanding of the institutions, processes and language of Brazilian 
cooperation and had built a network of contacts in Brazil. I had also previously lived and 
worked in Mozambique. Development cooperation and agricultural policy and governance had 
been areas of focus, during my times as Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Fellow and 
economic adviser within the Mozambican Ministry of Planning and Finance, consultant for aid 
organisations, or as associate of the Africa-focused agricultural research platform Future 
Agricultures Consortium. It was this combination of experiences that led me to the ESRC-
funded research project, China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA), where I joined an IDS-
led team focused on the study of Brazil’s agricultural cooperation in Mozambique and three 
other African countries. From the outset, my doctoral research was therefore inserted in a 
broader research project where I worked alongside researchers from across disciplines and 
countries. Through CBAA, I benefitted from the continuous intellectual exchange with 
colleagues with expertise in areas that were central to my analysis. This interaction also helped 
me extend my network of contacts in Brazil and Mozambique further and gradually build a 
connection with some of the leading academics on the topic of Brazil in Africa. 
Although I started with these advantages, I also encountered several challenges during these 
four years of doctoral work. The first challenge was that my research subject was an ongoing 
                                                          
38 See Appendix VI. 
39 Examples of the former are: ‘Brazilian models, experiences and technology relevant to Africa’ and ‘motivations for cooperation 
with Africa’. Example of the latter are: ‘paradigms of agricultural modernisation and development’ and ‘internationalization of 
Brazilian agricultural politics and policy’. 
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and unfolding policy process. Brazilian cooperation and the two selected programmes were in 
the process of being constructed while I was doing my research. I was therefore studying a 
moving target where actors’ roles, narratives and practices were subject to a considerable 
degree of volatility. This required a constant updating and regular contact with some key 
respondents. Yet, the volatility of Brazilian cooperation would emerge as a central analytical 
issue that led me to explore the phases, twists and turns that ProSAVANA and MFI went 
through during the period of analysis. Deciding where to stop was not easy, as it was tempting 
to carry on doing additional interviews to find out about the latest developments. 
The second challenge was that, during the early stages of my research, Brazilian agricultural 
cooperation in Mozambique emerged as a controversial policy issue, resulting from the 
criticism of ProSAVANA that intensified from late 2012. This made the subject of study even 
more volatile and challenged my data collection process. Access to government documents 
and people became harder and I personally confronted several closed doors during my field 
research in Mozambique – Figure 2 illustrates with a photograph taken in Nampula when an 
interview previously agreed was cut short and I was asked to send my questions by email 
(which I then did).  
Figure 2. The closed doors of ProSAVANA 
 
Photograph taken at Provincial Directorate of Agriculture in Nampula, March 2013. 
People whom I had previously interviewed and had displayed an open and collaborative 
attitude towards my work now refrained from talking about the topic. Some agreed to talk but 
reproduced a rehearsed narrative that avoided controversial points and refused to take a 
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reflective attitude. Fortunately, either by personal disposition or interest, many agreed to 
collaborate. Yet, the controversy meant that I had to work hard to interpret attitudes, and 
read between the lines and through the narratives. I also had to expand my range of 
respondents to get a better sense of people’s attitudes, allegiances and interests. The 
controversy also meant that there was pressure to take sides in what was becoming a 
significantly polarised debate. Preserving a neutral stance was, hence, a constant challenge 
that led me to question all sides of the argumentation and reflect on the performative role of 
discourse in politics.  
The last challenge worth highlighting was about combining my research role with a more 
active involvement with the ongoing debate about Brazilian cooperation in Africa that led me, 
through the CBAA project, to write papers and opinion pieces and make presentations at 
events. This meant I had to strike a balance between taking a back seat as a researcher and 
engaging directly with the topic and a live debate. In the concluding chapter, I make some 
reflections on the future trajectory of Brazilian cooperation that is the product not only of this 
research but also of my broader connection to the topic of Brazilian cooperation and SSC as a 
practitioner in international development. 
Before talking about the past, present or future of Brazil in international development, let me 
start by placing the priests, technicians and traders of agricultural cooperation in their 
domestic setting. That is the focus of the next chapter, before I turn to their overseas 
engagements and the concrete experiences of ProSAVANA and MFI in Mozambique. 
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Chapter 3. Priests, technicians and traders at home 
When my Embrapa interviewee (introduced at the start of this thesis) categorised Brazilian 
actors in ProSAVANA as priests, technicians and traders, he was drawing on his own personal 
experience and interpretations about agricultural development from back home in Brazil. The 
triad referred to the characters of Brazil’s agricultural development history, who had been 
transported to foreign land through the channel of cooperation to replicate a similar history, 
with its presumed successes and ambitions but also inherent political struggles. 
In his view, technicians brought in knowledge on modern tropical agriculture, the same that 
had been deployed in Brazil: 
We are doing here exactly what we do in Brazil. The idea of cooperation was to bring 
[to Mozambique] principles of conservation agriculture for large-scale production, 
which is what we do in the Cerrado. (…) The idea is to bring that accumulated technical 
knowledge and share it with Mozambican technicians.40 
 
The traders who had sent the technicians expected to explore opportunities for business 
offered by Mozambican agriculture, while filling technological gaps: 
Naturally, behind that philosophy [of training local technicians and sharing knowledge] 
there are business agendas. What is expected is that technological inputs will be sold 
and these will address existing needs in Mozambique. Mozambique is a tropical 
country that needs to develop its tropical agriculture. The best country to supply 
equipment for the development of tropical agriculture is, obviously, Brazil.41 
 
Finally, priests were the caricature of those claiming to be in Africa on an altruistic mission and 
who presumably failed to have a reasonable and technically informed understanding of local 
agricultural and its development prospects. Mozambican agriculture had, from the Embrapa 
technician’s perspective, just emerged from the ‘stone age’, was incapable of producing for 
the needs of the population, and would turn into a desert without the advanced tropical 
knowledge that Embrapa could provide and that traders could help to turn into the much 
needed food, commodities and foreign exchange. 
Furthermore, the priests’ criticism towards modernity was regarded not just as an ill-informed 
attitude, but also as driven by ‘ideological’ opposition. Such opposition had its roots in Brazil’s 
domestic territory and, as put by another Embrapa respondent linked to agricultural 
                                                          
40 Interview with EMB#7. 
41 Interview with EMB#7. 
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cooperation in Mozambique, was part of a ‘battle for political space’ fought by Brazilian rural 
social movements that supported landless workers and family farming.42 
The notion that Brazilian cooperation is a site for political battles is, indeed, reflected in the 
view that the Brazilian government exported not just agricultural technology and solutions to 
Africa, but also the ‘contradictory interests’ (Instituto Humanitas Unisinos (IHU), 2013) and 
‘antagonistic models’ (CONSEA, 2013) of Brazilian agriculture. As I will illustrate through my 
case studies, these contradictions are often framed in terms of agribusiness-versus-family 
farming dualism which, in one view, is regarded as a ‘Gramscian struggle for hegemony’ 
between two ideologically opposed models of agricultural development, as discussed by 
Cabral and Shankland (2013, p. 18). Before that analysis, however, it is necessary to consider 
the origins and substance of the models in opposition in who the protagonists are, what their 
experiences in Brazil’s agricultural history have been, and how have these been turned into 
competing agendas and narratives about agricultural development. 
This chapter, hence, situates priests, technicians and traders in the context of Brazil’s 
agricultural domestic history, a key policy area in my framing of Brazil’s agricultural 
cooperation policy process. To this end, I offer an overview of the agricultural sector, its 
policies, actors and social struggles, all at the root of the rival interests and contrasting 
narratives travelling to Africa. I consider two major and largely separate agricultural policy 
trajectories. Following a chronological order, I start in the 1970s, the moment when the birth 
of Brazil’s modern agriculture is usually located, marked by the beginning of the Cerrado 
transformation. The second trajectory is one that was consolidated after the arrival of the PT 
in government, in 2003, and regards the institutionalisation of family farming and public 
policies to support this social group. I highlight some of the key actors in these two 
trajectories, particularly those who would emerge as protagonists of agricultural cooperation 
in Mozambique, and discuss how they are positioned vis-à-vis agricultural dualism. I then 
conclude the chapter with a discussion on the notion of dualism and its multiple subjective 
interpretations. 
3.1. Brazil’s modern agriculture 
3.1.1 The narrative of successful transformation 
Twin-wagoned lorries laden with soya thunder along the highways. Away from the 
main roads, human beings are a rarity, glimpsed only in the cabins of combine 
                                                          
42 Interview with Embrapa researcher, Brasília, November 2013 (EMB#3). 
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harvesters or, in the late afternoon as the air becomes still, in the cockpits of crop 
dusters flying crazily close to the ground. (Wheatley, 2010, para. 3) 
 
This description of a modern soybean farm in the Brazilian Cerrado is an evocative 
representation of a widely shared image of Brazil’s agricultural success, and one that has 
reverberated worldwide (Morris, Binswanger-Mkhize, & Byerlee, 2009; The Economist, 2010; 
Wheatley, 2010).  
Success is often equated to a process of modernisation that started in the 1970s and resulted 
in significant improvements in productivity, crop diversification and shares in international 
markets (Amann & Barrientos, 2014; Arraes Pereira, Martha Jr, Santana, & Alves, 2012; Bacha 
& de Carvalho, 2014; P. Figueiredo, 2014; Mueller & Mueller, 2014). As the narrative goes, 
Brazil’s agricultural transformation entailed turning from a condition of low productivity and 
backwardness, where the country was until the 1970s, to its current status as a major player in 
international markets (Mueller & Mueller, 2014), or a ‘global agricultural powerhouse’ 
(Wheatley, 2010).  
Two trends are often highlighted in this transformation. One concerns the growing 
diversification of the sector with a greater variety of high performing products with increasing 
value addition through processing. The other is the changing geography of production, with 
the agricultural frontier expanding towards lower latitudes, enabled by technological 
innovation and a range of state incentives. 
Until the 1970s, Brazilian agriculture was dominated by coffee and sugar, which thrived 
despite dysfunctional agricultural policies and mostly because of favourable international 
market conditions (Mueller & Mueller, 2014). By contrast, Brazil is today a world reference on 
a range of products. Soybean is among the crops that have grown the most.43 It currently tops 
the list of exported agricultural commodities, with the states of Mato Grosso in the Centre-
West and Paraná in the South combined accounting for just under half the national production 
(CONAB, 2013, p. 22). Soybean has also become Brazil’s most strategic and economically 
significant commodity that supplies 40% of the world market (de Oliveira, 2016, p. 348). Other 
products, such as sugar cane, maize, meat and agro-processed items, for example, orange juice 
and pulp, also registered considerable increases (Bacha & de Carvalho, 2014). The rise of the 
agro-industrial sector is a key feature of the transformation. By 2012, agriculture and agro-
                                                          
43 Between 1996 and 2006 (the dates of the two last censuses), the area of cultivated soybean expanded by 6.4 million hectares 
and production increased by 88.8% (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), 2006, p. 143), and by 2011/12 soybean 
cultivation was estimated to cover 25 million hectares of land (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento (CONAB), 2013, p. 5). 
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industry combined accounted for 22% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), compared to the 5% 
of agriculture alone (Bacha & de Carvalho, 2014, p. 3). 
Much of the growth in production results from productivity gains. Significant improvements in 
yields have been recorded across a number of agricultural products over the years. 
Productivity for coffee, rice, and cotton increased from below world averages to well above 
them, and soybean, poultry and sugar cane consolidated their advantage position (Mueller & 
Mueller, 2014). Overall, in the period from 1970 to 2006, productivity gains accounted for 65% 
of growth in agricultural output (Arraes Pereira et al., 2012, p. 6).  
Improved productive performance coupled with favourable conditions in international 
markets, including the rise in global demand (Bacha & de Carvalho, 2014), created the 
conditions for Brazil to become a major force across a number of commodities in export 
markets. By 2011, it was the world leader for sugar cane, ranked second for soybean and beef, 
and third for poultry and maize (Mueller & Mueller, 2014, p. 10). 
The other key feature of the transformation concerned the changing geography of production. 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, the fastest growing farming areas moved from temperate 
locations in the South and Southeast of Brazil towards the tropical savannah, the Cerrado 
biome (Figure 3 illustrates Brazil’s main biomes or agro-ecological zones).44  
Figure 3. Brazil's biomes 
 
Source: IBGE (n.d., Biomas). 
                                                          
44 More recently, the production frontier moved towards the Cerrado areas bordering the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí 
and Bahia, a region informally known as MATOPIBA (Bacha & de Carvalho, 2014). 
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The Cerrado covers an area of about 24% of Brazil’s territory, cutting across 12 federal states 
and stretching across regions, comprising much of the Centre-West region, and some territory 
in the North, Northeast and Southeast regions – Figure 4 depicts Brazil’s five large regions and 
federal states within the regions. 
Figure 4. Brazil's large regions and federal states 
 
Legend: Region North, Region Northeast, Region Centre-West, Region Southeast, Region South. Source: IBGE (n.d., 
Divisão Territorial). 
This shift of the agricultural frontier and the turn to the Cerrado in particular was at the centre 
of a broader geo-strategic orientation of the Brazilian government that pushed for a number of 
decisive policies, as I now discuss. 
3.1.2 The Cerrado as the cradle of modern agriculture 
Brazil’s agricultural modernisation emerged from the combination of a context of rapid 
industrialisation, urbanisation and expansion in transport infrastructure with a set of 
agricultural policies, combining public research, credit and minimum prices (Arraes Pereira et 
al., 2012; Buainain, Alves, da Silveira, & Navarro, 2013; Mueller & Mueller, 2014). 
From the early 1970s, the military government (1964-85) wanted to promote the intensive use 
of land in the Cerrado and introduced a package of policies targeting the agricultural sector 
and that region specifically. It therefore set in motion a process that led to a considerable 
expansion and diversification of agriculture and growing linkages with the industry. 
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The development of agriculture in the Cerrado fit the political agenda of mid-20th century 
Brazil. The occupation of the central plateau was part of a strategy of political and economic 
modernisation that entailed leaving behind archaic post-colonial structures (local oligarchies), 
building the nation state and strengthening the industrialisation process. This was reflected by 
President Getúlio Vargas’45 ‘go West’ vision (‘Marcha para o Oeste’), which aimed to intensify 
migration to emerging urban centres and supply cheap labour forces to the nascent industry 
(Arbex Jr., 2005, pp. 34-35). The foundation of the new capital city, Brasília, in 1961, reflected 
President Juscelino Kubitchek’s46 vision of relocating the industry to the rural landscape, 
particularly Brazil’s hinterlands. Alongside the foundation of Brasília, the road and railway 
infrastructure network in central Brazil was developed to link major urban centres to the new 
capital. 
Against this context, the Brazilian government devised a package of policies to explore the 
agricultural potential of the Cerrado, including a range of economic instruments (including 
subsidised credit and minimum prices), considerable investment in agricultural research and 
extension services (notably, the creation of Embrapa) and local development programmes. 
These measures put in place a massive state-led modernisation of agriculture that aimed to 
increase food production to feed the growing urban centres, boost exports and substitute 
imports to rebalance the trade deficit. It also envisaged redistributing rural population across 
the national territory to release social pressure from land concentration in the southern 
regions. 
Given the thrust of the industrialisation process, the modernisation of agriculture in the 
Cerrado focused mainly on large-scale production, consistently with the development of 
integrated agro-industrial complexes and the objective of strengthening links with 
international markets (Salim, 1986). Unlike the densely populated South and Southeast 
regions, where rural social movements were beginning to rise against land concentration, and 
the Amazonia, where environmental concerns were starting to be voiced, the Cerrado, with its 
relatively even topography, predictable rainfall and strategic location vis-à-vis the capital and 
major ports, was the ideal setting for such endeavours (Pires, 2007). 
These circumstances led to the emergence of a ‘dynamic rural entrepreneurial class’ (Mueller 
& Mueller, 2014), originating largely from a group of migrant farmers from the South of the 
                                                          
45 Getúlio Vargas was Brazil’s 14th and 17th President (1930-45 and 1951-54, respectively). 
46 Kubitchek was Brazil’s 21st President (1956-61). 
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country attracted to the Cerrado by favourable policies and the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier (Heredia, Palmeira, & Pereira Leite, 2010). 
While heavy public financing played a major role in unlocking the potential of the sector and 
prompting the formation of the modern farmer, it was shown to be unsustainable, particularly 
as the country ran into significant economic difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s (Markoff, 
1990). State spending in agriculture and credit in particular declined significantly in the 1990s 
as part of macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment policies (Mueller & Mueller, 
2014). Yet, favourable market conditions (initially in domestic markets and later, since the 
2000s, in international markets) and continuing state protection, not least through favourable 
foreign exchange policy, combined with the fruits of earlier investment in agricultural 
research, enabled Brazilian agriculture to expand and become highly productive, diversified 
and competitive in international markets. 
The Cerrado consolidated its position as the country’s breadbasket and the home for highly 
successful soybean farms of the type portrayed by Wheatley (2010). Although soybean farming 
has become a diverse and heterogeneous collection of farming styles (large and small, highly 
capitalised and family-based), in the Cerrado and in Brazil more broadly (Mier y Terán, 2016; 
Vennet, Schneider, & Dessein, 2016), the landscape described by Wheatley (cf. beginning of 
this section) remains a powerful symbol and instrument of Brazil’s Green Revolution (de 
Oliveira, 2016). 
3.1.3 Four key elements of Brazil’s agricultural modernisation ‘model’ 
I now analyse in further depth four elements in this modernisation trajectory: (i) Embrapa; (ii) 
government-led programmes targeting the Cerrado, notably the Japanese-Brazilian 
Cooperation Programme for Cerrado Development (PRODECER); (iii) the development of agro-
industrial complexes and the consolidation of the notion of agribusiness; and (iv) integrated 
development corridors. The first two elements played an important role in kick-starting the 
process of modernisation and entailed significant state financing. The third emerged from 
opportunities created by state intervention, particularly during the 1970s and subsequent 
macroeconomic management, and in response to rising demand in international markets in 
the context of a more opened Brazilian economy. As I will discuss later, these various elements 
are represented in the package or ‘model’ taken to Africa, and to Mozambique in particular. 
 Embrapa 
Embrapa was established by the military government in 1973 as a public corporation linked to 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA). Its creation was part of a 
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government response to the international food supply crisis and mounting pressure from the 
rapidly growing urban population (Alves, 2010). 
Embrapa’s first major task was to address the technological challenges of the Cerrado and 
thereby expand the country’s agriculture frontier. The successful ‘redemption’ of the barren 
Cerrado to modern agriculture was a decisive result for Embrapa, helping to consolidate its 
position within government and vis-à-vis public opinion, and hence secure a generous level of 
budgetary allocations.47 
Embrapa’s adaptation of soybean to tropical latitudes is still hailed as one of its greatest 
achievements (Arraes Pereira et al., 2012; P. Figueiredo, 2014; Lopes, 2012), playing a central 
part in what has been dubbed the ‘miracle of the Cerrado’ (The Economist, 2010) and 
suggested as a model for Africa (Morris et al., 2009). Embrapa’s technological innovation 
entailed not only the expansion of cultivation into new areas, but also allowed the productive 
use of degraded pasture land. The most significant innovations included biological nitrogen 
fixation, improvements in soil fertility, new plant varieties and hybrids, no tillage and 
integrated crop and livestock systems (Arraes Pereira et al., 2012). 
Embrapa’s technological innovation, coupled with subsidised credit for purchasing modern 
inputs, extension and infrastructure development, contributed to transforming the region 
from ‘sterile land’ into a ‘major global breadbasket’ (Hosono & Hongo, 2012), and turned Brazil 
into an agricultural powerhouse, leading world rankings for a range of commodities produced 
in large capital-intensive farms. 
Alves (2010) highlights Embrapa’s institutional innovation model as a key success factor. 
Embrapa was established as a very large and widespread decentralised network that not only 
ensured close contact between researchers and a diversified range of producers, but also 
attracted sympathy from state governments and the National Congress. Headquartered in 
Brasília, the corporation was structured into central administration units and decentralised 
research and service units covering the national territory. Its network currently comprises 47 
research units distributed throughout the country and specialised in agricultural products 
(such as meat, coffee, soybean or rice and beans), agro-ecological zones (such as the Cerrado) 
and cross-cutting themes (such as soils, the environment or satellite monitoring).48  
                                                          
47 Embrapa’s budget increased very rapidly between 1975 and 1982 and has since fluctuated, in line with macroeconomic 
circumstances, between US$ 0.5 and 1 billion (Alves, 2010, pp. 144-145). 
48 Embrapa also has three special services (Technology Transfer, Technological Information, Strategic Studies and Capacity 
Building), 16 business offices (escritórios de negócio) and two production units responsible for producing, distributing and 
commercialising seeds and seedlings. 
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Over the years, Embrapa turned into a massive organisation, reaching nearly 10,000 
employees (of which 2,360 are researchers) and a budget, in 2010, of about US$ 1 billion 
(Mendonça-Santos, de Oliveira, Vasques, Lima, & Dart, 2011). The option for a public 
corporation model, following private sector hiring rules, allowed Embrapa to carry out a 
flexible human resource management policy and ensure the development of a well trained 
and motivated research cadre in an environment seen as conducive to creativity (Alves, 2010). 
As result, its research capacity expanded exponentially – while in 1974 Embrapa counted 3 
researchers at doctoral level (Hosono & Hongo, 2012, p. 11), by 2011 the number had risen to 
1,908 (Mendonça-Santos et al., 2011). 
Embrapa also benefitted from international support. Since its inception, cooperation projects 
funded by the United States Department of Agriculture, the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Japanese government, among others, sponsored Embrapa’s post-
graduation programme (Mendonça-Santos et al., 2011). Japanese technical cooperation is 
claimed to have been particularly important not only for institutional building, but also for the 
development of critical knowledge and technology (particularly soil analysis and improved 
soybean varieties) suitable for the Cerrado (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). Embrapa also developed 
ties with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) network and 
these played a key role in setting directions for research and training programmes in the 
organisation’s early days (Alves, 2010). 
Furthermore, Embrapa set up institutional presence in several developed countries from the 
late 1990s. The so-called Virtual Labs Abroad (Laboratórios Virtuais da Embrapa no Exterior), 
or Labex, aim to provide permanent scientific links for advanced training and collaborative 
research projects between Brazil and countries in the three major regions of knowledge 
generation in the world (Alves, 2010).49 
Embrapa also established representations in developing countries with the aim of transferring 
knowledge and technology in tropical agriculture, as part of development cooperation 
agreements, as well as exploring opportunities for licensing Embrapa’s technology. The first of 
such representations was located in Ghana, in 2006, followed by Venezuela, in 2008. Beside 
technical cooperation, Embrapa researchers also collaborate in research projects with experts 
                                                          
49 The first Labex was set up in 1998 at the Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, in Maryland, USA. Virtual Labs have since 
expanded into Europe and Asia. In 2002 a Labex was inaugurated at Agropolis International/CIRAD, in Montpellier, France, 
followed, in 2006, by another at the University of Wageningen, in Holland. In 2009, Embrapa created the first Asia Labex, in 
partnership with the Rural Development Administration of South Korea. In 2009, Labex-UK was established at Rothamsted 
Research, an institute of the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council. China is the latest location for an Embrapa 
Labex; this one hosted by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and focusing on a range of issues, from biofuels to food 
processing and agroecology. 
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in countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as part of the Agricultural Innovation 
Marketplace. This is an initiative supported by several international organisations, such as the 
World Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, which funds collaborative research, capacity building and policy dialogue on 
agricultural development issues (Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, n.d.). 
I will discuss Embrapa’s internationalisation and its development cooperation programme in 
Mozambique in further detail in Chapter 4. For the moment, suffice to say, Embrapa became a 
major asset for Brazil’s solidarity diplomacy in Africa. It was a mighty stakeholder in Brazilian 
agriculture; it had built a solid reputation of technological innovation and was endowed with a 
cadre of highly qualified scientists, many with overseas training and linked to international 
research organisations. Furthermore, its role in Brazil’s agricultural transformation was 
internationally celebrated. As The Economist stated, in 2010: 
Since 1996 Brazilian farmers have increased the amount of land under cultivation by a 
third, mostly in the cerrado. (...) And it has increased production by ten times that 
amount. But the availability of farmland is in fact only a secondary reason for the 
extraordinary growth in Brazilian agriculture. If you want the primary reason in three 
words, they are Embrapa, Embrapa, Embrapa. (p. 47) 
 
 PRODECER, the Cerrado’s Green Revolution and the emergence of the modern farmer  
Local development programmes in the Cerrado constitute another important element of 
Brazil’s agricultural modernisation trajectory, and one that would also incorporate the 
agricultural development model for Mozambique, specifically in ProSAVANA. These 
programmes were carried out from the 1970s by the Brazilian government to promote 
agricultural development in the region. They established settlements of experienced farmers 
from Southern regions in Brazil, especially gaúchos,50 attracted to the Cerrado through a 
package of favourable conditions, including subsidised credit, price guarantees, access to 
technology and inputs, and an expanding transport network connecting fields to markets.  
N. G. Delgado (2010) argues that the military government combined two conflicting aims 
under these programmes. One aim was to reduce social tensions in the crowded South by 
offering opportunities to peasant farmers in other parts of the country, and hence potentially 
consolidate a class of ‘mercantile peasant agriculture’. The other aim was to create a modern 
                                                          
50 Gaúcho is typically the name given to a person originating from the state Rio Grande do Sul, in the South of Brazil. However, the 
term is also used to refer to migrants from other southern states, such as Paraná and Santa Catarina. 
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farming sector that would supply domestic and export markets. The programmes ended up 
favouring the latter and increasing tensions in the countryside, as I will discuss in Section 3.2. 
PRODECER, was the largest and best known of these programmes and was arguably the most 
influential in setting the technology-intensive Green Revolution type of farming found in the 
Cerrado today (Pires, 2007). The programme built on earlier development experiences in the 
region, including the pilot, and also Japan-sponsored, Programme of Directed Settlement of 
the Alto Paranaíba (Programa de Assentamento Dirigido do Alto Paranaíba), PADAP, in the 
state of Minas Gerais, as well as the federal government’s programme POLOCENTRO, 
implemented in the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and Minas Gerais. 
PADAP, launched in 1973, is regarded as having played a particularly important role in 
demonstrating the technical and economic feasibility of agricultural development in the 
Cerrado (Hosono & Hongo, 2012; Pires, 2007). The programme was implemented with strong 
involvement by the Minas Gerais state government which, together with the farmers’ 
cooperative Cotia,51 was chosen to manage the programme, selected settler farmers (80% of 
whom came from the South and Southeast, had links to Cotia and were of Japanese origins), 
determined the settlements’ location, and directly controlled the production process, 
including crop selection, sources of inputs and technology and commercialisation channels 
(Pires, 2007). The claimed success of PADAP settlements has been attributed to the 
organisational capacity of Cotia, its leader’s passion for technology, and the high educational 
level and knowledge of agriculture52 of the young second-generation Japanese-Brazilians who 
settled in the region (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). The latter were highly receptive to new 
technologies and already familiar with the challenges of the highly acidic soils of the Cerrado 
and with some of the required corrective measures. The settlers’ personal dedication to 
soybean – one of the crops prioritised by the programme – is also claimed to have played an 
important role (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). Cotia also promoted the integration between 
agriculture and the industry and the development of agro-industrial complexes, by connecting 
farmers with input suppliers and by channelling production to the industry, to the benefit of 
large groups (Pires, 2007). 
POLOCENTRO was created by the federal government in 1975 to promote the intake of 
technological innovation and improve the economic viability of agriculture in four states. 
Similar to PADAP, it provided technical support, subsidised credit and access to markets to 
                                                          
51 Cotia was the largest agricultural cooperative in Brazil, founded by Japanese-Brazilians in 1927 and based in the states of São 
Paulo (Southeast) and Paraná (South) (Hosono & Hongo, 2012, pp. 18-19). 
52 Some of them had university degrees from American universities. 
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settled farmers but interfered less in the productive process. Between 1975 and 1982, a total 
of US$ 577 million was spent on the programme, benefiting mainly medium and large farmers 
– farms of 200 hectares or more absorbed 88% of allocated funds (Klink & Moreira, 2013, p. 
77). Although POLOCENTRO originally envisaged the production of food crops, it ended up 
financing mostly cattle ranching and soybeans and stimulating the expansion of commercial 
agriculture. The programme has been criticised for exacerbating land concentration and 
specialisation of production and for failing to generate employment opportunities or 
increasing productive efficiency (Pires, 2007). It was discontinued in the early 1980s, as 
PRODECER was starting to be implemented. 
PRODECER was launched in 1980 in the state of Minas Gerais and expanded to other states in 
subsequent stages. Similar to its predecessors, it provided a range of services, notably credit 
and support to commercialisation, to agricultural settlements established by the programme. 
The Companhia de Promoção Agrícola (Campo), a holding set up with Brazilian and Japanese 
public and private capital, was responsible for selecting settlers and implementing the 
programme, playing a role similar to that of Cotia in PADAP. 
The involvement by the Japanese government in the programme was significant. It provided 
financial cooperation and technical expertise on soil management and improved varieties 
(Hosono & Hongo, 2012). It also had direct participation in implementation, including in 
settlers’ selection.53 Besides supporting Japanese descendants in Brazil, the Japanese 
government’s interest in the programme stemmed largely from the shortage of soybeans in 
international markets, at a time when the USA was imposing restrictions on grain exports (G. 
de Oliveira, 2016). 
Over its three stages (running until the early 2000s), PRODECER created 21 settlements, 
covering an area of 345,000 hectares across seven Brazilian states (Hosono & Hongo, 2012, p. 
22). It benefited 758 farmers producing mostly grains (G. de Oliveira, 2011, p. 5). The 
programme is hailed for confirming the business feasibility of agriculture in the Cerrado and 
for pioneering the expansion of soybeans (Hosono & Hongo, 2012), which became one of 
Brazil’s most successful commodities. It is also celebrated for encouraging the rise of 
entrepreneurial farmers highly responsive to new technologies (Hosono & Hongo, 2012; 
Mueller & Mueller, 2014).  
Criticism of PRODECER, however, highlights the negative environmental and social impacts in 
the region where diversity was loss and land became more concentrated (Fearnside, 2001; A. 
                                                          
53 In the first phase of PRODECE,R one-third of the settlers had to be Japanese-Brazilian farmers (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). 
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U. Oliveira, 2005; Pires, 2007; Silva, 2009). High levels of default on credit have also been 
noted (Pires, 2007) and the credit policy has been criticised for discriminating in favour of 
export commodities and for reaching a small number of well-off farmers, thereby contributing 
also to income concentration (Mueller & Mueller, 2014).  
Irrespective of their net balance, the local development programmes of the Cerrado remain a 
powerful symbol of the Brazilian Green Revolution experience and a model of modernisation, 
based on settlements of experienced migrant farmers and considerable state support and 
interventionism. They played a significant role in shaping the modern Brazilian farmer of the 
Cerrado, increasingly connected to the industry and international markets.  
This experience would reverberate years later in Mozambique through ProSAVANA, a 
programme inspired by PRODECER that mobilised some of its key actors, including the 
Japanese and Brazilian governments, Campo (as consulting arm of the Japanese government 
on ProSAVANA) and farmers from the Cerrado prospecting opportunities for investment in 
production overseas. 
 Agro-industrial complexes, agribusiness and class representation 
The emergence of agro-industrial complexes and the notion of agribusiness is the third 
element of Brazilian agricultural modernisation worth highlighting. The rural credit system put 
in place by the military government played a key role in strengthening upward and downward 
linkages between agriculture and industry (Graziano da Silva, 1996). Credit was provided to 
farmers to support the acquisition of modern inputs, supplied by the industry, and to assist 
commercialisation of produce to be processed by the industry (N. G. Delgado, 2010; A. 
Figueiredo, 1993; Mueller & Mueller, 2014). 
Local development programmes, such as PADAP and PRODECER, strengthened these linkages, 
and actors such as Cotia and Campo played a brokering role. The modernisation of agriculture 
was therefore closely associated with the emergence of agro-industrial conglomerates, where 
primary and secondary activity became increasingly integrated. The term agribusiness was 
initially introduced in Brazil to refer to such process of vertical integration (Graziano da Silva, 
2010). 
The industrialisation of agricultural activity that unfolded between the 1970s and 1980s 
through credit and local development programmes became known as ‘conservative 
modernisation’ (N. G. Delgado, 2010; Heredia et al., 2010). It was a process of modernisation 
that would reinforce agrarian elites by transforming large land ownership (latifúndio) into 
large capitalist enterprises and that would discriminate against small producers, landless and 
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waged labourers (N. G. Delgado, 2010). This process is also criticised for having introduced a 
bias in the rural landscape towards agriculture and production, and exacerbated dependency 
of farmers from the industry (N. G. Delgado, 2010; Heredia et al., 2010). 
Agro-industrial complexes expanded significantly, particularly since the mid-1990s, once the 
Brazilian economy became stabilised, following the massive debt and inflation crisis that 
dominated much of the 1980s and 1990s. Multinational corporations were dominant in the 
initial stages of the modernisation process but domestic conglomerates eventually emerged, 
some of which became multinationals (Mueller & Mueller, 2014).54 
The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1995-2002), particularly during its 
second term in office, is regarded as having favoured the consolidation of corporate 
agribusiness by promoting the exports sector in a context of favourable international prices for 
agricultural commodities, especially for soybeans (N. G. Delgado, 2010). His government 
policies included devaluing real exchange rates to make exports more competitive, investing 
infrastructure (focusing specifically on territorial integration and development corridors) and 
the reorganisation of Embrapa and its agricultural research (orienting public research to the 
needs of multinational agribusinesses, is areas such as transgenic crops). 
The conservative modernisation of agriculture also favoured the emergence of new elites in 
the agricultural sector who were increasingly urban and connected to non-agricultural 
activities, such as processing or commercialisation. The modern farm gave way to the 
agribusiness enterprise. In the soybean sector, de Oliveira (2016) notes that poor farmers and 
rich ranchers were replaced by rural managers, many with university degrees, living in cities 
and specialised in business management. A professional sector of agribusiness advisors also 
emerged to serve this new elite and interest groups that represented the agricultural elites 
also changed and became more numerous and complex (Bruno & Sevá, 2010). 
The proliferation of social actors representing societal interests was a process unfolding since 
the period of re-democratisation that followed the military dictatorship (ending in 1985). In 
the rural sphere, this manifested in episodes of land occupation and growing demands for 
agrarian reform by increasingly active rural social movements. This prompted the coalescence 
of agrarian elites to counter the social mobilisation. As result, the Ruralist Democratic Unit 
(União Democrática Ruralista, UDR) was established and a conservative political caucus, the 
Bancada Ruralista, emerged in the Brazilian Congress representing large land owners and 
                                                          
54 Perdigão, for example, is an agro-industrial complex located in the state of Goiás that became Brazil’s largest producer of pork 
and poultry products (Gasperoni, 2011). 
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businessmen (Bruno, 2009b; Bruno & Sevá, 2010). Yet, land reform soon waned and as 
agriculture and industry became more integrated, the representation of agricultural elites was 
gradually broadened. The creation of the Brazilian Agribusiness Association (ABAG), in 1993, 
was part of this process of constructing a new political identity for agricultural elites that 
brought together interests from across ‘value chains’. 
The notion of agribusiness emerged as an attempt to convey a more modern political language 
that emphasised business, rather than ‘mission’ (sacerdócio), as the new conception of 
agricultural activity (Bruno & Sevá, 2010). Success and competitiveness were also highlighted 
as the key attributes in a context of increasing openness of the Brazilian economy to 
international markets. Roberto Rodrigues (2010), a co-founder of ABAG, became an 
ambassador of the concept of agribusiness in Brazil. He would also become an influential 
voice, as minister of MAPA and then president of the Brazilian think tank GV Agro – the 
Agribusiness Centre of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), a Brazilian academic institution – 
in the initial thinking behind ProSAVANA and FGV’s consulting work on agribusiness in Africa 
(as I will discuss in Chapter 5). 
This take on agricultural activity as modern, entrepreneurial and globalised did not, however, 
replace or undermine more conservative forces in the countryside, represented by UDR or the 
Bancada Ruralista, which continued to exert considerable influence in domestic politics. Bruno 
and Sevá (2010) argue that in spite of the increasing diversity of actors representing 
agribusiness elites, the unity and solidarity with regards to substantive issues such as land 
ownership had not been compromised. On occasions when fundamental values and privileges 
are at stake (as was the case of the new Forestry Code approved in 2012), the role of political 
representatives becomes particularly salient. One of the most prominent political figures at 
the time of my fieldwork was Senator Katia Abreu, the first woman to preside over the male-
dominated Bancada Ruralista, and widely regarded as the political champion of agribusiness 
and the interests of the agricultural elites. She also presided at the National Agricultural 
Confederation (CNA)55 and eventually became minister of MAPA in Dilma Rousseff’s second 
government. Abreu would also play a part in Brazil’s story in Africa, travelling to Mozambique 
as President of CNA in 2010, in a prospection visit aimed at exploring the business potential for 
Brazilian farmers and entrepreneurs. 
                                                          
55 CNA is Brazil’s professional representation of landowners and employers established in the 1950s. Its language and identity has 
also adapted to changing times and today it presents itself as the representative of ‘rural producers’ broadly, thereby attempting 
to dismiss distinctions between large versus small, of agribusiness versus family farmers and appeal to a larger population of 
farmers. 
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 Integrated development corridors 
The fourth and final element I wish to underline in Brazil’s modernisation trajectory is broader 
than agriculture and concerns territorial integration and development corridors. The logic of 
integrated territorial development had been a preoccupation of the Brazilian government 
since the days of the foundation of Brasília in the remote Centre-West (and can indeed be 
traced back to colonial times as a form of territorial control). The expansion of transport 
networks was also central to the modernisation of agriculture in the Cerrado and ensuring 
modern farms were connected to input suppliers, agro-processors and output markets. 
Ecological and Economic Zoning (Zoneamento Ecológico-Econômico, ZEE), an environmental 
due diligence tool introduced in Brazilian legislation in the early 1990s (Becker, 1999), would 
become a key instrument for mapping the territory, identifying its economic potential and 
projecting patterns of use. It combined environmental concerns with top-down bureaucratic 
planning tendencies and quickly became an instrument of geopolitical control, bureaucratic 
power and political negotiation between different interest groups (Acselrad, 2001). Its 
cartographic logic of static zoning based on physical characteristics casted doubts, however, on 
the ability to generate solutions that reflected the nature of socio-economic relations on the 
ground that cut across zones and their contours (Ab’Saber, 1989). 
Furthermore, in 1996, ‘Integration and Development Axes’ (Eixos de Integração e 
Desenvolvimento) were implemented by the government of FHC as an instrument of 
integrated economic development along large infrastructure networks across the national 
territory (Becker, 1999). This policy entailed the development of 16 such axes through the 
construction or expansion of transport corridors funded by public resources, private 
investments (notably the mining giant Vale) and development banks. The aim was to promote 
economic activity (mining, agriculture, industry or tourism) along such corridors, based on 
detailed territorial mapping. The policy was criticised for prioritising transport and logistics 
with a focus on channelling commodities, natural resources and other products for export 
markets and to the detriment of local development (da Rosa, 2001). Becker (1999) describes 
the emergence in the Amazonian region of: 
An immense platform of grain production in the Cerrado directed to exports, 
particularly soybean, with expected expansion across the Acre, South of the Amazon 
and Southeast of Pará. (p. 38) 
 
Territorial mapping and integrated economic development linked to transport corridors would 
also emerge as important references in the conception of ProSAVANA. Vale, specifically, would 
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settle in Mozambique to explore a coal mine in the hinterland and would sponsor the 
development of a transport and logistics corridor connecting the mine out to sea, the same 
region targeted by ProSAVANA. Furthermore, ProSAVANA would sponsor the ZEE mapping of 
the region as a guide to identifying economic opportunities centred on agricultural 
modernisation. 
 
Overall, these various elements of Brazilian agriculture’s modernisation history constituted key 
ingredients in the formation of a particular Brazilian ‘model’ for African agriculture. They 
represented a set of tangible experiences as well as symbolic references that Brazilian actors 
would draw from in their engagements abroad, comprising the agronomic expertise of 
Embrapa researchers and the ‘miracle of the Cerrado’ imaginary they carried along. It included 
a particular approach to territorial development, focused on settlements of experienced 
farmers, special zones and transport corridors. It also included an emphasis on agro-industrial 
linkages and orientation towards export markets and networks of actors connected to those 
markets. Also, alongside the modernist and somewhat liberal agribusiness concept, there was 
a particular Brazilian take on capitalism shaped by a history of state-driven development and 
intimate state-capital relations. 
The successful transformation narrative, founded on the above elements, started to be 
significantly challenged, however, in the post-military dictatorship period.  Alternative 
narratives and countervailing forces to modernisation gradually took shape in the 1980s and 
were consolidated after the arrival of the PT in government in 2003. This resulted in the 
coexistence of two distinct projects for agriculture and the rural sphere and the reinforcement 
of dualism in Brazil’s agricultural politics. This dualism would too become reproduced in 
international engagements. 
3.2. Brazil’s family farming  
3.2.1 The narrative of family farming as distinctive identity 
Brazil’s contemporary agriculture is not just about large, mechanised farms typical of the 
Cerrado and the high-earning commodities dominating global markets. Drawing on the last 
agricultural census (IBGE, 2006), there are an estimated 4.4 million farms with an average size 
of 18 hectares, representing 84% of total farming units in Brazil (IBGE & MDA, 2009, p. 19).56 
This significant group of small production units managed to achieve levels of productivity 
                                                          
56 Whereas the remaining 16% of so-called ‘non-family farms’ have an average size of 309 hectares (IBGE & MDA, 2009). 
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similar to that of large farms, despite the high degree of land concentration that persisted in 
the countryside, fed by decades of policies that discriminated against them and directed credit 
programmes and technological innovation mainly to large farms (G. C. Delgado, 2012; Pereira 
Leite & Wesz Jn, 2014). 
The small units are classified as ‘family farms’ (IBGE & MDA, 2009), following a definition 
institutionalised in 2006 that set criteria related to farm size, sources of labour and sources of 
household income. Four criteria were established by law to characterise a family farm 
(Presidência da República, 2006b): (i) landholdings cannot be larger than four fiscal modules; 
(ii) non-wage family labour is predominant; (iii) household income derives mainly from 
activities on the farm; and (iv) the family manages the farm. These criteria guide a formal 
registration process used to identify the target group of public policies overseen by MDA, 
whose mission entails strengthening family farming (MDA, 2010). With a legislated definition 
and a ministerial champion, family farming thus became an institutionalised (and politicised) 
category of producers. 
Family farmers are also a socially constructed identity, whereby an association is established 
between them and food production, domestic markets and labour absorption. Family farms 
are claimed to play a major role in addressing domestic food needs, producing Brazil’s main 
food items, such as beans, cassava and milk (de França, Del Grossi, & Marques, 2009; MDA, 
2010).57 They also employ 77% of people working in agriculture (de França et al., 2009). Yet, 
when compared to the non-family sector, they benefit from a disproportionally low share of 
land (24%) (IBGE & MDA, 2009). They also get a considerably lower share of the state budget: 
in the 2014/15 Crop Plan, the family farming sector was allocated less than 15% of the amount 
allocated to the non-family farming sector.58 
Land and the territory are important elements in the identity of family farmers, distinguishing 
them socially and culturally from agribusiness. A moral argument is usually made about family 
farmers’ connection to the land, similar to the argument that has long driven struggles for land 
justice by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). As discussed by Wolford (2005), MST’s 
‘moral argument’ emphasised not only the right to land as a productive space, but also land as 
a space of life where the social reproduction of the community takes place. One of my 
respondents from a Brazilian rural social movement shared a similar perspective, highlighting 
the moral virtues of family farming: 
                                                          
57 This claim is contested by the argument that it is the non-family sector that accounts for the bulk of food production, including 
some of the key items in the national food basket, such as grains (FGV & CNA, 2010). 
58 The family farming sector was allocated 20 billion Reais and the non-family farming sector 150 billion Reais (Favareto, 2014a, p. 
9) (equivalent to approximately US$ 5 and 51 billion, respectively). 
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[We went to] Rio Grande do Sul to visit family farming units. There we found farmers 
with three hectares of land producing 28 types of products for their consumption and 
for commercialisation of excess production. This is the wealth of family farming: 
producing food for the region and food that people’s culture allows them to eat. It is 
therefore a very healthy and peaceful way of living. At the same time, we witness their 
experience of coexisting with nature, because family farming is careful about using 
nature’s endowments. It thinks about production but it also thinks about future 
generations. By contrast, where the Brazilian agribusiness settles it does not care 
about water springs, it does not care if there is a river. If it can, it will bury everything 
just to have soybean, eucalyptus or other things, because it does not have the vision 
that nature’s endowments are part of a balance for the sustainability of society. It 
plants deserts. It poisons soils and water, compromising people’s heath and 
biodiversity. The family farming model [by contrast] emphasises that we are part of 
nature.59  
 
A senior MDA official used a similar argument to highlight the difference between family 
farming and agribusiness: 
He [the family farmer] works where he lives. It is different from those in agribusiness 
because usually in that case the farmer has his economic activity in one place and lives 
in another and therefore does not have much interest in what happens there because 
he does not live there.60  
 
These arguments about the morally superior attributes of family farming (producing food 
staples for Brazilian people and caring for their place of work and life) have been at the 
frontline of politico-ideological struggles against agricultural modernisation and corporate 
agribusiness. 
Beneath such distinctive institutional, social and political identity, however, lies a 
heterogeneous population of farmers, with diverse socioeconomic characteristics and 
relationships with markets and state-funded programmes and, therefore, diverse interests and 
opportunities (Guanziroli, Buainain, & Di Sabbato, 2013; Medina, Almeida, Novaes, Godar, & 
Pokorny, 2015; Schneider & Cassol, 2014). Mier y Terán (2016) and Vennet et al. (2016), for 
example, describe family farmers growing soybeans, in the Cerrado and in Southern Brazil (the 
cradle of family farmers), respectively, offering a contrast with the commonly deployed image 
of peasant families displaying staple crops on their small plots of land (and indeed a contrast 
to the large-scale soybean farmer of the Cerrado). 
A common typology of family farming, drawing on a seminal study on small family-based 
production in Brazil (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA) & FAO, 
                                                          
59 Interview with CONTAG respondent, Brasília, November 2013. 
60 Interview with MDA#1. 
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1994), distinguishes between three sub-sets of farmers: consolidated, transition and 
peripheral. Guanziroli et al. (2013) identify about 400,000 family farming units with income 
levels similar to those of large agribusinesses and corresponding to the consolidated subset. 
Transition family farms comprise about 2.4 million units that are the main target of public 
policies, aimed to increase productivity and contributions to the economy through a 
modernisation. Peripheral family farms represent about 2 million units with very low incomes 
and that have been the target of social development programmes. Other typologies have been 
produced illustrating the diversity of family farmers even further. Schneider and Cassol (2014) 
classify farmers according to their source of income and on this basis, find significant diversity 
in the social and economic production structure and geographical distribution of Brazilian 
family farms. 
The South of Brazil is generally home to the better off in the family farming category, those 
who are more fully integrated in markets (Schneider & Cassol, 2014). The South, comprising 
the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná, has historically been an area of 
relatively less land concentration. This is explained by a history of colonisation by European 
and Japanese migrants, who settled in the region throughout the 19th century, occupying areas 
of relatively small size and replicating their homeland family-type farming experiences (Oberg, 
1965a). The emergence of the family farming concept would, in fact, draw significantly on this 
experience, reflecting the influence of lobby groups of gaúcho farmers. 
Poorer or peripheral farmers are typically located in the Northeast (where 89% of farming 
units are family farms, according to the Census), particularly in the semi-arid hinterland (called 
Sertão), in the Northern region (dominated by the Amazonia), and in areas where the advance 
of the agricultural frontier, and of soybean specifically, has dispossessed farmers from their 
land (Fearnside, 2001). These are regions affected by high and persisting inequality (Fernandes 
et al., 2012). 
Socio-economic and geographical diversity notwithstanding, family farming remains a strong 
unitary identity, and this is largely the fruit of considerable political mobilisation domestically 
and internationally. In the Latin America region, the Brazilian government played a key role in 
the establishing the Specialised Meeting on Family Farming (REAF), a forum of family farmers, 
rural organisations and institutions from the Mercosul region, launched in 2004, aiming to 
develop a framework of regional public policies for family farming. More globally, family 
farming has become a prominent emblem in FAO’s discourse, since José Graziano’s election as 
the organisation’s Director-General, and the concept has been widely celebrated in the 
context of the UN declared International Year of Family Farming in 2014 and initiatives that 
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followed (FAO, n.d.). As for the domestic context, I now proceed with an overview of the 
historical trajectory of family farming, its actors, policy instruments, political disputes and 
narratives, since the times of rural social mobilisation linked to land reform at the end of the 
military regime. 
3.2.2 The historical trajectory of family farming and hidden contestation 
The major debt crisis that hit Brazil in the 1980s weakened the military government 
considerably (Markoff, 1990). As the regime lost its strength, a range of new actors, 
representing those who had been excluded or negatively impacted by agricultural 
modernisation, started to mobilise in the countryside. Landless people demanded land, people 
displaced by infrastructure development asked for compensation, waged-labourers in farms 
and the industry called for better salaries and working conditions, and small farmers asked for 
more favourable prices and credit services (N. G. Delgado, 2010).  
When democracy was restored in 1985, new spaces for social participation in public policy 
were opened up and became gradually institutionalised, including national councils and 
conferences where civil society was invited to discuss public policies (Cornwall et al., 2008; 
Houtzager, 2000; Lavalle, Houtzager, & Castello, 2005). Social movements, trade unions, non-
governmental and religious organisations representing a highly heterogeneous rural 
population became increasingly visible and active, particularly around the drafting of the 1988 
Constitution (N. G. Delgado, 2010). Amongst the most prominent social actors during this 
period were: the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG), that had been 
established in 1963 but silenced during the military regime; the United Workers' Central (CUT), 
created in 1983; and the MST, officially founded in 1984. The Family Farming National Workers 
Federation (FETRAF), another prominent rural social movement, would be established later in 
2005 (Favareto, 2006).  
As the process of re-democratisation unfolded, inequality in rural areas was gradually 
highlighted, and calls for agrarian reform intensified and became more complex, revealing 
divisions within rural non-state actors themselves (N. G. Delgado, 2010; Favareto, 2006). 
Whereas the 1980s saw significant social mobilisation and field demarcation, fuelled by a 
context of economic crisis, it was in the 1990s that a number of policy decisions were made 
that would eventually lead the way, especially after the PT arrived in government, towards 
more redistributive and progressive policies in the rural space and the consolidation of the 
family farming identity in the countryside. Some of these key policy measures were introduced 
amidst the neoliberal regime of FHC, reflecting in the agricultural sphere the ‘perverse 
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confluence’ of two contradictory political projects in Brazilian society (Dagnino, 2004). A 
‘neoliberal project’ privileging export-oriented agribusiness and favouring a selected few 
concurred with a ‘democratizing project’ associated with demands for agrarian reform and a 
rural development model based on family farming. The scope of the latter project was 
gradually expanded to include calls for social participation in public policy, the recognition of 
social rights of the rural populations and the right to food and food security (N. G. Delgado, 
2010).  
Although the neoliberal government of FHC may have favoured the consolidation of large-
scale export-oriented farming, it was also responsible for several policy decisions, 
acknowledging the appeals of the ‘democratizing project’, or at least making space for those 
appeals to be addressed more persuasively later. One example is the re-establishment of the 
National Institute for Coordination of Agrarian Reform (INCRA), under the Land Reform 
Extraordinary Ministry in 1996, in aftermath of violent episodes involving landless people and 
MST activists – notably the Eldorado dos Carajás massacre, in the state of Pará, where 19 
landless farmers were killed by the military police (Pereira, 2003). FHC would make way for 
land reform, although, as argued by Pereira, his market-based reforms did not work for the 
poor in a system in which land markets were underdeveloped, large landowners largely 
dominated access to land and credit, and the poor were subject to violence at the hands of the 
military police or landlords’ gunmen. Furthermore, Wolford (2005) notes that besides 
privileging agrarian elites, the market-led approach also delegitimised MST’s rights-based 
struggle by favouring a focus on productivity and property rights. 
More significantly for the emergence of the family farming identity was the creation, in 1996, 
of the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF), in response to 
growing pressure from social movements, especially unions such as CUT and CONTAG, and 
their Southern representations in particular. Family farmers from the South had been 
significantly affected by the economic crises and its effect on credit availability (Schneider, 
Mattei, & Cazella, 2004). They were also relatively more organised and better represented, 
and would become an influential lobby for public policies targeting family farming (Favareto, 
2006). 
PRONAF aimed to improve the productive capacity of family farming and raise employment 
and income in rural areas (Bianchini, 2015). Its most salient feature was subsidised credit, 
although it also comprised other types of support, including training and infrastructure 
development and services at the municipal level (Schneider et al., 2004). The INCRA/FAO 
studies on family farming conducted in the 1990s (INCRA & FAO, 1994, 2000) contributed to 
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the demarcation of PRONAF’s target group and would be the basis for the family farming 
concept that would become institutionalised (Abramovay & Veiga, 1999; Guanziroli et al., 
2013; Wanderley, 2014). The family farmers’ identity was further consolidated with the 
establishment of MDA, in 2000, whose mandate was to the coordinate agrarian reform and to 
‘promote the sustainable development of the rural segment constituted by family farmers’ 
(Presidência da República, 2000). 
From 2003, the PT-led government of President Lula da Silva would build on these policies and 
eventually institutionalise family farming as a category of farms legally defined and make it the 
main focus of MDA’s policies. MDA’s budget increased significantly over the years – between 
2002/03 and 2010/11 PRONAF expanded eightfold, reaching 16 billion Reais (US$ 9 billion) 
(MDA, 2010, p. 23). The scope of the programme was also enlarged to include rural extension, 
and new policies for family farmers were created, including insurance, technical assistance, 
price guarantees and public procurement (Bianchini, 2015; MDA, 2010). 
Rural social movements played a central part in this process by converging around a common 
rural development project that replaced the protest nature of mobilisation with a pragmatic 
approach of engagement with policymaking (Favareto, 2006). Family farming provided the 
common ground for engaged action, although it did not eliminate fundamental differences 
across social actors.61 
Social movements’ access to policymaking was thus strengthened through the consolidation of 
formal structures for social participation. The National Council for Sustainable Rural 
Development (CNDRS), created under FHC, was re-baptised as CONDRAF by President Lula’s 
government to bear the initials of family farming. The National Council for Food Security 
(CONSEA), which had been set up in 1993 but extinguished by FHC, was re-established and the 
much-hyped Zero Hunger programme was launched right at the onset of the PT government. 
Zero Hunger was a package of cross-sectoral policy measures designed under the premise that 
hunger is a multidimensional problem, requiring state intervention both on the supply and 
demand side of the food system (Graziano da Silva & Takagi, 2007). The package included 
some specific interventions such as the widening of the National School Feeding Programme, 
emergency food distribution and the establishment of public food procurement from family 
farmers. Some of these would lead to the development of Bolsa Família, a massive conditional 
cash transfer programme that is thought to have played a major role in reducing extreme 
                                                          
61 Favareto (2006) argues that fierce contestation and rupture vis-à-vis the state regarding land reform did not combine easily with 
demands for enhancement of public policies aiming, amongst other things, to strengthen family farmers’ integration in markets. 
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poverty and inequality (Soares, 2012), lifting about 20 million out of poverty between 2003 
and 2009, according to one estimate (World Bank, 2010). 
Land reform, however, remained a sticking point for some rural movements. The land reform 
agenda had gained pace in the first years of the PT government but then waned to come to a 
halt under President Rousseff (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2014). Poverty reduction, 
urbanisation and technological advancement (which gradually turned land into a lesser 
contributor to the value of production) reduced pressure over land somewhat (Buainain et al., 
2013; Navarro, 2014). Yet, the agrarian question stayed alive, not least because Brazil had (and 
has) one of the most concentrated landholding structures in the world62 (Fernandes et al., 
2012; Reydon, 2014), bound to be aggravated by the global land rush (Sauer & Pereira Leite, 
2011). New dimensions were added to the social struggle against land concentration (Ramos, 
2014). Bruno (2009c) argues that resistance to the persistent modernisation project of 
agrarian (and now corporate) elites gradually took on board a range of more contemporary 
issues, including food sovereignty, agroecology and the struggle against genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). In her study of the MST, Wolford (2005) illustrates indeed how the 
movement gradually reinforced its opposition to agribusiness and the agrarian elite by 
combining the old land rights argument with new arguments, concerning the provision of 
healthy food and ensuring local control over food production, or food sovereignty. 
Some of the additional demands raised by rural social movements also challenged core family 
farming public policies, including PRONAF, criticised for benefiting the better off within the 
family farming aggregate and for inducing the ‘conservative modernisation’ of family farming 
(Ibase, 2006). Such criticism is more explicit in the positioning of MST than it is in that of 
CONTAG or FETRAF, which remained more aligned with MDA. The more critical perspectives, 
adopted by MST, agroecology movements, and others closely associated with the international 
peasants’ network La Vía Campesina, typically qualified family farming with the prefix 
‘peasant’ (Sá, 2012; Teixeira, 2013).63 Peasant family farming not only stood in opposition to 
corporate agribusiness, but also to the capitalist nature of modern agriculture more broadly. 
Therefore, it also confronted family farmers integrated in markets, producing commodities 
                                                          
62 Between 1985 and 2006, farms smaller than 10 hectares accounted for less than 2.7% of total occupied land and farms larger 
than 1,000 hectares for more than 43% of total (IBGE, 2006, pp. 107-108). 
63 Wanderley (2014) argues that the term ‘peasant’ is a fairer representation of the diversity of family farms and their social 
function that stems beyond production and income generation. The focus on these latter dimensions had lead to classifications of 
a great proportion of family farmers as peripheral (to the economy) and this, she claims, leads to a bias in policies, which targets 
this group with myopic social protection interventions rather than with a comprehensive set of policies that acknowledges their 
social role as farmers. 
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and employing modern technology (Petersen, Mussoi, & Soglio, 2013; Stedile & de Carvalho, 
2010). 
The reframing of the agrarian question exposes the contested nature of the family farming 
narrative. Although remaining a strong symbol of the opposition against agribusiness in Brazil, 
the notion of family farming therefore encompasses distinct views on agriculture and the rural 
sphere. Appreciating the contested identity of family farming will be important to understand 
a programme such as MFI as well as the positions of Brazilian social actors vis-à-vis Brazilian 
development cooperation, which I will analyse in my case studies. 
To dissect these differences further, I now consider two Brazilian public policies targeting 
family farmers that would become flagship programmes of agricultural cooperation in Africa. 
These are the More Food Programme and the Food Acquisition Programme. The former is a 
credit line aiming to assist the ‘modernisation of family farms’, where modernisation is used as 
a synonym of mechanisation (MDA, 2010, p. 58). The latter is a social development 
programme that buys produce from targeted family farmers, and channels it to food security 
and nutrition programmes, including the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE), another 
public instrument uplifted by the PT government. They constitute two key instruments of 
family farming public policy in Brazil, yet they reproduce competing perspectives of the family 
farming identity. 
3.2.3 Two contrasting instruments of family farming reproduction 
 More Food programme 
The More Food programme (programa Mais Alimentos) is a credit line under PRONAF, 
designed to support the mechanisation of family farms. It was introduced by MDA in 2008, the 
time of the international food price crisis, with the aim of addressing concerns with 
productivity and food price vulnerability. By providing family farmers with subsidised credit 
and access to discount prices, the programme managed to distribute, between 2008 and 2010, 
over 26,000 tractors (of up to 78 horsepower – HP) and motor-harvesters worth 3 billion Reais 
(US$ 1.6 billion), compared to fewer than 7,000 tractors bought by family farmers in the 10 
years preceding the programme (MDA, 2010, p. 58). Bianchini (2015) notes: 
PRONAF More Food would enable an intense process of mechanisation of family 
farming with the average financing of 20 thousand tractors per year, beside the 
advancement of modernisation of the productive infrastructure of a series of activities. 
(p. 58, my emphases) 
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More Food also aimed to stimulate the dormant Brazilian industry and act as a ‘countercyclical 
industrial policy’ (Patriota & Pierri, 2013, p. 140) by expanding the domestic market for 
agricultural machinery and equipment. Indeed, eight out of ten 78 HP tractors produced in 
Brazil during 2009 were absorbed by the programme (MDA, 2010, p. 58). The programme was 
also claimed to be responsible for 32% of jobs in the tractor-manufacturing sector in 2010. 
Besides these economic impacts, the programme constituted a political opportunity to boost 
the family farming agenda in Brazil’s agricultural policy (Patriota & Pierri, 2013). 
More Food is implemented by MDA together with the Brazilian industry that supplies the 
equipment and provides discounted prices. Industry representatives involved in the design of 
the programme include Anfavea, Abimaq and Simers.64 
The programme is hailed by government as a successful undertaking that has stimulated 
Brazil’s food production and industrial activity at a time of international economic crisis (MDA, 
2010; Patriota & Pierri, 2013). Yet, beyond the prevailing narrative of success taken abroad 
through MFI, impact assessments suggest that implementation of the programme has faced a 
number of challenges that could ultimately compromise the sustainability of family farming as 
a mode of production.  
A study conducted in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, a region that traditionally absorbs an 
important share of the PRONAF resources, showed that the distribution of benefits were 
uneven and that PRONAF credit lines, including More Food, benefitted the better off within 
the family farming segment and stimulated specialisation of production to the detriment of 
livelihood diversification (Gazolla & Schneider, 2013). The bias towards tractors in 
beneficiaries’ demand was highlighted and argued to reflect a tendency in PRONAF credit lines 
(specifically credit towards running costs) towards specialisation of production (especially on 
maize and soybeans) that, in turn, demands this type of machinery. A ‘vicious circle’ emerges 
in family farmers’ credit use, whereby a productivist and mercantilistic logic is increasingly 
stimulated (Gazolla & Schneider, 2013, p. 58).  
An earlier study conducted in the state of Paraná had raised similar concerns: 
The big limitation of the PRONAF model as applied in Paraná is that it broadly 
stimulates the consolidation of a traditional model of technological modernisation and 
specialisation of agricultural production that strongly compromises the sustainability 
of family farming, aggravating its dependency from markets and large agro-industrial 
enterprise. (Ibase, 2006, p. 108) 
                                                          
64 Respectively: Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores, Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Máquinas e 
Equipamentos and Sindicato das Indústrias de Máquinas e Equipamentos Agrícolas do Rio Grande do Sul. 
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More Food, and PRONAF credit lines more broadly, are hence criticised for favouring the 
‘conservative modernisation’ of family farming, through its focus on mechanisation and 
indirect incentives towards specialisation of production (Ibase, 2006; Teixeira, 2013). Despite 
this criticism, the programme remains an important instrument of family farming political 
strengthening that, alongside other PRONAF credit lines, also contributes to increasing food 
production and employment generation. Its effectiveness in the promotion of rural 
development, beyond a narrow logic of agricultural production that fails to appreciate the 
importance of livelihoods diversification and the social and environmental dimensions of 
family farming, is argued to depend on the ability of PRONAF to connect with programmes 
such as the Food Acquisition Programme (Gazolla & Schneider, 2013). 
 Food Acquisition Programme 
Launched in 2003 as part of the Zero Hunger initiative, the Food Acquisition Programme 
(Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos), also known as Food Purchase Programme or PAA, is a 
public procurement policy, whereby the state buys food products from selected family farmers 
and channels them to food security and nutrition programmes, such as the National School 
Feeding Programme. It emerged from a demand by CONSEA and therefore had, from the start, 
strong backing of rural social movements (Pacheco, 2013).65 Whereas PRONAF benefits mostly 
the better-off of the family farming segment (Guanziroli et al., 2013), PAA was designed to 
target specifically peripheral family farmers, particularly those settled by the land reform 
programme, indigenous people, Quilombola and other minority communities. It is therefore a 
twin-track approach that addresses food security and nutrition needs, on the demand side, 
and supports poor family farmers, on the supply side. 
The Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and MDA are responsible for implementation. MDA 
specifically leads on a programme component concerning the management of food stocks, 
which works to allow family farmers to explore market conditions better. Other government 
agencies involved include the Ministry of Education and MAPA’s food distribution agency 
CONAB.   
Between 2003 and 2009, PAA’s procurement budget totalled 2.7 billion Reais (about US$ 1.3 
billion), benefitted 764 family farming units and reached, annually, 7.5 million food insecure 
people (MDA, 2010, p. 50). The programme, however, remains a relatively confined initiative 
                                                          
65 A point also made by one of my respondents (and a former leader of CONSEA), interviewed by Skype, April 2014 (BRAC#5). 
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covering a small subset of family farmers – the 204 families reached in 2011 represented a 
mere 4.6% of total family farming units (Grisa, 2012, p. 241). 
The programme is often celebrated for its food focus, targeting of poorer family farmers and 
land reform settlements, and for connecting agricultural policy with food security and nutrition 
concerns. PAA is also complimented for its participatory character and for incentivising and 
rewarding agroecological practices – for example, organic food products get a 30% premium 
on the price (Grisa, 2012). My Brazilian social movement respondents generally praised the 
programme and emphasised the need to scale it up. One respondent called it a ‘revolutionary 
programme’ that tacked upfront the peripheral position of peasant farmers by granting them a 
secure and fair market for their produce.66  
Yet, PAA has failed to reach the most vulnerable family farmers and implementation reveals a 
bias towards the better off in the category (Grisa, 2012). Better-organised family farmers are 
those who are in more favourable conditions to respond effectively to the programme. Poorer 
farmers have struggled to meet several of the programme’s operational requirements, 
including those concerning capacity to maintain and transport production and consistency of 
delivered product (Grisa, Schmitt, Mattei, Maluf, & Pereira Leite, 2009). Lack of information 
about the programme and poor organisational and institutional capacity (for example, lack of a 
land ownership title) are some of the reasons that compromise the involvement of lower 
income subgroups (Grisa et al., 2009; Grisa, 2012). The rewarding of organic farming has also 
often failed for poorer farmers as many have difficulties accessing the required certification 
needed to claim a premium price (Grisa, 2012). 
Despite its mixed record, the narrative of PAA as a successful undertaking and as an exemplar 
of Brazil’s progressive policies has become widespread (Clements, 2015b; CONSEA, 2013; 
Nehring & McKay, 2013). This narrative has reverberated abroad, promoted not only by 
Brazilian government agencies, social movements and academics but also by international 
organisations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and FAO. FAO became particularly 
permeable to Brazilian discourse and influences under the leadership of José Graziano da Silva 
(FAO, 2014). 
 
Overall, More Food and PAA constitute two distinct approaches towards strengthening family 
farming that targeted different segments of the population – PAA may have failed to reach the 
poorer within peripheral farmers, but it has still been directed towards a different subset of 
                                                          
66 Interview with MST respondent, Brasília, November 2013. 
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the family farming population to that of More Food. Although both stress the role of the state 
in subsidising family farming, the two programmes symbolise different ideological stances on 
agricultural development – More Food embraces modernisation of family farms through 
mechanisation, whereas PAA represents resistance to modernisation by emphasising food 
sovereignty and agroecology and support to marginalised peasant farmers (Articulação 
Nacional de Agroecologia, 2016; Pacheco, 2013; Terra de Direitos, 2013). They also reflect 
distinct alliances forged by the Brazilian government – More Food resulted from an alliance 
with the industry whereas PAA emerged from the alliance with social movements – that 
reflect, in turn, the heterogeneous nature of the PT-led coalition government. Yet, both 
contribute to reproducing family farming as a mobilising concept for a coalition of rather 
distinct actors. They also contribute to strengthening family farming institutionally, through 
expanding the size of the family farming bureaucracy. 
These two programmes entered the Brazilian agricultural cooperation portfolio in 2010 as 
multi-country projects (MFI and PAA-Africa) that offered to replicate domestic successes in 
Africa. They thereby added a family farming dimension to a portfolio that had been largely 
dominated by Embrapa and Brazil’s agricultural modernisation ‘model’. Yet, for the reasons 
above, they carried along contrasting perspectives on agricultural development and the rural 
sphere and distinct actor-networks and coalitions under the shared motto of strengthening 
family farming. 
3.3. Dualism and its multiple significations 
It is evident, in the light of the above, that Brazilian agriculture is a highly polarised policy field. 
Disputes are based on bureaucratic rivalry, competing interests and different ideologies and 
values, woven over 40 years of history. How the debate is framed today is in itself part of the 
dispute. The emphasis put on dualism (Pierri, 2013) is countered by the argument that dualism 
is a Manichean illusion driven by political calculation (Navarro, 2010; Navarro & Pedroso, 
2011). Dualism is indeed an expression of the political, and its symbolic significance goes 
beyond conceptual definitions of rural producers; Graziano da Silva (2010), for example, 
argues that agribusiness is not necessarily separate from or inimical to family farming, as 
family farms are often integrated in value chains that connect farm production with processing 
and marketing activities. The validity of this claim does not preclude the existence of a lively 
political-ideological dispute that is rooted in the history of Brazilian agriculture, and within it, 
persistent class- and geography-based inequalities in the countryside and contrasting values in 
Brazilian society more broadly. Yet, the family farming-versus-agribusiness framing of dualism 
conveys one particular dimension of the dispute that is most unequivocally reflected in the 
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institutionalised division between MDA and MAPA and in competing categorisations of rural 
producers (FGV & CNA, 2010; IBGE & MDA, 2009). 
Neither family farming nor agribusiness are fixed categories. Instead, each of them 
incorporates diverse social identities and distinct political projects. Sauer (2008) refers to them 
as ‘synthesis concepts’. The term agribusiness encompasses not just the negatively connoted 
latifúndio, but also the somewhat more socially acceptable values of modernity, efficiency and 
competitiveness. It includes both old-style unproductive landlords linked to Brazil’s traditional 
oligarchies (Hagopian, 1996), for whom land remains an instrument of power rather than 
business, but also modern large farms, successfully integrated in international markets 
(Favareto, 2013). Family farming, on the other hand, comprises both marginalised peasant 
farmers, excluded from the modernisation process, and also modern small producers, seeking 
to modernise themselves and fit into the capitalistic system. Policy actors from across the 
agricultural sector have deployed these categories for political convenience. Favareto (2006) 
highlights that within a united family farming coalition lay old fissures between social 
movements integrating it.67 As for agribusiness, Bruno and Sevá (2010) argue that modern 
large-scale farmers and traditional agrarian elites coalesced around a notion that enabled 
them to rise above their differences and strengthen their hegemonic position, namely, by 
blurring the frontier between rural and urban. 
Besides the political differences it conceals, dualism as conventionally framed also 
misrepresents some of the intellectual debates that underlie the political confrontation. The 
opposition to either capitalism, productivism or modernisation that is implicit in some 
arguments suggests, indeed, a different intellectual framing of dualism and its opposing parts. 
For example, Fernandes, Welch and Gonçalves (2012) talk of dualism as the opposition 
between capitalist elites (equated to large landholdings and corporate agro-industrial 
complexes) and an alternative paradigm centred on the ‘agrarian question’, where the latter 
highlights the problem of class inequality and regards land redistribution as the only way of 
ensuring a more balanced and sustainable agricultural development model. Others highlight 
the multidimensional nature of family farms and the significance of diversified livelihoods in 
the countryside (Favareto, 2014b; Gazolla & Schneider, 2013; Schneider & Cassol, 2014; 
Wanderley, 2014) and oppose a focus on productivism and efficiency and arguments that small 
farms are doomed to disappear and dominated by large-scale efficient farms (Buainain et al., 
                                                          
67 This fractures reflected differences in the constitution of each movement and the interests they represented (indigenous people 
or other minority groups, landless people, wage labourers, small landholders and employers) but also competition for political 
space. 
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2013). Others, still, reject modernity by emphasising the humanistic and ecological dimension 
of peasant farming and its connection to the territory (Petersen et al., 2013), as in my 
respondent’s earlier description of family farmers’ concern for people’s culture and respect for 
nature. Of course, there is also the denial of dualism implicit in arguments that all farming is 
agribusiness, that there is no fundamental distinction between them besides scale and degree 
of market integration, and that family farming and agribusiness represent at best 
complementary modes of production (Presidência da República, 2011b; Rodrigues, 2010; Sou 
Agro, 2014). 
Thus, family farming and agribusiness came to represent, each of them, aggregates of distinct 
perspectives, values and interests, united around an overarching battle – defined in rather 
simplified terms – that obscured their internal differences. As discursively constructed 
concepts, family farming and agribusiness can hence be regarded as ‘floating signifiers’ 
(Torfing, 2005) and their deployment expresses a hegemonic battle for meaning that conceals 
their individual multiple significations. Also, following Hajer (1993, 2005), their multifaceted 
actor-networks can be regarded as discourse coalitions. 
These different framings of dualism, family farming and agribusiness, with their ideas, 
interests, actors-networks and discourse coalitions, have inevitably travelled with 
development cooperation programmes and as part of the increasing degree of 
internationalisation of Brazilian agricultural protagonists and policies, as reflected by the 
priests, technicians and traders metaphor. The priests opposing ProSAVANA that my Embrapa 
respondent talked about, represented mainly a battle against modernisation and 
subordination to corporate interests, rather than family farming proponents associated with 
MFI’s mechanisation. As for traders, they represented the modern farmer seeking 
international opportunities, but also the interests of Brazilian corporate elites. Embrapa’s 
technicians, in turn, carried the modernisation imaginary as an apolitical and scientifically 
validated route to agricultural development. 
In the following chapter I discuss the process of internationalisation of Brazilian agriculture in 
its various guises, the interests pursued and narratives reproduced. I therefore situate priests, 
technicians and traders in relation to South-South cooperation and the Mozambique context, 
setting the scene for my subsequent analysis of ProSAVANA and MFI. 
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Chapter 4. Priests, technicians and traders in Mozambique 
The first decade of the 21st century saw an unprecedented flow of Brazilian priests, technicians 
and traders to the African continent, many of whom got a ride through the diplomacy channel. 
President Lula da Silva presided over Brazil’s most intensive diplomatic venture in Africa in the 
post-colonial period (Saraiva, 2010; Visentini, 2009; White, 2010; World Bank, 2012). This is 
reflected by his record number of Presidential visits to African countries and the more than 
doubling of Brazilian embassies on the continent during his time in office, giving Brazil one the 
largest non-African diplomatic networks in Africa (Amorim, 2010; Jorge, 2011). 
The question of what led Lula’s Brazil into Africa is lengthily discussed in the literature; 
particularly that produced within international relations scholarship (cf. Chapter 1). The 
government’s official line of ‘solidarity diplomacy’ towards developing countries, where South-
South cooperation (SSC) is held to be a central instrument (Abreu, 2013a; Amorim, 2010; 
Farani, 2010), is qualified by analyses pointing towards geopolitical tactics (Lima & Hirst, 2006; 
Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; White, 2010) as well as economic calculation (Stolte, 2012; White, 
2013). The concurrence of agendas appears as a distinctive feature of Brazil’s engagements in 
Africa. White (2010) talks about a ‘three-pronged approach’ in Lula’s foreign policy towards 
Africa, coherently combining political diplomacy, commercial affairs and development 
cooperation. Visentini (2009) asks whether Brazil’s ‘southern solidarity’ under Lula is the 
outcome of the combination of ‘prestige diplomacy’, or the quest for geopolitical influence, 
and ‘soft imperialism’, or the pursuit of economic interests. 
However, the confluence of agendas in Brazil-Africa affairs is not a feature introduced by the 
Lula government, but one that had been identified for earlier engagements in the continent 
(Dávila, 2010; Saraiva, 2010). Saraiva (2010), for example, describes Brazil’s foreign policy 
under the military regime (1964-85) as the combination of a national conservative political 
project of state-led modernisation, of economic pragmatism, including the need to guarantee 
stable energy supplies, and the urge to exercise geopolitical influence in the South Atlantic 
region. 
Which agenda item takes precedence seems to depend on the historical juncture – during the 
oil crises of the early 70s, trade with oil-rich African nations, such as Angola and Nigeria, 
became particularly strategic (Dávila, 2010). It is also a matter of individual judgement, likely 
to be induced by disciplinary inclination or political positioning. For my own purposes, what is 
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significant is that there is an intersection of agendas and influences. As I argue in this thesis, 
and it will become apparent with my case studies, this intersection happens not only as part of 
a pre-conceived strategy, where alliances are deliberately forged for convenience or common 
purpose, but it is also an expression of a multiplicity of interests and perspectives, sometimes 
converging under unifying narratives. Hence, instead of a ‘three-pronged approach’ 
perspective which, in part, rests on the idea of pre-conceived strategy of a monolithic state or 
a unitary centre of command, I return to the Embrapa researcher’s ‘priests, technicians and 
traders’ metaphor. This equally conveys the idea of diversity of interests, but highlights their 
dialectic interaction: at times converging but other times conflicting. 
My aims in this chapter are twofold. The first is to account for the diversity of engagements in 
Brazil-Mozambique relations. The second aim, connecting to the agricultural domain, is to 
illustrate alignment, as well as tension, between concurrent forms of engagement and nuance 
in the metaphor by pointing to the fluid nature of each category in the triad, as indicated by 
the intersection of actors, agendas and narratives. 
Before I consider Brazil’s priests, technicians and traders in Mozambique in detail, and to 
situate their engagements better, I first discuss Brazil’s solidarity diplomacy and SSC towards 
Africa and then give an overview of the Mozambican context. 
4.1. Brazil in Africa: ‘solidarity diplomacy’ and South-South cooperation the ‘Brazilian 
way’ 
Solidarity towards Africa was a salient element of Brazil’s foreign policy under President Lula 
(Amorim, 2010). At its most rhetorical, the approach was justified as part of a moral obligation 
to redeem a history of slave traffic across the Atlantic (BBC News, 2005). It was also portrayed 
as the expression of a fraternal relationship between natural partners. To emphasise 
proximity, Africa was (and still is) referred to as Brazil’s ‘Atlantic’ or ‘eastern’ border (Saraiva, 
2010) and the Atlantic ocean sometimes portrayed as a river (Lula da Silva, 2006, p. 68), 
perhaps reflecting the influence of Brazilian historian Alberto da Costa e Silva and his book A 
river called Atlantic: Africa in Brazil and Brazil in Africa, where a common identity is analysed at 
length, as discussed by Dávila (2010). 
The ideas of Brazil’s African origins and ‘natural vocation’ towards Africa are rooted in the 
thinking of Gilberto Freyre and his understanding of Brazilian society as a ‘racial democracy’, 
‘saturated with African culture’ (Dávila, 2010, p. 12). These ideas have influenced Brazil’s 
foreign policy towards post-colonial Africa since the 1960s and continue to do so today.  
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President Lula embraced the Africa agenda with particular passion and was exceptionally 
persuasive in conveying ideas of solidarity and common identity: 
Brazilian people are what they are – happy, beautiful, full of swing, samba, carnival 
and football-loving – because of our miscegenation and the extraordinary mix 
between Africans, indigenous peoples and Europeans. This in fact should be our 
strength compared to the rest of the world, but because we had our minds colonised 
for centuries, we were taught that we were inferior. When we make a choice for 
Africa, we want to stand up and lift our heads together. We want to build a future in 
which the South is not weaker than the North nor is dependent on the North. A future 
where, if we believe in ourselves, we can be just as important and as smart as they 
are. (Lula speaking in Mozambique, in his last visit to Africa as President in 2010, 
quotation by Uchoa (2010), author’s translation) 
 
Oratory aside, solidarity had a purpose, as acknowledged by its own engineers. Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim (2003-10) described cooperation with the South as resulting from the 
‘authentic desire to exercise solidarity towards poorer countries’, while also conceding that it 
helped ‘expand[ing] Brazil’s participation in world affairs’ (Amorim, 2010, p. 231). Indeed, 
Brazil’s diplomacy towards Africa is regarded as part of a strategy aiming to diversify its 
alliances for greater diplomatic autonomy (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007), assert its stance as a 
global and regional player (Lima & Hirst, 2006; Malamud, 2011; Pinheiro & Gaio, 2013), and 
run a ‘pilot test’ as an emerging power (White, 2010). This pattern had already been noted for 
Brazil’s earlier engagements in Africa, as argued by Dávila in his account of Brazilian foreign 
policy at the time of Africa’s decolonisation, when ‘Brazilian leaders used relations with Africa 
to assert autonomy from the United States and stake a claim as an emerging world power’ 
(2010, p. 4). 
Furthermore, southern alliances, such as those fostered with African countries, are viewed as a 
counter-hegemonic movement vis-à-vis the established international order, which nowadays 
aims specifically at gaining more clout in international trade agreements and pushing for 
reforms in the multilateral system, such as making the United Nations more prominent in 
international affairs and the governance of international institutions more inclusive (Amorim, 
2007).  
Besides aspirations concerning a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, so far frustrated, 
and increased influence in multilateral organisations, to some extent successful (Brazilian 
nationals currently lead both the World Trade Organisation and FAO), Brazilian foreign policy 
has also attempted to assert leadership within the South. It has managed to do so in 
international trade negotiations, and the establishment of the G-20 alliance of developing 
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nations is considered a major achievement (Visentini & Silva, 2010).68 By lobbying with African 
countries, Brazil pushed successfully for the reduction of trade protectionism vis-à-vis 
agricultural commodities in European and North American markets.69 
While promoting multilateralism, bilateral technical cooperation with countries in the South 
was consolidated during Lula’s administration as a central instrument of southern solidarity 
(Amorim, 2010), serving also to strengthen Brazil’s stance as a global player (Pinheiro & Gaio, 
2013). Foreign policy presidential advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, an influential voice during 
both Lula and Dilma’s governments, commented that ‘Brazil’s political weight in global politics 
can come from its ethical and moral presence in Africa; through the sharing of solutions’ (Folha 
de S. Paulo, 2003). 
Although bilateral cooperation with African countries dates back to decolonisation (Dávila, 
2010), it was Lula who promoted it most intensively. This was done in a context of favourable 
economic performance in Brazil, and rising foreign investment and exports, all of which 
contributed to projecting Brazilian companies abroad and increasing the country’s global 
influence (White, 2010). Brazil’s sustained economic growth and falling poverty and inequality 
during the 2000s (Amann & Barrientos, 2014) gave the Brazilian government the confidence to 
claim that it had ‘solutions’ suitable for other developing countries and to assert some past 
experiences as successful undertakings – the ‘miracle of the Cerrado’ (The Economist, 2010) is 
one with considerable resonance in agricultural cooperation, as I will discuss later. Brazil’s 
buoyant economic stance combined with entrenched Freyrean ideas of affinity towards Africa 
(Dávila, 2010) such as that Brazil’s ‘tropical technology’ and ‘multicultural and multi-ethnic 
society’ made its technical cooperation particularly fitting to the needs of its counterpart 
developing countries (ABC, 2011a, p. 3). While Brazil’s bilateral cooperation narrative 
emphasises altruistic solidarity, its practice reveals a complex mingling of intents, however, 
which is a direct reflection of the pluralisation of Brazil’s foreign policy and its permeation to 
diverse domestic influences (Cason & Power, 2009; Pinheiro & Milani, 2012). 
Brazil’s notion of development cooperation draws from that of SSC (ECOSOC, 2008; High Level 
Event on SSC, 2010) and traditional foreign policy principles of non-interference and respect 
for sovereignty of partner countries (principles shared by other SSC providers). As noted 
earlier, the Brazilian government claims its approach to be driven by demands from partner 
                                                          
68 The G-20 of developing nations (distinct from the G-20 of major economies) was established in August 2003 in the run 
up to the 5th Ministerial World Trade Organisation conference, held in Cancún, Mexico, on 14 September 2003. 
69 Brazil’s winning of the cotton dispute with the USA generated resources (from the penalty paid by the USA) to fund a bilateral 
technical cooperation programme led by Embrapa in four countries in West Africa, known as Cotton-4. 
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countries rather than imposed by Brazil and to be detached from commercial interest (ABC, 
2011a; Abreu, 2013a). In the words of the Director of ABC:  
In promoting cooperation, Brazil takes particular care in acting in agreement with the 
principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other nations. Without lucrative purpose and detached from economic and 
commercial interests, Brazil’s South-South cooperation aims to share our successes 
and best practices in areas demanded by our partner countries, without imposition or 
political conditionality. (Abreu (2013a, p. 6), author’s translation) 
 
Yet, the idea that cooperation is disconnected from business interests does not reconcile easily 
with that of ‘mutual benefit’, which is also emphasised. For example:  
Brazil considers that South-South cooperation is not “aid” per se, but rather a 
partnership in which all involved Parts benefit. In other words Brazil adopts the 
principle of horizontal cooperation. (ABC, 2011a, p. 3) 
  
It begs the question of what the benefit of altruistic solidarity for Brazil is. Foreign Minister 
Amorim portrays SSC as ‘[c]ooperation among equals in matters of trade, investment, science 
and technology and other fields’ (2010, p. 231), expressing a position that is more consistent 
with the principle of mutual advantage and that acknowledges interaction between different 
fields of engagement. 
The practice of technical cooperation in Africa suggests there is, indeed, an association with 
business. Vocational training provided by Brazil’s National Service for Industrial Apprenticeship 
(SENAI) in Lusophone Africa under the framework of technical cooperation is hardly 
dissociated from Brazilian private investment in those countries and the urge to make those 
investments viable by securing availability of qualified human resources (White, 2013). The 
various attempts to pursue technical cooperation with African countries on bioenergy also 
illustrate business drivers, and specifically the interest in promoting a sector where Brazilian 
technology dominates. 
The connection between technical cooperation and business in Brazil’s strategy towards Africa 
became more explicitly articulated in the presidency of Dilma Rousseff. This was not because 
she adopted a savvier strategy – her interest in foreign affairs has been remarkably low 
(Simon, 2016; Stuenkel, 2014) – but  rather because of lack of skill, compared to her 
predecessor, for toning down business drivers in foreign policy and playing up ‘solidarity 
diplomacy’. Dilma’s limited interest in Africa is illustrated by the words of a director of 
Odebrecht in Mozambique, one of Brazil’s largest construction companies: 
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Lula push businessmen to Africa. Now it is businessmen pushing Dilma. That has 
always been the way, it only changed a little bit with Lula. (quoted by Rossi (2013, 
para. 9), author’s translation) 
 
Yet, Dilma did introduce some novelties during her first term in office. In 2011, she created 
Grupo África, an advisory group with an overtly business agenda that included several 
ministerial departments as well as private sector executives. Socially responsible business was 
its motto as investors and traders were urged to leave a legacy in their business dealings 
through transfers of technology, training and social programmes (Leo, 2011). The ‘business 
with a legacy’ narrative would be reaffirmed in Dilma’s few visits to the continent. 
Furthermore, in 2013, speaking at the 50th anniversary of the African Union in Addis Ababa, 
she announced the creation of a new agency for international cooperation, trade and 
investment, to replace Itamaraty’s ABC (Exman, 2013). Although this latter announcement 
never materialised, it cast light on the political orientation for Brazilian cooperation and 
exposed broader institutional and party-based political battles. One of my respondents 
interpreted the announcement on the new agency and the creation of Grupo África as 
indicative of the deterioration of Itamaraty’s clout under Dilma and of the growing influence of 
the industry lobby over foreign policy, and the Africa agenda specifically, as Dilma mobilised 
support for her second presidential candidacy.70 
More significant was the revelation, also in Addis, of a generous renegotiation of debt with 
thirteen African countries which unblocked constraints for business expansion (Exman, 2013; 
Rossi, 2013): 
The rational for renegotiation is as follows: if I don’t have this [debt] negotiation, I 
cannot establish relations with them, from the point of view of investment, financing 
Brazilian companies in African countries, and trade that has greater value added. It is a 
two-way rationale: it benefits the African country and it benefits Brazil. (Dilma 
interviewed by Valor Econômico, quoted by Exman (2013), author’s translation) 
 
Whereas some regard links between cooperation and business as problematic (Schlesinger, 
2014), others see it as a natural evolution that stems from an increasingly competitive 
environment in Africa and one that renders cooperation economically sustainable (White, 
2010). Some (Stolte, 2012; White, 2013) go as far as arguing that what makes Brazil distinctive 
from other emerging powers, such as China or India, is precisely the marriage between 
business and developmental purposes and White comments:  
                                                          
70  Interview with Embrapa researcher, Brasília, November 2013 (EMB#2). 
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Commercial players from Brazil have become important as active role players in 
development across the African country, and development has become part of 
Brazilian firms’ sustainable commercial interests. (2013, p. 118)  
 
This supposedly ‘Brazilian way’ of conducting business while promoting development in Africa 
is particularly evident for agricultural and food production, regarded as the new frontier of 
engagement between Brazil and Africa. The agricultural domain has been the stage for 
business-cooperation alliances, but also for confrontation and resistance. Priests, technicians 
and traders are a metaphor for these alliances and confrontations. Before I situate the triad in 
SSC and the Mozambican context, an introduction to Mozambique’s economy, politics, 
agriculture and aid sector is required. 
4.2. Mozambique: a snapshot of the economy, politics, aid and agriculture  
Brazil and Mozambique were first united through the slave trade during the Portuguese 
colonial rule. After Brazil’s independence from Portugal, in 1822, a long period followed when 
there was no connection between the two countries. At Mozambique’s independence, in 
1975, the Mozambican government displayed reluctance towards Brazil (it refused to have a 
Brazilian delegation at its independence ceremonies) in response to the country’s hesitant 
support to the independence movement in Lusophone Africa, which resulted from the 
continuing influence of Portugal in Brazil (Dávila, 2010). The Brazilian Embassy in Mozambique 
would, however, open in 1976, although diplomatic affairs between the two countries 
remained timid for more than two decades. 
Mozambique has changed significantly since those days. After an almost two-decade long 
period of civil war that followed independence (itself obtained after a 10-year period of war 
with Portugal), Mozambique started its process of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the 
early 1990s, with support from the international donor community. The end of civil war in 
1992, that opposed Frelimo (the Mozambique Liberation Front that had fought for 
independence) to Renamo (the Mozambican National Resistance, an anti-Frelimo and anti-
communism guerrilla force set up with support from Rhodesia and the apartheid regime), 
followed the Frelimo government’s abandonment of the socialist doctrine at the end of the 
Cold War and the withdrawal of South Africa’s support of Renamo. 
These new circumstances made way for a new political settlement and the introduction of 
macroeconomic stabilisation (to control debt and inflation) and liberalisation policies (to roll 
back the state and remove barriers to trade) by the government, under the conditional 
support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Arndt, 1999). Under 
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the new partially liberalised regime,71 the 1990s and early 2000s witnessed massive inflows of 
aid from Western donors and increasing donor interference in domestic affairs (Killick, Castel-
Branco, & Gerster, 2005; de Renzio & Hanlon, 2007). Donors funded economic development, 
particularly transport and social infrastructures, and supported the delivery of public goods 
and social programmes targeting poverty reduction (World Bank, 2006). A narrative of success 
was widely shared across the donor community and Mozambique entered the 21st century as 
an ‘aid darling’ (Hanlon, 2010). 
The Mozambican economy registered its most sustained growth period in post-colonial times 
between 2004 and 2014, when GDP growth stabilised at an average rate of 7% (Macha & Ross, 
2014). Much of this dynamism resulted from so-called ‘megaprojects’72 in the mining-energy 
sector, funded largely by foreign direct investment – such as large hydropower dams and 
natural resource extraction plants (Xiong, 2014). High prices for fossil fuels and other 
commodities in international markets attracted investors to Mozambique to explore its natural 
resource endowments – especially of coal, natural gas and heavy sands (Xiong, 2014). Among 
foreign investors in Mozambique’s large-scale hydropower and fossil fuel projects are Chinese 
and Brazilian firms, some linked to multinational capital (Power et al., 2016). 
Yet, recent developments have revealed the ‘shaky foundations’ of Mozambique’s economic 
growth model (Jones, 2016). The excessive focus on primary extraction exposed the country to 
volatilities in international prices and foreign investment. In 2014, several foreign investments 
in extractives infrastructure stopped without having reached the stage of operational activity. 
The future of Mozambique has been further compromised by mismanagement of the economy 
and pervasive corruption by governing elites. A series of large corruption scandals has erupted 
since 2014, revealing the Mozambican state has incurred public debt worth US$ 2 billion 
through the establishment of dubious of public companies in the security and fisheries sectors 
that had failed to become viable (Africa Confidential, 2016).73 This raised public debt to 
alarming levels and rendered access to commercial capital markets very hard. Some donors 
have put a freeze on budgetary support to the government. 
                                                          
71 Partially in the sense that several liberalisation reforms called by the IMF and World Bank met resistance by government, as in 
the case of the land tenure system, where there was pressure for creating a market for land titles (de Renzio & Hanlon, 2007). 
72 Macha & Ross (2014, p. 9) define megaprojects as ‘large foreign-owned and capital-intensive, island-type activities that rely on 
extracted resources and/or imported intermediate goods, and which export almost all of their production’. 
73 One such scandal involves the Mozambique Tuna Company, EMATUM, a state-owned enterprise set up in 2013 to develop the 
tuna fisheries industry. EMATUM was set up through two sales of bonds worth US$ 850 million, which would buy French vessels 
for commercial fishing and fisheries protection (Vines, 2015). The company is at the risk of defaulting and international banks and 
lenders have raised their risk ratings for Mozambique as a result. 
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Opportunities for rent extraction and accumulation have also biased the government’s 
economic choices. For the mining-energy sector, for example, Power et al. (2016) argue that 
large-scale coal, gas and hydroelectricity offer the Mozambican elites more lucrative 
opportunities for accumulation than alternative small-scale renewable technology, which 
would strengthen a low carbon transition. 
Despite having held five multi-party presidential elections since independence, only one party, 
Frelimo, has been in power in Mozambique. The hegemonic Frelimo-state not only has the 
monopoly of power but also, increasingly, of the economy and its endowments and has 
created an elite-based system that abuses power for private business interests (Phiri & 
Macheve Jr., 2015). Frelimo’s political and economic hegemony led to growing discontent 
inside Renamo and, eventually, a return to armed conflict in 2013, aggravated by accusations 
of electoral fraud in the last 2014 elections (Beck, 2013). 
The growing opulence of urban elites linked to power contrasts with poverty levels that remain 
high and have worsened in rural areas (Hanlon, 2010; Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012). Revenue 
from megaprojects has not trickled down and a study concluded that their overall impact has 
been to increase poverty (Virtanen & Ehrenpreis, 2007). Also, the agricultural sector that was 
expected to play a central role in addressing rural poverty (Arndt, 1999) has failed to develop 
in an inclusive and pro-poor fashion (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012). Instead, farmers’ access to 
public services (extension, for example) is limited, local markets remain poorly developed and 
land grabbing and large-scale investments in agriculture have proliferated, in a process that 
has been about land speculation and accumulation by local and foreign elites (Hall & Paradza, 
2012; Norfolk & Hanlon, 2012).74 
In the meantime, the international donor community has been pouring money into poverty 
reduction and agricultural development programmes. In the new liberalised regime, NGOs 
became key service providers in the countryside throughout the 1990s, filling gaps left by the 
rollback of the state (Woodhouse, 1997). Many have recently turned towards private sector 
strengthening programmes, funded by donors whose aid policy focused or had shifted towards 
strengthening markets and enabling the private sector as a key development player (DFID, 
2014; United States Agency for international Development (USAID), 2014). Yet, given resource 
constraints and limited development of financial markets a domestic private sector has 
struggled to emerge (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012), except when well connected to governing 
elites and foreign capital (Hanlon & Mosse, 2010). 
                                                          
74 Interview with Mozambican political scientist, Maputo, February 2013 (MOZAC#1). 
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Large-scale farming and private sector-driven development fit a modernisation trajectory that 
has become the new orthodoxy for agricultural development. This is set in the context of the 
African Green Revolution that emphasises modern technology, productivity and 
competitiveness (Anseeuw, 2013; Blaustein, 2008). A Green Revolution is being resisted from 
below though, in a process that reflects broader transnational civil society contestations (S. M. 
Borras, Edelman, & Kay, 2008). Linked to transnational actors, Mozambican players include 
rural movements calling for agrarian justice, and environmental movements demanding 
ecologically conscious development solutions (I will introduce them and their claims in further 
detail in Chapter 5). 
The natural resources’ boom, land grabbing, agricultural modernisation and civil society 
contestation are central themes to my analysis of the Brazilian engagements in Mozambique; 
therefore let me now give further details on Brazilian priests, technicians and traders and 
consider how they fit into the particular historical moment of early 21st century Mozambique. 
They would start to arrive in Mozambique following President Lula da Silva’s inaugural visit to 
the country in 2003, his first year in office. This visit marked the start of development 
cooperation and business relations between the two countries. 
4.3. Brazilian actors, interests and narratives in Mozambique  
Fortaleza, Ceará state, 28 August 2014: Seven men in smart suits sit at a table of an air-
conditioned room at a luxury hotel in the Fortaleza seafront. They are opening the 
Second Brazil-Africa Forum, themed Infrastructure, Partnerships and Development. 
We stand at one of the closest points to Africa – Freetown lies at a mere 3,100 km 
across the Atlantic (the shortest distance is 2,800 km). ‘Welcome to Fortaleza, Brazil’s 
African capital’, greets the head of the Brazil Africa Institute (Instituto Brasil África), 
the host of the event. At his side, a group of Brazilian diplomats, businessmen and 
politicians, along with a representative of the African Union.75 In the audience, more of 
a kind, plus a few journalists and the odd researcher such as myself. During the 
following 48 hours, I would witness deals being forged, cordial invitations delivered, 
future partnerships pledged and mutually celebratory performances where business 
opportunities in Africa and Brazilians’ good fit to explore them were the dominant 
tone. Freyrean thinking ‘saturated’ the room, so that I wondered whether this was a 
display of Brazil’s coherent strategy towards Africa. 
                                                          
75 Brazilian speakers at the opening panel included the Head of the Africa Department at MRE, a representative of the Ceará state 
government, a representative of local industry and the CEO of Banco do Nordeste, a state bank headquartered in Fortaleza. 
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4.3.1 Business with a legacy 
The presence of delegations of business executives in presidential visits to the continent has 
been a constant feature of Brazil’s diplomacy in Africa. There is a view that the involvement of 
business has been driven by government, rather than being pushed by business itself (Stolte, 
2012), although this may have changed under Dilma (Rossi, 2013). It is also argued that 
entrepreneurs and diplomats are connected under a coordinated strategy, with the Brazil-
Africa Forum76 being one of the spaces for cultivating the network and prospecting new 
opportunities for engagement (Saraiva, 2010). Regardless of where the initial impulse came 
from, traders have for long occupied a prominent position in Brazil’s diplomatic venture in 
Africa. Their foothold in the continent dates back to at least the trading of Brazilian beef and 
home appliances in Nigeria in the 1970s (Dávila, 2010). In my analysis, however, traders stand 
not only for those trading goods and services with African countries, but also for investors in 
productive activity, and indeed diplomats and other brokers, such as the Brazil Africa Institute, 
seeking to forge business deals. Traders therefore stand for all those interests (of Brazilian 
origin) pertaining to doing business with or in Africa. 
Both trade with and private investment in Africa intensified considerably during the first 
decade of the millennium. Between 2000 and 2011, the volume of Brazil-Africa trade 
expanded six-fold, from US$ 4 to 28 billion (Stolte, 2012, p. 3). The share of Africa in Brazil’s 
overall trade also increased (Costa & Veiga, 2011). The composition of trade and trading 
partners did not change significantly though, especially in terms of imports from Africa, which 
remained dominated by oil and other minerals, from a small number of countries, notably 
Nigeria, Angola and Algeria (White, 2013). As for Brazilian exports to Africa, these were 
dominated by agricultural commodities, followed by manufactured goods, whose proportion 
was higher than the average for Brazilian exports (Costa & Veiga, 2011; Stolte, 2012). 
Despite the weight of natural resources in Brazil’s imports from Africa, Brazil’s long-term 
commercial interest in Africa lies not in natural resources, as the country’s own resource 
endowment is generous, but in consumer markets for Brazilian technology (Stolte, 2012) and 
as serving the investment agenda for the continent (White, 2013). There is an active policy to 
promote the diversification of trade and stimulate exports of Brazil’s manufacturers, where 
the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), a federal public financial 
institution associated with the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (MDIC), plays a 
                                                          
76 Three of these events have taken place to date, organised by the Brazil Africa Institute, a non-profit organisation created in 2013 
that presents itself as the broker in the promotion of interests of Brazil and African countries. A fourth Brazil-Africa Forum will be 
hosted by the institute in November 2016 and will focus on strategies for agricultural development in Brazil and Africa (Instituto 
Brasil África, n.d.).  
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central part. Export credit lines have been established by BNDES for Mozambique and other 
African countries (Costa & Veiga, 2011). BNDES has had a branch in South Africa since 2013. 
The Mozambican (and Southern African) market is central to Brazil’s trade diversification 
agenda and the strategy of the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) of 
promoting Brazilian manufacturers.77 BNDES’s credit lines to support the export agenda in 
Mozambique had raised much interest, as confirmed by the president of BNDES’ South Africa 
branch.78 For agriculture specifically, Brazilian machinery and implements were already being 
sold to Mozambique on concessional terms (with lending from Banco do Brasil, another 
Brazilian state bank) under the MFI programme, as I will analyse at length in Chapter 6. 
Brazil’s private investment in Africa also grew considerably throughout the 2000s (World Bank, 
2012). Whereas oil-rich countries stand out in trade relations, Lusophone countries, 
particularly Angola and Mozambique, have been the preferred location for productive 
investment (Figure 5). Private investment is led by a handful of players from the mining and 
construction sectors. Leading brands of Brazilian capital are Petrobras and Vale as mining 
companies, and Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Corrêa and Queiroz Galvão as 
construction firms that have turned into diversified conglomerates covering a range of 
economic activities including agribusiness. These are Brazil’s biggest corporations with capacity 
to invest overseas. For some of them, such capacity was developed with support received from 
government, notably loans from BNDES, as part of a process of internationalisation of Brazilian 
companies initiated by the military regime in the 1970s (Visentini, 2009; Stolte, 2012).79 
                                                          
77 Interview with APEX officials, Brasília, July 2014 (APEX#1 and APEX#2). 
78 Personal communication with President of BNDES office in South Africa, Fortaleza, August 2014. 
79 Petrobras and Vale initiated operations in Africa in the 1970s and Odebrecht established operations in Angola in the 1980s 
(Visentini, 2009). 
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Figure 5. Brazilian corporations in Africa 
 
Legend: Total of countries: 19. Source: Jorge (2011, p. 16). 
In Mozambique, where trade with Brazil is not yet significant, the business agenda is 
dominated by private investments, with Vale as the most prominent actor in the flourishing 
energy-mining sector. In 2004, Vale gained a mining concession for a coal mine in Moatize, in 
Tete province (north of the country). It has since invested US$ 1.8 billion in the mine and is 
expected to invest another US$ 2 billion, making it Vale’s largest coal operation overseas (Vale, 
2013b). With productive capacity expected to double from its current 11 million tons of coal 
per year, Moatize is also one of the biggest coal mines in the world. Besides the Moatize mine, 
Vale’s investments in the region also include the rehabilitation (and construction of new 
sections) of a 912-kilometre-long railway along the Nacala corridor and connecting Moatize to 
the coast (across Malawi), worth US$ 3.4 billion, which will become the main route for coal 
exports (Figure 6). Vale is also sponsoring the construction of a port terminal at Nacala, 
estimated at US$ 1 billion; its productive investments foreseen for Mozambique add up to US$ 
8.2 billion, half of the country’s GDP in 2013, making it one of the largest foreign investors 
(Vale, 2013b). 
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Figure 6. Vale's railway from Moatize to Nacala-a-Velha 
 
Source: Vale (2013b). 
Vale brought along other Brazilian companies. The mining infrastructure at Moatize was built 
by a consortium led by Odebrecht and included Camargo Corrêa. Odebrecht was also the 
leading company constructing the Nacala international airport, inaugurated in 2014 by landing 
the first commercial flight using an aeroplane produced by Embraer, another Brazilian 
company. Furthermore, Camargo Corrêa won the bid for building the Mphanda Nkuwa 
hydroelectric plant, on the Zambezi river. Smaller Brazilian firms have also settled in the region 
to supply the larger companies.80  
Brazilian business in Africa was portrayed rhetorically as responsible in the sense that, unlike 
China, as was frequently noted by my Brazilian respondents, they did not have a predatory 
attitude but instead sought to offer a contribution to ‘local development’, either through the 
employment of a local labour force, professional training or through the transfer of 
technology.81 The Lula Institute, a non-profit organisation that engages in the international 
promotion of Brazil in Africa and Latin America, has advocated specifically for the responsible 
internationalisation of Brazilian business.82 
                                                          
80  Interview with executive from Vale in Mozambique, Maputo, February 2014 (VALE#1). 
81 Interview with Vale employee, Maputo, February 2014 (VALE#2). 
82 The Lula Institute has been a platform for former president Lula to continue having an active presence in the international 
sphere and in Africa and Latin America in particular. Interview with Lula Institute respondent, São Paulo, November 2013. 
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Whilst Brazilian private investments in agricultural activity in Mozambique were not 
significant, there was long-term interest in the sector.83 The Nacala Fund provides an 
illustration. The Fund was launched in 2012 as a private initiative managed by FGV Projetos, 
the consultancy branch of FGV linked to the agribusiness lobby in Brazil (cf. Chapter 3), which 
expected to raise up to US$ 2 billion to fund agricultural investments in the Nacala corridor 
region. Although I will come back to the Nacala Fund in further detail in my analysis of 
ProSAVANA (Chapter 5), it is worth noting here the connection between this agricultural 
investment fund and other productive investments by Brazilian firms as well as trade 
prospects.  
The interest in sponsoring agricultural activity in the Nacala corridor went hand in hand with 
investments in mining and transport infrastructure by Vale in the region. Vale’s rehabilitation 
of the railway aimed mainly at establishing a route for transporting coal from Moatize. Yet, 
additional cargo (such as agricultural commodities for export markets) would increase returns 
on the investment in the railway (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). The Nacala Fund also 
indicated a connection with the trade agenda. Mozambique was portrayed, in FGV Projetos’ 
advertising about the Fund, as a stepping-stone to Asian markets for agricultural commodities 
produced in Mozambique, with support from Brazilian capital and farmers (Figure 7). It was 
also held as a strategic market for Brazilian technology, including agricultural machinery and 
inputs, as suggested by the latest formulation of the Fund. 
Besides trade promotion agencies, large investors and their professional advisors (such as FGV 
Projetos), my introduction to Brazilian traders in Mozambique would not be complete without 
mentioning Brazilian farmers. Their interest in Mozambican agriculture appears to have been 
induced by the Brazilian government rather than having spontaneously arisen from farmers 
themselves. ProSAVANA worked as an enticement to the internationalisation of Brazilian 
farmers as a series of visits by Brazilian agricultural entrepreneurs and their political 
representatives took place between 2010 and 2012, targeting specifically ProSAVANA and the 
Nacala corridor. More than 100 farmers are reported to have visited Mozambique 
(Schlesinger, 2014), led, inter alia, by Senator Katia Abreu, President of CNA at the time (and 
who would become Minister of Agriculture in Dilma’s second mandate), and Member of 
Congress Luiz Nishimori, both supporters of the bancada ruralista (cf. Chapter 3). Abreu, who 
visited the country in 2010, highlighted the great potential for Brazilian entrepreneurs, both 
farmers and merchants of agricultural commodities, and also remarked on the contribution of 
                                                          
83 Interview with CNA respondent, Brasília, July 2014. 
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Brazilian research and technical assistance for the development of African agriculture (Castro, 
2010). 
Figure 7. The Nacala Fund-ProSAVANA connection 
 
Source: Senatore and Matos (2012, p. 55). 
Despite the hype around the African savannah, the launch of Nacala Fund, the official tours 
and casual invitations,84 Brazilian farmers in Mozambique remained rare during the course of 
my study. The one notable Brazilian presence, pre-dating ProSAVANA, was that of Pinesso, 
farming soybeans, maize and cotton in the district of Gurué, in Zambézia province. Gilson 
Pinesso, the President of the company and the head of the Brazilian Cotton Association, a 
major reference of Brazil’s agribusiness, was also a partner of Paulo Hegg, a successful 
Brazilian entrepreneur with a large cotton farm in Sudan. A speaker at the Brazil-Africa Forum, 
Hegg told me how a group of about 20 Brazilian farmers, led by his partner Gilson, had their 
eyes on the Nacala corridor and were following progress with the Nacala Fund with 
expectation. When funding became available, they would be willing to take up the 
opportunity. 
Besides Nacala, other parts of Mozambique were under the radar for Brazilian traders, 
including the Zambezi valley, another attractive region for agricultural investment (@Verdade, 
                                                          
84 I recall, for example, at a coffee break at the Brazil-Africa Forum, a Mozambican diplomat approaching a successful Brazilian 
melon producer and inviting him to visit the Nacala corridor, ‘a land of opportunities’. 
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2014). The Afro-Brazilian business association (Associação Nacional de Empresários e 
Empreendedores Afro-Brasileiros, ANCEABRA), which I interviewed, organised visits to the area 
in 2014 and 2015, with backing from MDIC, APEX and Itamaraty.85 Claiming to represent black 
micro to medium-size entrepreneurs in Brazil, this association was particularly well placed to 
exploit Freyrean ideas of Brazil’s African identity.86 ANCEABRA’s interests in Mozambique 
comprised business in agriculture, housing construction and tourism, but agriculture along the 
Zambezi was regarded as particularly strategic. The presence of Vale in the region, the 
availability of land, water and proximity to key markets such as China and India, were 
mentioned by my respondent as criteria for selecting the region. ANCEABRA planned to 
‘occupy’, in my respondent’s words, an area of 100,000 hectares made available by the 
Mozambican government, with average farm size of 10,000 hectares and up to 40,000 
hectares (i.e. very large areas). Mobilised entrepreneurs included cattle-ranchers from the 
state of Pará, medium size soybean, maize and sugar farmers from the states of Goiás and 
Mato Grosso (acknowledged to be large farmers by Mozambican standards), and family 
farmers mobilised via FETRAF, ANCEABRA’s partner for the family farming segment. The 
Cerrado and family farming combined in the search for expanding Brazil’s agricultural frontier: 
We are marrying three basic elements. First, land. Today land is very expensive 
everywhere in the world. [By going to Africa] we are expanding Brazil’s agricultural 
frontier. Second, we are taking there the best Brazilian agricultural technology in the 
world for large-scale farming. But we are also taking there the family farming 
experience.87 
 
Although making money was ANCEABRA’s main driver, the initiative was portrayed as 
distinctive for its technological contribution: ‘Brazilian technology will stay in Mozambique, 
with Mozambican farmers. Family farming, its technology will stay in Mozambique, with local 
peasants’.88 It was, once again, business with a legacy. 
By the time I concluded fieldwork in 2014, no concrete business deals for farming of any scale 
had yet been struck by Brazilians in Mozambique or at least there was no publicly available 
information about them. The slowdown of the Brazilian economy and a particular political 
moment in Brazil,89 alongside civil society contestation around ProSAVANA (discussed further 
                                                          
85 Interview with ANCEABRA respondent, Brasília, July 2014. The 2015 mission is mentioned in a promotional video by ANCEABRA 
(Bosco, 2014). 
86 ANCEABRA connections with Africa started in 1998, when a business office was set up in Senegal, La Maison du Brésil to sell 
mostly Brazilian garments in the Senegalese market. 
87 ANCEABRA respondent, Brasília, July 2014. 
88 ANCEABRA respondent, Brasília, July 2014. 
89 In 2014, Brazil hosted the World Football Cup, a major international event, and held Presidential elections. 
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in Section 4.3.3 and Chapter 5), may have played a role. Yet, business interests in Mozambique 
remained high, as suggested by successive prospection missions and business events in several 
guises, including the Brazil-Africa fora. There may have been no evidence of Brazilian-led land 
grabbing, but the rush for grabbing opportunities for trade and technological implantation 
seemed well in place. 
4.3.2 Embrapa’s tropical technology 
 Technical cooperation as business and geopolitics 
Agricultural research was the most powerful instrument that made Brazil the power 
that it is today. Brazil is giving it away and offering it to Africa. (Kátia Abreu, quoted in 
Castro (2010), author’s translation). 
 
These were the words of Senator Kátia Abreu when visiting Mozambique in 2010. Brazilian 
technology and know-how, supplied through government-sponsored technical cooperation, 
was the legacy that complemented business, as demanded by President Rousseff. This view 
was articulated by my respondents at MDIC, APEX, ANCEABRA and the Brazilian Association of 
the Machinery Industry (ABIMAQ), that is, those directly involved in promoting trade in Africa, 
for whom technical cooperation was the added value offered by Brazilian business.90 
Despite the manifest connection with business, the Brazilian government portrayed technical 
cooperation as an altruistic endeavour, in line with its SSC principles (Abreu, 2013a). Presented 
in these terms, technical cooperation was deployed as an instrument of soft power, of 
establishing Brazil’s authority in international development as a source for tropical solutions 
suitable for developing countries. These solutions often came from specialised agencies, such 
as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (known as Fiocruz)91 in health or Embrapa in agriculture. 
These two agencies had established their reputation as world leading research centres and 
President Lula promoted their brands enthusiastically across Africa. In 2006, he inaugurated an 
Embrapa office in Ghana, expecting it would become a hub for the continent and delivering a 
similar agricultural transformation to that experienced in Brazil: 
To have Embrapa in the city of Accra, in Ghana, is the beginning of a peaceful 
revolution that will have as result the germination of grain, food, products that can do 
in the African savannah the same revolution that Embrapa carried out in the Brazilian 
Midwest (Lula cited by Gallas (2008), author’s translation). 
 
                                                          
90 Interviews with: CAMEX respondent, Brasília, November 2013; APEX#1 and APEX#2; and ABIMAQ respondent, São Paulo, July 
2014. 
91 Fiocruz is a biomedical sciences research organisation. 
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With Lula’s passionate advertising, Embrapa became one of most significant actors of Brazilian 
cooperation in Africa (Cabral et al., 2013), with a portfolio of technical cooperation projects 
covering about 30 countries, in some of which Embrapa’s footprint dated back 25 years 
(Embrapa, 2010a). Its perceived global relevance is reflected in its motto: ‘what Embrapa 
plans, the world harvests’ (Embrapa, n.d., pp. 1-2). Its reputation as the champion of Brazil’s 
agricultural ‘miracle’ has become a source of inspiration for African counterparts that hope to 
replicate the achievement. This poses the question of what Embrapa would gain from this. 
 The politics of cooperation inside Embrapa 
Inside Embrapa, not everyone was persuaded by the Presidential initiative of promoting 
Embrapa as an instrument of solidarity diplomacy in Africa.92 A senior manager at Embrapa’s 
International Relations Secretariat (SRI), the unit responsible for implementing the technical 
cooperation programme, noted that cooperation with Africa was not a priority and that the 
most significant international agenda item for Embrapa was collaborative scientific research 
with partners in the USA, China and countries in Europe.93 There was also the view, however, 
that Embrapa could gain from cooperation with Africa. Gains included collaborative research 
with international organisations – such as through the Brazil-Africa arm of the Agricultural 
Innovation Marketplace – and international experience and career progression for Embrapa 
researchers (as discussed in Cabral, forthcoming). 
Despite some reluctance to see the Africa agenda as strategic, the build-up of promises made 
by Lula to African counterparts pushed some improvements in Embrapa’s institutional capacity 
to honour commitments. The Centre for Strategic Studies and Training in Tropical Agriculture 
(CECAT) was established in 2009 as a decentralised unit to offer a more structured training 
programme. A dedicated four-storey building, erected at Embrapa’s headquarters in Brasília 
and equipped with state-of-the-art technology to support training activities, was inaugurated 
by Lula in person, in 2010 (Embrapa, 2010a). The date of the inauguration was synchronised 
with a landmark event focused on Brazil-Africa agricultural cooperation – the Brazil-Africa 
Talks on Food Security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development (Diálogo Brasil-África em 
Segurança Alimentar, Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural), henceforth referred to as 
the Brazil-Africa Talks – that was attended by delegations from more than 40 African countries 
(ABC, 2010b). I will come back to this event and its significance when I introduce the ‘priests’ in 
Mozambique. 
                                                          
92 Interviews with EMB#1, EMB#2 and EMB#3, Brasília, November 2013. 
93 Interview with EMB#2. 
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In 2013, CECAT published a catalogue of courses on offer. Despite the association between 
Embrapa and the Green Revolution-type of transformation of the Cerrado, the material 
advertised in the catalogue emphasised organic farming and small-scale production (CECAT, 
2013). Besides studies and training, CECAT also promoted debates on development 
cooperation, such as a seminar series on SSC during 2013 (Embrapa, 2013). CECAT was 
dismantled in 2014 and its training capacity moved into the Department for Technology 
Transfer (DTT). The decision was interpreted as part of a political manoeuvre to increase the 
PT’s control inside Embrapa, by transferring the training function into PT-controlled DTT (O 
Globo, 2014).94 
To emphasise the growing significance of cooperation inside Embrapa, it is also worth 
mentioning the attempt to establish ‘Embrapa International’, an overseas representation that 
would grant more flexibility to operations abroad – including less dependency from the 
cumbersome and resource-constrained ABC for technical cooperation. A provisional measure 
(medida provisória), ratified by Congress during Lula’s legislature, approved its creation, but 
the initiative was later reverted (in Dilma’s legislature) based on concerns over the legality of 
the measure, and resulted in political turmoil inside Embrapa, leading to the replacement of 
President Pedro Arraes and several senior staff at SRI.95 There is a view that legality concerns 
were used as a pretext to remove Pedro Arraes and replace him with someone more closely 
aligned with the new team at the Presidential office.96 
The intricacies around the dismantling of CECAT and the internal reshuffling triggered by the 
‘Embrapa International’ process go beyond the scope of my analysis. What is relevant for my 
introduction of Brazilian technicians is that these two episodes illustrate the increasing 
relevance of the internationalisation agenda, including development cooperation, inside 
Embrapa and, crucially, the instrumentalisation of this agenda for political purposes.  
Hence, besides the business and geopolitical rationale of Brazil’s technical cooperation, what 
was at stake was also a power struggle driven by political party allegiances and, specifically, 
attempts from the PT to exert influence inside an institution that had long been subordinated 
to a ministry led by PT’s rival party, PMDB.97 Linked to these party-politics dynamics, there was 
also a struggle between competing views on agriculture and the role of the state in supporting 
                                                          
94 My Embrapa respondents EMB#1 and EMB#2 articulated a similar view. 
95 The Embrapa International episode was discussed at length by an anonymous researcher from Embrapa on a blog between 
October and December 2012 (‘A verdade sobre a Embrapa’, n.d.). 
96 Interview with EMB#1, EMB#2 and EMB#3. 
97 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Embrapa is institutionally subordinated to MAPA, whose minister has been historically appointed by 
the PMDB, the second largest party in the PT-led coalition (as well as the preceding PSDB-led coalition headed by Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso). 
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the sector and specific groups within it. To introduce this latter dimension, I will now give an 
overview of the Embrapa portfolio in Mozambique and highlight some contrasting elements. 
Embrapa appears, therefore, less as a monolithic organisation associated with one particular 
agricultural development experience in Brazil (large-scale and modern agriculture in the 
Cerrado). Its engagement in technical cooperation in Africa emerges, hence, as a battle for 
identity and power within the organisation. 
 Embrapa’s ‘contested agronomy’ in Mozambique 
At the time of fieldwork, Embrapa had three active technical cooperation projects in 
Mozambique and was involved in one collaborative research project under the Agricultural 
Innovation Marketplace initiative. The three projects were the research component of 
ProSAVANA (known as ProSAVANA-PI), the Technical Cooperation Support to the Agricultural 
Innovation Platform of Mozambique (Plataforma) and the Technical Support to Nutrition 
Programs and Food Security in Mozambique (ProAlimentos) – Table 1 summarises. 
There were more than a dozen different specialised research units from Embrapa in Brazil 
involved in project implementation (Cabral, forthcoming). Roles carried out by Embrapa 
researchers covered a range of areas, including: undertaking studies, supporting local 
counterparts’ planning activities, producing guidelines for various agricultural research and 
technology transfer activities, organising training courses, conducting agricultural experiments, 
amongst others. Across these different activities, Embrapa’s main contribution was about 
transferring agriculture technology, in terms of improved tropical varieties developed by 
Embrapa in Brazil. As described by two of my respondents: 
Given that Embrapa dominates tropical agriculture, it is Embrapa that has the cultivars 
that Africa needs, and that can serve Africa very well.98  
We took specific varieties of crops, improved varieties, hybrids of various cultures, 
varieties with better nutritional qualities compared to the degenerated varieties they 
use there.99  
 
Embrapa’s tropical technology was expected to help modernise agriculture in Mozambique, 
seen as ‘primitive’ and ‘rudimentary’100 and ‘incapable of producing for the needs of the 
population’.101 From this perspective, project achievements were often described in terms of 
                                                          
98 Interview with Embrapa researcher, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014 (EMB#11). 
99 Second interview with Embrapa researcher, Brasília, July 2014 (EMB#5). 
100 Interview with EMB#7. 
101 Interview with Embrapa researcher, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014 (EMB#8). 
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experimentation or adaptive research and in relation to the results of those experiments, or 
how well Brazilian tropical cultivars responded to local conditions (Cabral, forthcoming). 
Table 1. Brazil's agricultural cooperation projects in Mozambique in 2014 
Project Timeframe Objectives Donor 
agencies 
managing 
projects 
Brazilian 
institutions 
officially 
involved 
Dominant 
Brazilian 
agriculture 
role models 
ProSAVANA 2011-21 “Create new models of agriculture 
development, taking into account 
environmental and socio-
economic aspects, aiming regional 
agriculture and rural development 
oriented towards the market and 
with competitive advantages.” 
(ProSAVANA, n.d.-b) 
ABC and 
Japan 
International 
Cooperation 
Agency 
(JICA) 
ABC, Embrapa, 
FGV Projetos and 
SENAR  
(in 2014, MDA’s 
involvement was 
indicated in the 
programme’s 
website but the 
reference has 
since been 
removed) 
Cerrado’s 
development 
ProAlimentos 2011-14 “Strengthen strategic production 
and distribution capacities 
regarding food products in 
Mozambique.” (ABC, 2011b, p. 9) 
ABC and 
USAID 
Embrapa, mainly 
Embrapa 
Horticultures 
Embrapa’s 
research on 
horticultures 
Plataforma 2010-14 “Strengthen the national system 
of agricultural research in 
Mozambique, aiming to have 
efficient planning, coordination, 
monitoring and evaluation of 
agricultural research activities and 
dissemination of agricultural 
technology.” (ABC, 2010a, p. 4) 
ABC and 
USAID 
Embrapa Embrapa’s 
institutional 
structure and 
research 
capacity 
MFI 2014-16 “Transfer, absorption and/or 
development of specific 
knowledge and selling of 
machinery and equipment.” 
(Governo Federal 2013: Art. 2º I) 
ABC and 
FAO 
MDA, Embrapa, 
Brazil’s rural 
extension 
agencies to be 
defined 
More Food 
Programme 
PAA-Africa 2012-15 “1- Support innovative local 
initiatives of food purchase from 
smallholders for humanitarian 
food assistance; 2- Strengthen 
partnerships and strategies to 
support long-term solutions to 
fighting hunger through local food 
purchase initiatives for food 
assistance.” (PAA, 2013) 
ABC, FAO, 
WFP 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
(MDS) and the 
General 
Coordination for 
International 
Action Against 
Hunger 
(CGFOME) 
Food 
Purchase 
Programme 
(PAA) 
Native seeds 
conservation 
2011-14 “Promote and support the 
exchange, dissemination and 
commercialisation of 
traditional/native seeds, though 
seed fairs and exchange of 
experiences.” (Brasil, Federal 
Government et al., n.d.) 
ABC General 
Secretariat of the 
Presidency, 
Brazilian social 
movements – the 
Peasant 
Women’s 
Movement 
(MMC) and the 
Small Farmers 
Movement 
(MPA) 
Social 
movements 
experiences 
with 
conservation 
agriculture 
Source: compiled by the author in Cabral (2015). 
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This focus on modern technology and experimentation was internally criticised for reflecting 
the hurriedness of cooperation and need to show quick results.102 The urgency to deliver was 
regarded as compromising the ability to engage with the local context, and motivate 
counterparts, and therefore come up with more embedded technological solutions. Besides 
the critique to the mode of technological transmission, the ‘model’ being transmitted was also 
questioned, revealing Embrapa’s ‘contested agronomy’ (Sumberg & Thompson, 2012).103 The 
rush to deliver was seen as running against a more critical discussion about development 
trajectories that questioned the Brazilian ‘modernisation model’, rather than deploying it as a 
ready-made success recipe.104 
Embrapa’s portfolio in Mozambique revealed this contested agronomy and specifically, the 
two contrasting paradigms of agricultural development arriving from Brazil. The contrast is 
indicated both by the type of production system prioritised and the respective technology and 
transfer methods proposed. ProSAVANA concerned ‘big cultures in big land extensions’.105 It 
was about testing highly productive varieties of commodities, often hybrids, which could feed 
the population and generate surplus for exports. By contract, those working on ProAlimentos 
emphasised agroecological methods and generating local solutions.106 They also tended to be 
critical of ProSAVANA and talked about efforts made to getting to know the context and 
engaging local counterparts, project beneficiaries and communities. One respondent 
highlighted the actual process of setting up agricultural experiments as one of the main project 
outcomes, as it was about strengthening the capacity to devise solutions locally, rather than 
focusing on results from experiments.107 The contrast also regarded the debate on GMOs, with 
ProSAVANA promoting for hybrid varieties and ProAlimentos favouring open pollination.108 
Overall, Brazilian technicians carried different motivations and contrasting views of agriculture, 
technology and cooperation. Some may have united with traders to pursue some of these 
motivations and to offer the extra (or the ‘legacy’) that made Brazilian business presumably 
distinctive in Africa. Others contested such alliances and the associated model of agriculture, 
thereby getting closer to priests, whom I now set out to describe. 
                                                          
102 Interviews with Embrapa researchers EMB#16 and EMB#19, Brasília, July 2014. 
103 The term ‘contested agronomy’ refers to a body of research focusing on the politics of agronomic research in the field of 
development. It questions the origins of knowledge, its legitimacy, the narratives it reinforces and the political agendas it seeks to 
serve (Sumberg & Thompson, 2012). 
104 Interview with EMB#19. 
105 Interview with EMB#7. 
106 Interview with EMB#16, EMB#17 and EMB#18, Brasília, July 2014. 
107 Interview with EMB#17. 
108 Interviews with EMB#5 and EMB#16. 
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4.3.3 The family farming alternative 
 Rise of the priests 
For my Embrapa respondent in Nampula, self-labelled as a technician sent by traders, priests 
were those criticising ProSAVANA on ‘ideological’ grounds, where the term ‘ideological’ was 
seemingly used as a synonym of idealistic and unscientific. Unlike Embrapa experts, ‘carriers of 
science’, as another researcher would put it,109 priests lacked the technical knowledge about 
real farming circumstances in Mozambique. 
What I have seen in terms of criticism to ProSAVANA, not to ProSAVANA but to the 
agriculture that ProSAVANA will eventually bring, is, from my technical point of view, 
very weak. It is an ideological discussion that does not make much sense in today’s 
world. It is an ideological discussion that claims that land in Mozambique will be 
destroyed. On the contrary, it is being destroyed today. It is a miracle that 
Mozambique is not already a desert with the agriculture that is being practised.110 
 
Priests represented antagonism towards ProSAVANA and specifically to the type of agriculture 
driven by economic interests (traders) and validated by scientific expertise (technicians) in the 
Nacala corridor. They stood against a network of actors (Embrapa, FGV and the corporate 
actors) connected to Brazil’s modernisation trajectory. Their opposition materialised in the 
cooperation realm as a civil society-led contestation movement, calling for an alternative to 
modernisation grounded on the dualism perspective and favouring a model of family- and 
peasant-based farming (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). I will discuss this mobilisation and the 
narratives deployed in Chapter 5. For the moment, my aim is to situate the ProSAVANA 
contestation (or the rise of the priests) against other developments in Brazil-Mozambique 
relations, to unpack and nuance the priest construct, another multifaceted category, further. 
Although the contestation of ProSAVANA erupted in 2011/12, the introduction of a family 
farming narrative into Brazil’s agricultural cooperation in Africa can be traced back to the 2010 
Brazil-Africa Talks, mentioned earlier. While the flashy inauguration of CECAT may have 
granted Embrapa a prominent standing at the event, other players got credit too, notably the 
MDA, the ministry for family farmers. Cerrado and family farming, the two icons of Brazil’s 
discursive duality were presented side-by-side as concurrent elements of Brazil’s success story. 
No one would have sounded more persuasive than Lula in articulating the duality as an 
untroubled coexistence. Talking about the importance of credit in agriculture at the event’s 
opening ceremony, he noted: 
                                                          
109 Interview with EMB#8. 
110 Interview with EMB#7. 
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[Credit] is part of the explanation of the success of Brazilian family farming and the 
success of agribusiness in Brazil. Here in Brazil, the government has to finance both 
agribusiness and family farming, and we do so with pleasure because we understand 
the importance that both sectors have in the Brazilian economy. (Lula da Silva (2010, 
p. 13), author's translation) 
 
The President went on advertising Embrapa’s ‘technological revolution’ in the Cerrado, as well 
as the success of government programmes directed towards family farming such as More 
Food, the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) and Rural Technical Assistance and Extension 
(ATER), while pledging to take these experiences to Africa. 
The menu of Brazil’s family farming programmes suitable for Africa, listed in a brochure 
produced by ABC specifically for the event (ABC, 2010b), introduced a new form of technical 
cooperation interaction – that of policy dialogue with government counterparts on agricultural 
public policies. With this, Brazilian cooperation would expand from being the exclusive remit 
of technicians, where Embrapa researchers delivered training courses and carried out adaptive 
research experiments, to become also a playing field for bureaucrats at MDA and the Ministry 
of Social Development (MDS), the champions of public policies for family farming in Brazil. 
 The politics of family farming activism 
Following from the Brazil-Africa Talks, MDA would go on and host its own promotional agenda 
for African delegations, with a programme of seminars, field visits and business fairs, focused 
on family farming and family farming technology (ABC, 2010b). Until then, MDA’s international 
engagements had essentially focused on trade issues, mainly within South America – it had 
had, for example, an active role in the establishment of the Specialised Meeting on Family 
Farming, REAF.111 From 2010 onwards, however, MDA’s International Advisory Office of 
Commercial Promotion (AIPC), a team advising the minister on international issues, would 
start working on the replication of its flagship programmes and the promotion of the family 
farming concept across the Atlantic. One senior official at MDA described MDA’s cooperation 
agenda in Africa as follows: 
Our vision is, if we are a developing country, we have the capacity to construct a 
trajectory, imperfect yes, but we have the capacity to build a development trajectory, 
to strengthen the state, to strengthen public policy, to strengthen family farming and 
build an institutional framework, and whatnot. We want to help other countries so 
they also achieve that too (...). [MDA’s relation with Africa] is an entirely political 
agenda.112 
                                                          
111 Interview with MDA respondents MDA#1 and MDA#3, Brasília, November 2013. 
112 Interview with MDA#1. 
  
94 
 
More Food and PAA were formally launched in Africa as multi-country programmes. Their 
launch in Mozambique happened as criticism to ProSAVANA was building up. The family 
farming alternative suggested by the critique to ProSAVANA had explicit references to Brazil’s 
PAA and state support to family farming more broadly. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Brazilian 
civil society actors typically highlighted PAA as the prototype of virtuous cooperation 
promoted by the Brazilian government. One of my respondents remarked: 
Our strategy here [in Mozambique] is the same strategy we have at home, which is 
about fighting for strengthening the weight of small-scale agriculture. That is what we 
are doing in relation to ProSAVANA, fighting so that the Mozambican population 
increases its support to small-scale agriculture. PAA is a major victory in Brazil. We are 
fighting hard so that this victory arrives with strength in Mozambique.113 
 
While some embraced the fight, other continued to describe Brazilian cooperation as technical 
exchange with no political or commercial motivations (Farani, 2012; Paiva, 2013a). Yet, the 
anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation would turn Brazilian cooperation into a battlefield between 
competing visions of agricultural development that mirrored Brazil’s dualism. 
The coalition of actors coalescing around the family farming alternative comprised not only 
those government agencies directly involved in cooperation (MDA and MDS), but also a range 
of diverse Brazilian civil society organisations. The latter were broadly supportive of the 
Brazilian government’s family farming policies and opposed the modernising agribusiness 
model that they saw represented in Embrapa and in ProSAVANA. In the first moment, this civil 
society movement included those with prior exposure to international fora and connected to 
transnational networks, such as the Federation of Social and Educational Support 
Organisations (FASE), MST and the Movement of Small Farmers (MPA).114 MPA had also been 
involved in the only cooperation initiative by the Brazilian government that engaged social 
actors (in Brazil and Mozambique) and that focused on strengthening native seeds (Table 1). 
The coalition gradually extended to include other players from Brazilian civil society, such as 
CONTAG, the Socio-Economic Studies Institute (INESC), the Brazilian Institute for Social and 
Economic Analyses (IBASE) and others represented at CONSEA. This pool brought together two 
broad types of Brazilian social actors – agrarian and rural movements such as MST, MPA and 
CONTAG, and non-governmental organisations and networks concerned with social justice 
                                                          
113 Interview with FASE respondent, by Skype, December 2013. 
114 A team at FASE had a history of engagement advocacy campaigns on international issues such as trade negotiations and the 
reform of multilateral institutions (FASE respondent). MST and MPA were part of La Vía Campesina and had, through the network, 
a long standing collaboration with their peer agrarian movement in Mozambique, UNAC (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). 
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more broadly, such as FASE, INESC or IBASE (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). The Lula Institute 
also emerged at some stage as an intermediary to manage the unrest on the Brazil side, and 
gather together the various parties with the aim of soothing grievances and finding common 
ground, drawing on Lula’s political capital and conciliatory charisma.115  
Furthermore, within Itamaraty itself, there was a unit that promoted the family farming 
alternative, particularly its food security and nutrition dimension. This was the General 
Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (known as CGFOME), a unit created 
within MRE in 2003 to coordinate Brazil’s foreign policy on food issues and maintain a channel 
of dialogue on food issues between Itamaraty and civil society (I. Leite, Pomeroy, & Suyama, 
2015).116 CGFOME was directly involved in the implementation of PAA in Africa and had played 
a central role in promoting Brazil’s food policies, including the Zero Hunger programme, 
internationally. 
Researchers at Embrapa would also become involved in family farming advocacy. Besides 
internally criticising the replication of the Cerrado in Mozambique, Embrapa researchers also 
became directly engaged in promoting PAA. Specifically, a study led by researchers at SRI 
focused on the conditions for scaling up PAA in Africa and Embrapa’s possible contribution, 
particularly in the field of technical assistance and extension (ATER), an area where political 
dispute for institutional protagonism in Brazil had been unfolding.117 
It is, therefore, apparent that priests in Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique embodied a 
heterogeneous collection of actors, with particular identities, views and interests rooted in the 
Brazilian context. Furthermore, the push for an alternative family farming trajectory also had 
an international dimension. 
 The priests’ international network 
The focus on food for domestic markets was a strong element of the family farming narrative 
embodied by priests, including the critique of ProSAVANA and praising of PAA. Food was also a 
central theme in the 2010 Brazil-Africa Talks, which served beyond the political agenda of 
promoting a family farming-based development trajectory. Present at the Talks was José 
Graziano, at the time Director of the FAO office for Latin America. Lula singled out his name at 
the opening speech as the champion of Brazil’s Zero Hunger programme, while stressing the 
importance of hunger in Brazil-Africa cooperation (Lula da Silva, 2010). He also addressed the 
                                                          
115 Lula Institute’s respondent, São Paulo, November 2013; INESC respondent, Brasília, July 2014. 
116 CGFOME is another illustration of the institutionalisation of spaces for state-society interface under the PT government. 
117 Interviews with EMB#19 and EMB#20, Brasília, July 2014. 
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serving Director-General of FAO, Jacques Diouf, in person, emphasising the contribution of UN 
agencies to the hunger agenda in Africa. Lula’s promotion of agricultural cooperation in Africa 
would be interpreted as a plea for support from FAO’s African membership to the candidacy of 
José Graziano to FAO’s top seat, which eventually succeeded, and strengthening Brazil’s stance 
in the multilateral system.118  
The connection between Brazil’s bilateral cooperation in Africa and Brazil’s relation with FAO 
would get tighter and more complex. FAO is a partner of CGFOME in the Africa version of PAA 
implemented in five African countries, including Mozambique. Yet, while Graziano’s FAO has 
been an international echo of the family farming narrative and the Brazilian experience (FAO, 
2014), FAO’s links with Brazilian agriculture are broader. Since the reshuffling of Embrapa’s SRI 
team, following the Embrapa International episode, the connections between Embrapa and 
FAO became reportedly closer, prompting internal criticism within the Brazilian research 
corporation that its mission should not be about assisting FAO in Africa just because the 
organisation was headed by Graziano.119  
Overall, an interweaving pattern of actors, interests and narratives can be found in relation to 
the family farming alternative in Brazil’s African engagements, making ‘the priests’ a more 
complex category than suggested by the Embrapa researcher’s condescending caricature. 
4.4. Summing up: alliances, fractures and blurred lines in the internationalisation of 
Brazil’s agriculture 
Brazil’s solidarity diplomacy in Mozambique has become an important channel for priests, 
technicians and traders to pursue their interests and exercise their influence outside Brazil. In 
this stylised categorisation, traders stand for the business aspect of international cooperation, 
an element that has been strongly present since the early days of post-colonial diplomacy. 
Since Lula, technicians have granted business deals a solidarity appearance (or responsible 
business look, under Dilma) and have contributed towards asserting Brazil’s image as the 
cradle of tropical solutions for developing countries. In agriculture, these solutions started off 
as being linked with the Cerrado ‘miracle’ and Embrapa’s contribution to it. In time, and as 
more Brazilian actors got involved in cooperation and African affairs, these solutions became a 
more assorted package. Late-coming priests, in various guises, represent the rejection of the 
Cerrado model and the push for a family farming alternative, based on dialogue around public 
policies and emphasising the role of the state in agriculture. 
                                                          
118 Interviews with EMB#1 and EMB#2. 
119 Interview with EMB#2. 
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Yet, my analysis in this chapter also nuances this stylised categorisation by illustrating how 
actors, their interests and the narratives they reproduce relate to one another and how 
dividing lines between them become sometimes blurred. Brazil’s solidarity diplomacy in Africa 
may be regarded as the product of an alliance between traders and technicians, where their 
respective interests (of pursuing business opportunities and international research prestige) 
become united under a common narrative of modernisation and tropical technology 
suitability. The extent to which this alliance is part of a coherently conceived strategy can be 
questioned by the multiplicity of actors involved. Priests have visibly opposed this deliberate 
or fortuitous alliance. Yet, although family farming may be the trademark carried by priests 
into cooperation, the family farming narrative is also used by traders and technicians alike to 
justify the fit and social credentials of their contributions. For example, the self-designated 
Afro-Brazilian entrepreneur from ANCEABRA highlighted family farming’s marketing potential 
for Brazilian business when he remarked: ‘our business strategy today is to take the Brazilian 
policies that worked well and take them to the African continent, from an entrepreneurial 
perspective’.120 In his account, these policies included both agribusiness and family farming. 
The connection between each stylised category in the triad and Brazilian institutional actors 
and individuals is worth an introductory comment, although I will discuss this further in the 
chapters ahead. Traders are by and large all those doing business, being private companies or 
governmental actors with a business promotion mandate. Also, Embrapa stands for the 
technical fixing rationale – Embrapa researchers are the image of the Brazilian technician in 
agriculture. MDA and civil society organisations mobilised against ProSAVANA unite around a 
family farming narrative, which the priests symbolise. However, these associations are not 
always straightforward, as in what the Lula Institute stands for and whether it is a trader, 
priest or a bit of both. As for Embrapa, I have already started questioning the idea of a 
monolithic entity by illustrating the various agendas at play and the disputed perspectives on 
agriculture and cooperation within the organisation, an issue I will return to in my analysis of 
ProSAVANA (Chapter 5). I will also nuance MDA as the patron of family farming advocacy and 
will bring to light concealed disputes within the family farming field (Chapter 6) that reflect the 
subjective nature of dualism in the Brazilian context (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
My analysis thus far also uncovered different forms of internationalisation of Brazilian 
agriculture manifested through agricultural cooperation and related engagements in 
Mozambique. These different forms carry along distinct views and practices of agricultural 
                                                          
120 ANCEABRA respondent, Brasília, July 2014. 
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development, or distinct Brazilian ‘solutions’. The internationalisation is about implanting 
Brazil’s tropical technology, either through the sales of hardware or the donation of know-
how. It is about clearing land in Africa to expand Brazil’s agriculture frontier. It is also about 
increasing profitability of investments and about getting closer to highly profitable Asian 
markets for agricultural commodities. It also entails collaborative tropical research, not least 
for asserting Brazilian agronomy’s standing in the international sphere. International assertion 
is not just about geopolitics but also, and crucially, about domestic agrarian politics as family 
farming advocacy and social mobilisation illustrates. 
Brazil may be exporting its internal contradictions to Mozambique through development 
cooperation, as someone put it.121 Contradictory or not, Brazilian cooperation has become a 
battlefield where domestic agrarian politics and institutional politics combine with the 
business and geostrategic imperatives of Brazil’s international affairs. The following two 
chapters explore these arguments in detail, by reviewing the experiences with ProSAVANA and 
MFI in Mozambique since their inception. 
                                                          
121 Interview with MST respondent. 
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Chapter 5. The discourse-politics of ProSAVANA 
ProSAVANA is the most prominent programme of Brazil’s agricultural cooperation portfolio in 
Mozambique. Its significance stems from its relatively long timeframe of 20 years, the volume 
of resources mobilised and the number of Brazilian entities involved in implementation. The 
prominence of ProSAVANA is also product of its high visibility, both from a positive perspective 
– for promising to awaken the ‘sleeping giant of Africa’s prosperity’ (Morris et al., 2009) – and 
from a negative one – for being labelled ‘the great land giveaway’ in Africa (Wise, 2015). 
The programme envisages the modernisation of agriculture as the engine of development for 
the region circumscribed by the Nacala Corridor, in the north of Mozambique. Its stated aim is 
to: 
[c]reate new agricultural development models, taking into account the natural 
environment and socio-economic aspects, and seeking market-orientated 
agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge. (ProSAVANA, 2013a, 
para. 3) 
 
ProSAVANA is governed by a trilateral cooperation arrangement between the governments of 
Mozambique, Brazil and Japan. Besides navigating across three cultures, ProSAVANA’s 
management complexity is amplified by a three-project structure, comprising: (i) ProSAVANA-
PI, focusing on strengthening agricultural research systems and performing crop adaptation 
experiments; (ii) ProSAVANA-PD, concerning the delivery of a regional development plan 
centred on agricultural activities; and (iii) ProSAVANA-PEM, focusing on strengthening 
agricultural extension systems – Table 2 describes these components in further detail.  
Each project brought along a set of actors, agendas and perspectives on agricultural 
development and cooperation. From Brazil alone, five institutions were mobilised as providers 
of technical inputs across the three projects – Embrapa, FGV Projetos, SENAR, EMATER and 
MDA – in addition to ABC in a coordination role. Furthermore, from within Embrapa, at least 
11 research units were involved in the programme’s research component. 
My research found that ProSAVANA’s complex set up, combined, on the Brazilian side, with 
weak coordination from ABC, favoured the proliferation of narratives about the programme 
and its intentions, as I illustrate in this chapter. Also, the anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation, led by 
civil society organisations and social movements in Brazil, Mozambique and Japan, generated a 
defensive reaction by the programme’s implementers and a degree of concealment about 
work progress (or lack of it). As a result, ProSAVANA turned into an increasingly fuzzy entity. 
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Table 2. The three technical cooperation projects of ProSAVANA 
(1) Component (2) Objective (3) Summary of activities (4) Brazilian 
technical 
institutions 
involved 
(5) Timeframe  
ProSAVANA-PI  
Project for Improving 
Research and 
Technology Transfer 
Capacity 
‘Appropriate agricultural technology is 
developed and transferred in Nacala 
Corridor’ 
 Strengthen research capacity of Mozambican agricultural research 
institution in the region 
 Studies on natural resources and regional socio-economic aspects, and 
methods to evaluate possible socio-economic impacts of ProSAVANA 
 Develop soil improvement technologies for agricultural use 
 Develop appropriate cultivation technologies and livestock production 
 Develop and validate new agricultural technology in two demonstration 
units in areas near the research stations of Lichinga and Nampula 
Embrapa, with 
researchers from at 
least 11 units 
April 2011 to 
March 2016 
ProSAVANA-PD 
Project for Support of 
Agriculture 
Development Master 
Plan 
‘To formulate an agriculture 
development Master Plan which 
contributes to social and economic 
development by engaging private 
investment to promote sustainable 
production systems and poverty 
reduction in the Nacala Corridor Region’ 
 Support of the Agriculture Development Master Plan for the Nacala 
Corridor 
FGV Projetos 2012-14 
March 2012 to 
the First 
Quarter of 
2014 
ProSAVANA-PEM 
Project for 
Establishment of 
Development Models 
at Communities’ Level 
‘Agricultural production increases at each 
farming size by adoption of the 
agricultural development models in the 
target areas of ProSAVANA’ 
 Carry out baseline survey and periodical survey 
 Define development models and formulate reference projects to be 
implemented with involvement of public/private/NGOs 
 Recommend potential agricultural development models based on the 
reference projects 
 Select potential stakeholders in target areas of ProSAVANA to engage in 
promoting agricultural development models 
 Establish extension methodologies and prepare guidance materials for 
promoting extension services of the agricultural development models in 
target areas 
 Support and promote extension services by public/private/NGO 
agricultural extension agents 
SENAR, EMATER 
and MDA 
May 2013 to 
May 2019 
Sources: adapted from (ProSAVANA, n.d.-b) for (1), (2), (3) and (5); and fieldwork interviews for (4).
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Hence, with its relatively little visible progress on the ground and mounting secrecy, the 
programme materialised largely as a discursive fabrication, subject to competing 
interpretations by its multiple players. These disputes over meaning not only reflected but also 
fed power dynamics between these players. Therefore, regardless of whether ProSAVANA’s 
planned activities were implemented, the discursive battles produced an effect on Brazil’s 
agricultural cooperation policy process. 
In this chapter, I unveil ProSAVANA’s policy process, its discursive nature and how it played out 
over time. Drawing on a timeline of key events and occurrences (listed in detail in Appendix 
VII), I identify three distinct stages when a particular balance of forces occurred between 
actors, their interests and narratives, and specifically between the triadic typology of priests, 
technicians and traders running through this thesis. 
As I will argue, at birth, ProSAVANA can be regarded as the product of an alliance between 
technicians and traders, somewhat dissimilar in their intents, yet convergent in the use of 
narratives about productive modernisation or about the Brazilian Cerrado-African savannah 
affinity (Section 5.1). The second stage corresponded with the arrival of priests on the scene 
and their embodiment of an active and visible opposition to ProSAVANA’s modernisation 
narrative and business drivers, while pushing for a family farming alternative (Section 5.2). The 
third stage is what emerged from the clash, which my analysis suggests was less of a clear-cut 
picture, as agendas and identities became somewhat blurred or intertwined. The patterns I 
discerned include: the fracturing of the technicians-traders’ alliance; the withdrawal of traders 
from ProSAVANA’s discursive field; a repackaging of the official ProSAVANA narrative with 
attempts to bring priests on-board; and, on the other hand, the repositioning of priests within 
the sphere of cooperation, building on the protest and on new alliances emerging, both in the 
domestic and in the international sphere (Section 5.3). The patterns and trends in this latter 
stage were unfolding at the time of fieldwork and it was therefore hard to anticipate which 
ones would become significant and which would become irrelevant (I will discuss this further 
in Chapters 7 and 8). 
5.1. Technicians and traders united by discourse: the ‘parallels’ coalition 
ProSAVANA got an official stamp of approval at the 35th G8 Summit, held in L’Aquila in July 
2009, where Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso agreed to 
support agricultural development in Mozambique as part of their contributions to the food 
security initiative announced at the Summit, at the height of the food prices crisis (JICA, ABC, & 
República de Moçambique, 2009). They proposed to build on their own experience with the 
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Japanese-Brazilian Cooperation Programme for Cerrado Development – PRODECER (cf. 
Chapter 3) at a time when the transformation of the Brazilian Cerrado was being pointed out 
as a model for the African savannah by a study sponsored by the World Bank and FAO (Morris 
et al., 2009). Much of Mozambique’s arable land lies in Africa’s Guinean savannah zone, a vast 
area spreading along the tropical belt where a ‘sleeping giant’ of agriculture-based prosperity, 
based on improved international commercial competitiveness of a handful of crops, was 
waiting to be awakened. The World Bank-FAO ‘sleeping giant’ thesis presented the 
development of large-scale and mechanised production in the Brazilian Cerrado as one of two 
successful models from which Africa could learn.122  
Prior to L’Aquila, one of the earliest allusions to what would become ProSAVANA dates back to 
2005 when the then Director-President of Embrapa, Clayton Campanhola, announced a new 
technical cooperation initiative in Mozambique in partnership with Vale, at a time when the 
mining company had just obtained the coal mine concession in Moatize (Vale, 2004). 
Campanhola noted: 
In the specific case of Mozambique, we already have a project that the Vale do Rio 
Doce Company [as Vale was called until 2008] developed there to win the competition, 
last year, for exploiting the coal mine of Moatize. In that project there are rural 
development interventions. Therefore, Embrapa will be an important partner of Vale 
do Rio Doce Company in that project. (…) This is just the beginning of a large 
institutional action, not only of Embrapa, but also of partner institutions in the African 
continent. (Rádio Nacional, 2005, author's translation)123 
 
Besides the link between Embrapa and Vale in Mozambique, another connection emerging 
from Campanhola’s radio interview concerns the then Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, 
Roberto Rodrigues, someone who was described as supporting the initiative, alongside 
President Lula (Rádio Nacional, 2005). This was significant as Roberto Rodrigues was (and still 
is) one of the most emblematic names associated with Brazil’s agricultural modernisation 
perspective (Rodrigues, 2010) and the agribusiness lobby, particularly (Bruno, Sevá, & 
Carneiro, 2009). As I illustrate in this chapter, Roberto Rodrigues remained a constant 
presence in ProSAVANA’s backstage. His influence on the original conception of the 
programme was noted by Vale’s CEO, Murilo Ferreira: 
The ex-minister [of agriculture in Brazil] Roberto Rodrigues had very beautiful plans for 
the Brazilian Cerrado... Here you are all too young, you do not know that Brazil in the 
70s did not produce anything in the Brazilian Cerrado. And today it is the breadbasket 
that we all know. There it looks very much like our Cerrado. So our ex-minister is doing 
                                                          
122 The other successful model singled out by the ‘sleeping giant’ report was Thailand’s smallholder-based development. 
123 Vale do Rio Doce was the original name of Vale. 
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the ProSAVANA project and I am sure that there is enough land to make that country 
food sufficient and a great food exporter. (Vale (2013, pp. 1-2), author’s translation) 
 
Following the L’Aquila pledge, in September 2009 the governments of Mozambique, Brazil and 
Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Triangular Cooperation for the 
Development of Agriculture in the Mozambican Tropical Savannahs in Maputo (JICA et al., 
2009). The technical annex to the formal agreement contains three key elements of the 
original narrative on ProSAVANA. One regarded similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and 
the tropical savannah of Mozambique and, hence, the potential for transfer of solutions. 
Another concerned PRODECER as the model to draw on – with the ‘sleeping giant’ perspective 
cited to emphasise the productive potential of Mozambique’s tropical savannah and confirm 
the relevance of Brazil’s modern agriculture. The third element was the emphasis put on 
productivity and competitiveness, noting, however, the need to safeguard food security and 
environmental conservation. 
The Cartesian logic of parallels remained a strong feature of the ProSAVANA narrative, 
extensively invoked to justify the suitability of Brazil’s tropical agricultural technology to the 
Mozambican savannah (Bellini & Silva, 2013; Embrapa, 2010b, 2012; Kumashiro & Paiva, 2011; 
ProSavana-TEC, 2011). The depiction of latitude parallels 13°S and 17°S cutting across central 
Brazil through to northern Mozambique and delimitating the relevant regions (the Brazilian 
Cerrado and the Mozambican tropical savannah) illustrates the underlying thinking: same 
geographical coordinates, similar biomes and same recipe for intervention, as depicted in 
Figures 8 and 9. 
The development of the Cerrado in the 1970s-90s, equally supported by Japanese aid (cf. 
Chapter 3), provided the recipe that had produced Brazil’s ‘agricultural revolution’ of massive 
productivity gains and trade surpluses (Kumashiro & Paiva, 2011). Also, the ‘parallels of 
knowledge’ generated by Embrapa (2010, p. 11) in Brazil offered plenty of opportunities for 
the development of Mozambican agriculture. The ‘parallels’ narrative at times exceeded 
geographic and agronomic dimensions and borrowed the Freyrean vision of Brazil-Africa 
affinities (cf. Chapter 4) to incorporate a cultural and socio-economic perspective also, where 
parallelisms were similarly claimed to exist: 
The Embrapa Project-Mozambique, based in the parallelism of geographical 
circumstances and development perspectives, is part of that context of latitudes, 
culture, socioeconomy and agricultural production. (Embrapa, 2010, p. 9) 
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Figure 8. Brazilian Cerrado-Mozambican savannah parallels I 
 
Source: Kumashiro and Paiva (2011, p. 9). 
Figure 9. Brazilian Cerrado-Mozambican savannah parallels II 
 
Text in bullet points (author’s translation): similar biomes, similar challenges, business opportunities, common 
learning opportunities, common vision for the future. Source: Bellini and Silva (2013, p. 38). 
 
Guided by this framework, ProSAVANA was set to develop in two phases. The first focused on 
research, dissemination and regional planning, and comprised the three ProSAVANA technical 
cooperation projects, described in Table 2, whereas the second focused on investment by 
private enterprises and the state (JICA et al., 2009; Kumashiro & Paiva, 2011; Mourão, 2011). 
These two phases were expected to overlap considerably – private investment would be 
mobilised immediately after the launch of ProSAVANA-PI and as work on ProSAVANA-PD was 
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being carried out, as depicted in the original roadmap laid out by project consultants (Figure 
10). 
Figure 10. Original roadmap for ProSAVANA 
 
Source: Kumashiro and Paiva (2011, p. 12) 
 
Research and technology transfer activities led by Embrapa began immediately after 
ProSAVANA’s official inauguration in Mozambique and the establishment of an office in 
Nampula in early 2011 (ProSAVANA-TEC, 2011; ProSAVANA, 2013). ProSAVANA-PI (initially 
referred to as ProSAVANA-TEC) comprised a variety of studies on the project’s target area 
(including studies on soils, socio-economic and environmental conditions), adaptive research 
on Brazilian varieties, training activities and the setting up of experimentation units in selected 
districts in Nampula and Niassa provinces in Mozambique. 
While Embrapa technicians rolled up their sleeves at experimentation units, traders were also 
becoming mobilised. As ProSAVANA was being launched in Nampula, a tripartite seminar was 
held in São Paulo to publicise the programme in Brazil and identify investment opportunities in 
Mozambican agriculture. The event’s evocative title was ‘Agribusiness in Mozambique: Brazil-
Japan Cooperation and Investment Opportunities’ and amongst its participants were the two 
leading ambassadors of Brazil’s agribusiness: Roberto Rodrigues and Senator Kátia Abreu, at 
the time President of the National Agriculture Confederation-CNA (cf. Chapter 3). Other 
participants included BNDES and Brazilian and Japanese companies, investors and producers 
(Embrapa Monitoramento por Satélite, 2011; JICA, 2011). Alongside business networking, 
technicians were also represented at the event. Embrapa (2010) launched its publication 
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Paralelos: Corredor de Nacala, where it validated the edaphoclimatic similarities premise and 
stressed the suitability of the Brazilian experience in the Cerrado for Africa and of its own 
‘tropical’ technology. Figures 11 to 13 capture the alliance between technicians and traders in 
those early days of ProSAVANA, where Embrapa, ABC, MRE and Brazilian agribusiness, 
represented by Kátia Abreu and Roberto Rodrigues, coalesced around a common ‘parallels’ 
narrative. 
Figure 11. Technicians and traders in ProSAVANA promotion I 
 
In the picture: Pedro Arraes (President of Embrapa) addresses the audience in ProSAVANA event in São Paulo 
(25/04/2011). On his side: Kenzo Oshima (Vice-President of JICA), Marco Farani (Director of ABC) and Murade 
Murargy (Mozambique Ambassador in Brazil). Source: Embrapa Monitoriamento por Satélite (2011). 
Figure 12. Technicians and traders in ProSAVANA promotion II 
 
In the picture: Embrapa researcher introduces ‘the parallels’ to CNA President, Senator Kátia Abreu. Source: 
Embrapa Monitoriamento por Satélite (2011). 
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Figure 13. Technicians and traders in ProSAVANA promotion III 
 
In the picture: Roberto Rodrigues, President of GV Agro, addresses the audience at the ProSAVANA launch in São 
Paulo. Source: Embrapa Monitoriamento por Satélite (2011). 
 
At that time, CNA expressed particular interest in exploring opportunities for Brazilian 
agricultural entrepreneurs, invited in by the Mozambican Minister of Agriculture José Pacheco 
(Figure 14). Kátia Abreu had led a visit to Mozambique prior to the event, in late 2010, when 
she had visited the Nacala region and met ProSAVANA representatives (CNA, 2010). She also 
invited José Pacheco for an official dinner immediately after the São Paulo event, to discuss 
investment possibilities further (CNA, 2011). 
Figure 14. Mozambican government invites agribusiness investors 
 
In the picture: José Pacheco (Minister of Agriculture of Mozambique) addresses the audience at the ProSAVANA 
launch in São Paulo, watched by ABC and JICA representatives on the panel. Source: Embrapa Monitoriamento por 
Satélite (2011). 
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Another business trip to Mozambique and the Nacala Corridor by Brazilian agricultural 
entrepreneurs took place in April 2012. This one was led by Federal Deputy Luiz Nishimori, 
who, as Kátia Abreu, was also a member of the bancada ruralista. Nishimori’s description of 
the visit, in a broadcasted interview, remains one of the crudest and most uncontrived public 
accounts of how Mozambique and ProSAVANA were perceived by Brazilian ‘traders’, where 
the image of Brazilian farmers clearing the Africa savannah to introduce modern large-scale 
agriculture recalled the gaúcho pioneers’ venture into the Cerrado in the 1970s (cf. Chapter 3): 
I was there [Nacala Corridor] in April taking along 20 Brazilian farmers and agribusiness 
entrepreneurs to check the implementation of the [ProSAVANA] project and see the 
African savannah. And I could in fact observe that there is great productive potential. 
(…) Now we want to take Brazilian farmers there and those young farmers who want 
to practise technology-intensive, large-scale and modern agriculture. They could even 
move to Mozambique and clear the African savannah. It’s a good challenge. There are 
many agronomists here in Brazil who cannot find jobs. They could try it, especially the 
young ones with limited land from the South of the country and who are interested in 
practising modern and large scale agriculture. It’s an opportunity that opens up for 
them. (Palavra Aberta (2012), author’s translation) 
 
As traders were screening the Corridor, technical cooperation work on the Master Plan was 
getting started. The consultancy arm of Getúlio Vargas Foundation, FGV Projetos, had just won 
a one-year contract for leading the task. Its track record of consultancy work on bioenergy 
production in Africa’s tropical Green Belt, including a feasibility study in Mozambique (Cunha & 
Matos, 2012; Paiva, 2013b, 2014; Senatore & Matos, 2012), sponsored by Vale,124 determined 
the selection.125 Also, it was hardly a coincidence that Roberto Rodrigues headed GV Agro, the 
agribusiness centre at FGV. 
Work on ProSAVANA-PD consisted of background studies and the design of an agricultural-
based development plan for the Nacala region. For this purpose, FGV Projetos applied the 
zoning and clusters methodologies it had developed for the tropical bioenergy work and drew 
on the ‘success’ of PRODECER in the Cerrado (Senatore & Matos, 2012).126 The area covered by 
the Master Plan comprised 19 districts situated alongside the railway cutting across the 
Corridor that were distributed into six distinct agricultural zones (Figure 15).127 
                                                          
124 Interview with VALE#1. 
125 Interviews with ABC official, Brasília, November 2013 (ABC#1) and with FGV Projetos consultant, São Paulo, July 2014 (FGV#1). 
126 Zoning was based on climate and soil data and environmental suitability (considering for example protected lands). Clusters 
were defined to maximise linkages between agriculture, industry and logistics, amongst other factors (interview with FGV#1). 
127 These districts, spreading across three provinces, are: Monapo, Muecate, Meconta, Nampula, Mogovolas, Murrupula, 
Mecubúre, Ribáuè, Lalaua and Malema, in Nampula province; Cuamba, Mecanhelas, Madimba, Ngauma, Lichinga, Majune and 
Sanga, in Niassa province; and Gurué and Alto Molócuè, in Zambézia province (ProSAVANA, n.d.-b). 
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Figure 15. ProSAVANA-PD agricultural zones and districts 
 
Source: Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar (MASA) (2015, Figure 2.12.1). 
 
Besides leading the technical work on the Master Plan for the Brazilian side, FGV Projetos also 
took on the coordination of another initiative in the Corridor, the Nacala Fund. This was 
designed to be a 10-year private equity fund ‘providing funding for the development of 
sustainable agribusiness operations in the tropical savannah of the Nacala Corridor’ (FGV 
Projetos, 2012a: 25). These operations were expected to comprise farming (food crops and 
animal protein) as well as the establishment of agro-industries and transport and storage 
infrastructures (Agroanalysis, 2012). The initiative aimed to raise US$2 billion in equal shares 
from Brazilian and Japanese private sources to support the agribusiness operations (Valor 
Econômico, 2012). 
The Nacala Fund was officially launched in July 2012 – first in Brasília and then in Maputo – and 
was presented then as part of the tripartite cooperation agreement between the governments 
of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, connected with ProSAVANA (FGV News, 2012; FGV Projetos, 
2012a). FGV’s press release announced: 
The Nacala Fund is aligned with the strategies of private investment attraction of the 
programme ProSAVANA-JBM, carried out in the realm of the trilateral cooperation 
between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique, and follows the guidelines pertaining to the 
Nacala Corridor Master Plan of Agricultural Development (ProSAVANA-PD). (FGV News 
(2012), author’s translation) 
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With backing from three governments and ProSAVANA-PD as the roadmap, the Nacala Fund 
was advertised as a solid project for investors (Valor Econômico, 2012). Indeed, ProSAVANA as 
a whole was regarded as the ‘institutional package’ for reducing the risk of investment in the 
region (Senatore & Matos, 2012, p. 58). Also, the zero cost of land in Mozambique, where 
government was expected to offer 50-year renewable concessions, was also mentioned as a 
critical factor in guaranteeing high investment returns (Valor Econômico, 2012). 
Besides the backing from the three governments, other sponsors also got on board. GV Agro 
co-organised the Brasília launch with FGV Projetos and Roberto Rodrigues was once again a 
notable presence (Figure 16). He praised Brazilian knowledge of agribusiness and tropical 
agronomy and emphasised the relevance of the Cerrado and PRODECER (FGV News, 2012).  
Figure 16. Nacala Fund launch I: the Embrapa-GV Agro link 
 
In the picture: Pedro Arraes (President of Embrapa), Mendes Ribeiro Filho (Minister of MAPA) and Roberto 
Rodrigues (President of GV Agro) at the Brasília launch of Nacala Fund (04/07/2012). Source: FGV Projetos (2012b). 
 
FAO also appeared as sponsor at the Brasília and Maputo events (Figure 17). Its contribution 
was both one of public affairs, lending an international tag to the initiative, and of technical 
support, supplying data for background feasibility studies conducted by FGV Projetos.128 
                                                          
128 Interview with FGV#1. 
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Figure 17. Nacala Fund launch II: FAO and other sponsors 
 
In the picture: Helder Muteia (FAO Representative in Brazil) addresses the audience at the Brasília launch of Nacala 
Fund. Source: FGV Projetos (2012b). 
 
Additionally, ‘key business partners’ in Brazil, identified in the Nacala Fund’s brochure for the 
event, included the Association of Brazilian Cooperatives (OCB), the Brazilian Cotton Producers 
Association (Abrapa) and Embrapa itself (FGV Projetos, 2012: 34). OCB is a longstanding 
representative of Brazilian corporate agribusiness and was headed, in the past, by Roberto 
Rodrigues himself (Bruno, 2009a). Abrapa is another influential player, in the Cerrado 
particularly, and one of its most senior figures was Gilson Pinesso, who headed the association 
in 2013-14 and whom I introduced in the previous chapter as one of the few Brazilian large 
farmers in Mozambique (with his farm in Gurué district, in the southern border of the Nacala 
Corridor) (Hegg, 2014; Ondei, 2013). The labelling of Embrapa as a business partner in the 
brochure may have been an overstatement, yet it signalled the envisaged alliances for the 
Corridor, where Brazilian agricultural technology and expertise were expected to render 
business viable.  
A further illustration of the confluence of technical cooperation and business pursuit can be 
found in the diagram used by FGV Projetos, mentioned earlier (cf. Figure 7). The Cerrado-
savannah affinities are signalled by the delineation of the parallels, replicating Embrapa’s 
depiction (Embrapa, 2010b). In addition to this, Mozambique appears, geographically, as a 
midpoint between Brazil and Asia or a stepping-stone into a highly lucrative market. With its 
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deep water port terminal at Nacala, the project was geared towards exploring ‘vast business 
opportunities’ (Senatore & Matos, 2012, p. 55). By being represented on both sides of the 
Brazilian engagement in Nacala (technical cooperation and business), FGV Projetos was well 
placed to forge such connections. Yet, the alliance did not go unnoticed and a movement 
contesting the marriage between business and solidarity in Brazilian cooperation started to 
take shape. 
5.2. The priests’ rising: ‘leveraging resistance’ against corporate agribusiness 
As I initiated my research in late 2012, ProSAVANA was starting to attract attention in 
international development circles, especially amongst those interested in debates about 
Africa’s natural resources and land specifically. GRAIN, an international non-profit organisation 
advocating for small farmers and contesting large scale land-grabs and the corporate control of 
food systems, had at the time initiated regular coverage on ProSAVANA in the web-based 
forum farmlandgrab.org. The forum quickly became a channel to voice concerns from civil 
society organisations and social movements, circulate research condemning ProSAVANA and 
back calls for alternative development solutions. It hence turned into a rich repository of anti-
ProSAVANA discourse, of essence to my analysis. The following passage is illustrative: 
Imagine a land of 14 million hectares, bigger than Switzerland and Austria combined. 
Populated by millions of farming families that together practice shifting cultivation. 
Now imagine a foreign consultant saying that all of these are abandoned lands. 
Another foreign company saying it will come to farm all of it. Yet another foreign 
company saying it will ship everything produced out of there. And a president agreeing 
to all of this, selling 14 million hectares for a dollar per hectare. Can’t be true? It’s 
happening in a part of Mozambique. Brazil and Japan are going to colonise a big chunk 
of the country. (GRAIN, 2012, para. 1) 
 
In this section, I review how the civil society-driven contestation erupted and unfolded, and 
document its criticism and arguments. Furthermore, and crucially for my analysis of the 
discourse-politics of Brazilian agricultural cooperation, I discuss the permeation of a Brazilian 
family farming narrative into the protest movement in Mozambique and the repercussions it 
had on discourse and positioning by Brazilian government actors. The anti-ProSAVANA 
contestation constituted, therefore, the priests’ uprising in ProSAVANA, as suggested by the 
Embrapa researcher,129 as well as, I add, in Brazilian agricultural cooperation more broadly. 
This uprising was not just about rejecting the ProSAVANA concept and process and warning 
about its dangers. As far as Brazilian actors are concerned, it was also about pushing forward a 
                                                          
129 Interview with EMB#7. 
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family farming narrative evoking Brazil’s own policy trajectory, instruments and political 
dynamics, not least between state and civil society. The priests’ mobilisation was, therefore, at 
least in a first instance, not only a rebellious social mobilisation, but also the tactical 
manoeuvre of a coalition of actors that gradually transcended civil society.  
I should emphasise at this point that my analysis of the ProSAVANA contestation focuses 
primarily on the dynamics concerning Brazilian actors in the process. I do not discuss the 
ramifications of the protest movement in Mozambique or in Japan, the complexities of which 
have been analysed at length by others (Funada-Classen, 2013; Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016; 
Shankland, Gonçalves, & Favareto, forthcoming). My interest lies in the dialectical interaction 
between Brazil’s domestic politics and cooperation politics abroad and, with regards to the 
rising of priests, the focus of this section, in how Brazilian civil society actors came into the 
picture and marked a new stage of the ProSAVANA drama.  
It was in late 2011 that discontent with ProSAVANA first emerged, more specifically at the time 
of Mozambican Minister of Agriculture José Pacheco suggesting, in one of his visits to Brazil, 
that his country had cheap and available land for Brazilian farmers and that the Cerrado 
transformation was a model to be replicated:  
Brazilian farmers have accumulated experience that is very welcome. We want to 
repeat in Mozambique what they did in the Cerrado 30 years ago. (Pacheco cited by 
Folha de S. Paulo (2011), author’s translation) 
 
Representatives of Brazil’s agribusiness sector reacted enthusiastically to what they saw as an 
attractive prospect in a land free of the constraints for farming expansion found in Brazil and 
that was also well located for reaching the Chinese market. The President of Mato Grosso 
Cotton Producers Association, Carlos Augustin, noted: 
Mozambique is a Mato Grosso in the middle of Africa, with zero-cost land, without the 
environmental impediments and much cheaper freight to China. (cited by Folha de S. 
Paulo (2011), author’s translation) 
 
There was also speculation in the press that some deals had already been struck and 40 
Brazilian farmers from Mato Grosso were on their way to Mozambique – portrayed as ‘Brazil’s 
next agricultural frontier’ – to explore land concessions given away at a mere cost of US$ 1 per 
hectare per year (Folha de S. Paulo, 2011). It was also suggested that these farmers would go 
to the Nacala Corridor ‘trailed by Embrapa’, which had already started conducting adaptive 
research in the region as part of ProSAVANA.  
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These remarks made by the Mozambican government and Brazilian business people, at a time 
when land grabbing was emerging as a hot topic in international development (S. Borras, Fig, & 
Suárez, 2011; Bush, Bujra, & Littlejohn, 2011; Hall, 2011), reverberated quickly across the land 
community, setting off alarm bells on yet another land-grabbing threat condemned as 
‘Brazilian neo-colonialism in Mozambique’ (IHU, 2011). Concerns over land dispossession, 
labour exploitation, environmental degradation, food insecurity and social exclusion were 
raised by Mozambican civil society organisations and social movements through a series of 
public statements released since 2012.  
The Mozambican National Peasant’s Union (UNAC) was among the first to come forward, 
issuing a statement that refuted Brazil’s industrial large-scale monocropping in the Cerrado as 
a desirable model for Mozambique, from a socially and environmentally-minded perspective 
(UNAC, 2012). The statement condemned the lack of transparency and involvement of civil 
society organisations and peasant movements in the ProSAVANA process. It disputed the view 
that there was land available in the Nacala region and warned about the threat of relocation of 
local communities and transformation of peasants into a labour force subordinated to 
corporate interests. It also proposed an alternative model for agricultural development 
centred on the peasant society and based on agroecological practices and food sovereignty 
ideals, thereby associating the ProSAVANA contestation with the global campaigns of 
transnational social movements, such as La Vía Campesina (LVC) (Cohn et al., 2006). UNAC 
(2012) noted: 
We stand firm and faithful in our support to peasant agriculture and an agroecological 
production model that is based in Food Sovereignty, as alternative for the 
development of the agrarian sector in Mozambique, a model that takes into account 
all aspects related to sustainability and that in its practice is a friend of nature (p. 2, 
author's translation). 
 
UNAC also underlined the moral grounds of its envisaged peasant-based development where 
peasants were portrayed as ‘guardians of life, nature and the planet’.  
The UNAC statement was followed by public positions from other civil society organisations 
and movements. Justiça Ambiental (JA!), a Mozambican environmental advocacy NGO and the 
local branch of Friends of the Earth international, corroborated UNAC’s position and reinforced 
concerns with the environmental threat posed by ProSAVANA. They condemned the 
programme for its association with high levels of mechanisation, excessive use of chemicals 
and unclear stance on GMOs (JA!, 2013).  
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Mozambique’s leading agrarian and environmental social movements were hence united 
against ProSAVANA and they reiterated their concerns and accusations at a clarification 
session on ProSAVANA-PD held by the tripartite governmental team in March 2013. The 
government team refuted the accusations and insisted that ProSAVANA was a ‘sustainable 
agricultural development’ programme that would not relocate communities or favour foreign 
investment and large-scale export commodities. Instead, it emphasised its focus on domestic 
markets and food crops and openness to discuss the strategy with civil society and the 
communities before completion later that year.130 Yet, a version of the Master Plan leaked to 
the public a few weeks later suggested the strategy was already fully defined (MINAG et al., 
2013). Protests reignited and a strongly worded Joint Statement was signed by 24 civil society 
organisations in Mozambique, Brazil and other countries (JA! et al., 2013).131 Brazilian civil 
society actors had hence become visibly involved in the emerging anti-ProSAVANA movement, 
though some had been engaged from the very start of the movement and had connected with 
UNAC through LVC, particularly MST and MPA. 
The Joint Statement accused the governments of the three countries of ‘secretly paving the 
way for a massive land grab in Northern Mozambique’ and the Master Plan of being produced 
by foreign consultants with links to multinational agribusiness corporations, some of which 
were already involved in land deals in Nacala (JA! et al., 2013, p. 1). It condemned the neglect 
of ‘small farmers’, who would be confined to one of the seven envisaged clusters and would be 
subordinated to ‘large corporate farms’ and ‘processors’ through contract farming 
arrangements. It also reproached the replacement of local traditional farming practices by a 
‘failed green revolution model of development’ (p. 4). It concluded that ProSAVANA was 
‘simply a business plan for the corporate takeover of agriculture in Mozambique’ packaged as 
a development aid programme (p. 2).  
The Joint Statement was shortly followed by the Open Letter to the Presidents of Brazil and 
Mozambique and the Prime Minister of Japan, this time endorsed by more than one hundred 
organisations and individuals, calling for the immediate halt of ProSAVANA (UNAC et al., 
2013).132 Brazilian and Japanese civil society organisations, movements and academics had, in 
the meantime, helped to build a foundation for the protest by drawing on their knowledge of 
the Cerrado and PRODECER and their own direct engagement (as far as Brazilian organisations 
                                                          
130 This is based on detailed notes on the event between the ProSAVANA team and civil society shared with me by a participant. 
131 It is worth noting that UNAC did not sign this statement, reflecting the dynamics between civil society organization and social 
movements and a degree of competition for prominence in the anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation. Shankland, Gonçalves, & Favareto 
(forthcoming) analyse the politics of the ProSAVANA protest in detail.  
132 This time the initiative was led once again by UNAC. The alternating agency of individual civil society actors in Mozambique is 
discussed by Shankland, Gonçalves and Favareto (forthcoming). 
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and movements are concerned) in agrarian politics back in Brazil. The Open Letter provides a 
crucial piece of evidence on the ‘priests’ rising’ in Brazilian cooperation as the wording used 
indicates that a distinctively Brazilian narrative of family farming and dualism was starting to 
permeate anti-ProSAVANA discourse in Mozambique. 
The notion of family farming appears extensively in the body of the Letter, despite not being a 
category commonly used in Mozambique by the local agriculture-specific jargon that most 
commonly refers to ‘smallholder farmer’ or ‘peasant farmer’, both in governmental policy 
documents (MINAG, 2004, 2011) as well as in rural social movements’ mission statements 
(Associação Rural de Ajuda Mútua (ORAM), n.d.; UNAC, n.d.). Previous anti-ProSAVANA 
pronouncements had indeed used those terms. The ‘family sector’ has been occasionally used 
in Mozambique but has largely been regarded as a transitional category expected to disappear 
as part of agricultural modernisation. By contrast, the Open Letter emphasised family farming 
as a key social category to be reproduced through progressive development. 
The Letter also highlighted the role of family farming in food production, both in Mozambique 
and in Brazil. It claimed that ‘more than 80% of the Mozambican population depended on 
family farming for its livelihood, accounting for the production of more than 90% of the 
country’s food’ (UNAC et al., 2013, p. 2), echoing MDA’s promotional motto, back in Brazil, 
that family farming supplies 70% of food consumed by Brazilians (MDA, 2010). Also noticeable 
was the mention to PAA-Africa, highlighted as a cooperation programme that rural 
populations supported and encouraged and that contrasted with ProSAVANA’s agribusiness 
promotion. The Letter also demanded the total reallocation of ProSAVANA resources to a 
National Plan for the Support of Sustainable Family Farming, prioritising issues such as food 
sovereignty, conservation agriculture and agroecology. 
A similar pro-family farming and anti-agribusiness positioning was voiced by additional protest 
material produced jointly by Brazilian and Mozambican organisations during 2013. For 
example, the collaboration between FASE, a Brazilian NGO,133 with UNAC and ORAM resulted 
in the first anti-ProSAVANA advocacy video exposing the ‘dark side of PRODECER’ (UNAC & 
ORAM, 2013) and a report documenting the presence of Brazilian corporate interests in Nacala 
and establishing links between ProSAVANA and Brazil’s agribusiness (Schlesinger, 2013). 
Besides confronting ProSAVANA’s corporate agribusiness drive, it endorsed a family farming 
alternative, replicating the Open Letter’s discourse: it emphasised the family and peasant 
farming identity of communities populating the Nacala Corridor; it condemned the Master 
                                                          
133 FASE’s work is focused on issues such as social justice, environmental sustainability, agroecology and food sovereignty. 
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Plan and its backstage champion, GV Agro, for serving the interests of a particular segment of 
Brazilian society in direct opposition to the interests of family and peasant farming; and it 
highlighted PAA, and the associated National School Feeding Programme, as examples to build 
on. 
The anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation escalated throughout 2013 and 2014, fuelled by the 
constant rescheduling of the official Master Plan’s release, the lack of satisfactory engagement 
of social actors in the design process, and increasing evidence of business promotion activities 
targeting agriculture along the Corridor, particularly by the Japanese government (JICA, 2013; 
Vunjanhe, 2014). Japanese civil society issued their own damning statement (CADTM, 2013) 
and a flurry of Brazilian activists and researchers travelled to Mozambique to document the 
threat and share their insights on Brazil’s agricultural policy and politics. 
Fátima Mello, a leading activist and representative of FASE, was one of the most vocal 
presences in a process, whereby social movements from the three countries were united in 
‘leveraging resistance’ against the interests of agribusiness that ProSAVANA intended to 
promote (Mello cited in IHU, 2013). Mello combined experience with international advocacy, 
through her coordination work in the Brazilian Network for the People’s Integration 
(REBRIP),134 with domestic advocacy, via FASE, in the Cerrado region against the advances of 
soybean mono-cropping in particular. 
Besides Mello and FASE, other Brazilian civil society actors were also mobilised, including 
agrarian social actors MST, MPA and CONTAG. MST had for long kept a close connection with 
UNAC through LVC and had been disseminating UNAC’s protests and making its own 
disapproving remarks about the programme and the land grabbing threat it posed – ‘open 
your eyes, you will lose your land, this in no joke, it is a land grabbing process’, noted a senior 
MST figure (Agência Lusa, 2013). CONTAG got on board later, at a time when the family 
farming narrative as an alternative to ProSAVANA had already been established (Conferência 
Triangular dos Povos, 2014).  When I interviewed a CONTAG representative in November 2013, 
my respondent only had secondary information about the programme, obtained via CONSEA 
where ProSAVANA had already been discussed.135  
This joint ‘resistance’ against ProSAVANA was premised on a common identity between the 
mobilised social actors from the three countries and the local communities of the Nacala 
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Corridor. This common identity was articulated as family and peasant farming-based and 
defined in opposition to agribusiness. One of my respondents put it as follows: 
They [Mozambican peasants and peasant organisations] do not want large foreign 
investments that are not supportive of peasant family production. (…) They will resist 
and fight against projects, programmes that aim to introduce a model of agriculture 
that is not the peasant, family farming model that exists in the region, the Nacala 
Corridor. Therefore, there is the hope that together, through the articulation between 
social movements from the three countries involved, we will change the logic of 
ProSAVANA directing it towards small peasant production. That is what we are trying 
to do. If we do not succeed, we will support them in what they are saying they want to 
do, which is resist.136 
 
With the explicit use of family farming as the language of social resistance in Mozambique, 
ProSAVANA was turned into an arena for the deep-rooted Brazilian dispute of family farming-
versus-agribusiness. Brazil’s domestic agrarian politics had thus penetrated the domain of 
Brazilian international cooperation. ‘Our strategy [in Mozambique] is the same as our domestic 
one’, remarked the same respondent, referring to Brazilian social actors’ struggle to 
strengthen the weight of family farming in public policy. This struggle was not confined to 
social actors; it was also supported by parts of government, notably MDA, regarded as an ally 
both domestically and internationally. 
MDA is trying to increase the weight [of family farming] and that is what Mozambican 
peasants want – that the weight of programmes such as the Food Acquisition 
Programme gets stronger in Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique. MDA is trying to do 
that and we support it.137 
 
The sense of comradeship was reciprocal, as my research also found disapproval of 
ProSAVANA to be widespread inside MDA. A senior MDA official censured it for failing to 
advance the interests of family farming and therefore being contrary to the interests of the 
ministry:  
We have a lot of criticism. We think it is a model that should not be followed. (…) It 
does not have the capacity, the way the project is set up, to develop and strengthen 
Mozambican family farming. (…) It does not represent the interests of family farming. 
That I’m sure about. Therefore, for me it is enough.138 
 
Whilst MDA’s criticism to ProSAVANA remained confined to backstage commentary, the most 
explicit manifestation of the priests’ positioning vis-à-vis development cooperation, inside the 
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Brazilian agricultural politics, was the debate on ProSAVANA held at CONSEA’s annual 
assembly, in December 2013. The assembly focused on international development 
cooperation in food security and nutrition and UNAC was invited to provide testimony on 
ProSAVANA. UNAC not only talked about the threat of ProSAVANA, but also commended PAA-
Africa as a successful experience in Brazilian cooperation. The proceedings of the meeting, a 
significant political statement,139 raised concerns about ProSAVANA and highlighted the 
tension between business promotion and solidarity diplomacy in the Brazil’s government’s 
actions (CONSEA, 2013). It also noted that agribusiness’ political and economic weight back 
home was being projected abroad through international cooperation and warned that this was 
detrimental to family farming and the peasantry. Moreover, once again, PAA was endorsed as 
a template for agricultural cooperation and praised for not only targeting family farming but 
also promoting social participation. 
CONSEA’s interest in Brazil’s international cooperation agenda, and the ProSAVANA case in 
particular, reflected the forum’s insertion in international networks and social movements, 
which was at the heart of its foundation. However, it was also regarded as a way of 
strengthening its own domestic political struggle by means of international recognition. A 
senior and prominent member of CONSEA remarked: 
I have always argued that our international engagement had a double purpose. On the 
one hand, it has a value on its own, which is about sharing and learning with the 
others. But it also has a second purpose, which is about reinforcing our domestic 
legitimacy. CONSEA’s existence, and all that has to do with food and nutrition security 
policy, is subject to permanent political dispute. (...) I have always thought that the 
more internationally known CONSEA and the social participation experience were, the 
more legitimacy we would have internally.140 
 
The mobilisation of support from policy actors and spaces such as CONSEA inserted 
ProSAVANA and associated social mobilisation back into Brazil’s internal agricultural political 
process. Hence, development cooperation, a foreign policy area traditionally insulated from 
domestic affairs (Pinheiro & Milani, 2012), started to emerge as a domain of domestic political 
relevance. 
Back in Mozambique, the anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation continued throughout 2014 and 2015 
with growing prominence of domestic voices, rendering less relevant previous allegations that 
Mozambican social mobilisation had been driven by Brazilian and international advocacy 
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organisations rather than being a spontaneous reaction from Mozambican communities. A 
Brazilian government official noted: 
We know that it was the Brazilian civil society that raised concerns initially. It was only 
after the assessment by Brazilian societal sectors regarding the expansion of the 
Cerrado that UNAC started expressing a position on ProSAVANA. In the beginning, they 
had even participated and contributed to the programme’s planning.141 
 
The Mozambican ownership of the protest was marked, in 2014, by the launch of the national 
campaign Não ao ProSAVANA! (No to ProSAVANA!), signed by several of the most active social 
movements and civil society organisations in Mozambique (UNAC et al., 2014). Furthermore, in 
2015, the Academic Action for the Development of Rural Communities (ADECRU), a students’ 
movement with links to UNAC (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016), produced its own anti-
ProSAVANA manifesto through a video, documenting the discontent of local communities in 
the Nacala region (ADECRU, 2015). ADECRU would from now on be at the forefront of the 
battle against the programme (ADECRU et al., 2015) and would become a key advocacy 
channel.142 
Although the dynamics and nuances of discourse within Mozambican civil society stand 
beyond the scope of my analysis,143 it is worth noting that the family farming thrust and anti-
agribusiness language, which I argue had a strong Brazilian tag, remained significant in 
Mozambicans’ own enunciations. Furthermore, references to ‘peasant family farming’ denoted 
the hybridisation of language that had also marked the trajectory of agrarian social movement 
discourse in Brazil’s domestic context (cf. Chapter 3). 
[ProSAVANA] is a programme that aims to seize about 14.5 million hectares of land 
across 19 districts in the provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Zambézia for the 
development of agribusiness to the detriment of peasant family farming (…) 
communities and peasant families in the Nacala Corridor, social movement and 
national and international civil society organisations articulated in the No to 
ProSAVANA Campaign, resist and fight against the agrarian development model 
proposed by ProSAVANA and defend peasant family farming. (ADECRU (2015), 
author’s translation) 
 
                                                          
141 Interview with ABC#1. 
142 See, for example, ADECRU’s online news service, focusing exclusively on ProSAVANA (ADECRU Archive, n.d.). 
143 The Mozambican civil society’s involvement in ProSAVANA had its own dynamics. These were characterised by disputes for 
protagonism in the protest as well as differences in positioning vis-à-vis ProSAVANA – with some adopting more radical positions 
than others. Some of these issues are analysed by Shankland & Gonçalves (2016). 
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5.3. Reconfiguration of the ProSAVANA narrative and alliances 
The anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation and accusations of Brazil’s corporate imperialism constituted 
a blow to the Brazilian government’s narrative of South-South solidarity, challenging the 
official line that the technical attribute of Brazilian cooperation granted the latter a politically 
neutral character, typically referred to as ‘no interference’ (ABC, 2011a; Abreu, 2013a). The 
contestation resulted in more politically conscious behaviour on the side of the Brazilian 
government and its ProSAVANA associates. This behaviour manifested itself in the ambiguity 
and secrecy that surrounded ProSAVANA and in discursive adjustments with regards to the 
programme’s framing and status, particularly for the PD and PEM components.144 In this 
section, I analyse this evolution and reflect on what it means for how Brazil’s agricultural 
cooperation politics played out. I trace the reconfiguration of the ProSAVANA government 
narrative and actors’ alliances, which I argue was largely a discursive repositioning within the 
sphere of development cooperation, and partly with roots in Brazil’s domestic policy context. 
Before becoming a reality on the ground, ProSAVANA materialised, therefore, as a discursive 
instrument shaped by the actors’ different understandings of agricultural development and 
cooperation and feeding their individual agendas. 
5.3.1 Discourse fluidity 
Reactions from Brazilian ProSAVANA implementers to the contestation movement were 
varied. They comprised the denial of accusations, attempts at dialogue alternated with silence, 
and the adoption of a compromise discourse seeking to incorporate some of the contestants’ 
pleas. The failure to generate a coherent and unambiguous response, on the Brazilian side at 
least, should be read in the light of the institutional framework of ProSAVANA and three 
factors in particular. One is the fragmented nature of Brazilian cooperation, with its 
assortment of actors and interests and ABC’s powerlessness to act as a de facto coordinating 
body. Another is the triangular aspect of the programme, where responsibilities were shared 
across the three governments. A third factor concerns the deteriorating salience of 
development cooperation, and foreign policy more broadly, within the Brazilian government’s 
agenda, weakening the position of those in the frontline of cooperation. 
Across ProSAVANA implementers, a pattern of reactions is noticeable. Amongst my 
respondents, those with a technical role and agricultural background, particularly Embrapa 
researchers, tended to dismiss the protest as politically driven and reject the dualism 
argument as technically flawed – the portrayal by the Embrapa researcher of ‘priests versus 
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technicians’ encapsulates this perspective. Replicating the dynamics of the political debate in 
Brazil, the anti-ProSAVANA movement’s accusation of agribusiness hegemony over family 
farming was contrasted with a unitary conception of agriculture where different forms of 
production were regarded as part of an integrated system (Rodrigues, 2010). Therefore, those 
mobilised against ProSAVANA insisted on portraying the dangers dualism, its inherently 
conflicting nature and the ‘impossible coexistence’ between the two distinctive modes of 
production.145 Embrapa researchers, by contrast, rejected dualism as a ‘fallacious fabrication’ 
without technical foundation and connected to political disputes in Brazil.146 In one account: 
I believe that [what is behind the ProSAVANA contestation] is the same as that behind 
the contestation from these movements that support landless workers, family farming, 
here in Brazil. It is a political rather than a technical question. It is a battle for political 
space. 147 
 
While technicians exempted themselves from what they saw as a politically motivated 
controversy, insisting on their scientific conduct and exclusive focus on sharing technical 
knowledge and solutions,148 others adopted a more conciliatory posture. The latter included 
cooperation officials, diplomats and consultants. In Mozambique, the tripartite ProSAVANA 
team initially reacted to the protest in a seemingly coordinated fashion, such as in the joint 
clarification session held in early 2013. 
Back in Brazil, there were attempts to convene dissenting voices including by the Lula Institute 
which sought to play a brokering role between government and civil society (CONTAG, 2013). 
Its message was one of compromise: 
There is an outstanding debate in ProSAVANA that is about how to conduct a 
development process integrating family farming and agribusiness. In reality, Brazil 
progressed through that combination. It is not an easy combination and it cannot be 
done without debate and tensions. (…) From Lula’s point of view and from the 
Institute’s point of view that is an inevitable combination to develop the economy of a 
country and address its food needs.149 
 
The need to strengthen communication with social actors and local communities on 
ProSAVANA was acknowledged by the Brazilian government, although the Mozambican 
government’s overall ownership of the programme and hence ultimate responsibility vis-à-vis 
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dialogue with civil society were also underlined. Yet, better communication was thought to be 
required to clarify that the Brazilian government had no intention to promote land grabbing by 
foreign investors or support a focus on commodities for export markets. The Concept Note on 
the Master Plan, published in September of 2013 as a basis for dialogue with civil society, 
sought to highlight the programme’s inclusion of all categories of producers, particularly small 
to medium farmers,150 and eliminate concerns about land grabbing and environmental 
negligence (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013).151 Some of the language of protest was also gradually 
absorbed into a revised ProSAVANA narrative, where the programme’s family farming 
credentials were played up.  
In effect, the official version of the Master Plan finally released in March 2015 by the 
Mozambican agricultural ministry, known as the ‘Zero Draft’, contained numerous references 
to family farming, identified as the main target group in the envisaged development strategy 
for the Nacala Corridor (MASA, 2015). As argued by Mosca and Bruna (2015), the Master Plan 
had been through several transformations compared to the leaked version of 2013. It went 
silent on private investment in export-oriented large-scale commercial agriculture and 
emphasised support for small-scale farming and local markets instead. 
Even respondents at FGV Projetos adopted this stance and started highlighting family farming, 
while downplaying the inspiration in the Cerrado and PRODECER. This contrasted with views 
articulated on earlier occasions (cf. Section 5.1):  
We worked very hard to propose sustainable business models. It is not demagogy. (…)  
There is a very strong background here in Brazil with family farming, with the 
integration of family farming into value chains. (…) Our focus has always been the 
small producer. (…) I would not say that was what qualified Brazil to participate in the 
process was the PRODECER experience. I don’t think so. What qualified Brazil was the 
experience of developing agriculture in all fronts – peasant farming, small-scale and 
large-scale. It was not PRODECER. That is an out-dated model. (…) We had a very 
strong focus on sustainability, on family farming development. It was our chief priority 
and our focus in the elaboration of the Master Plan.152 
 
Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) argue, however, that the gradual expansion of the boundaries 
of ProSAVANA into the less populated northern region of Niassa province, where conditions 
                                                          
150 For example: ‘the target of ProSAVANA covers all categories of agriculture producers that work in the area: according to their 
scale of production, being small, medium and large farmers; type of agricultural management, being single farmer, farmers’ 
organisations and commercial agriculture; and gender’ (ProSavana-PD, 2013b, p. 1). ‘The target beneficiaries of the master Plan 
implementation are the small and medium size farmers of the Nacala Corridor’ (ProSavana-PD, 2013b, p. 15).  
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and agricultural land, taking care of the environment, socio-economic aspects, and paying maximum consideration to protecting 
the rights of local inhabitants over the use of those resources’ (ProSavana-PD, 2013, p. 2). 
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for large-scale soybean cultivation were more suitable, reflected the hidden agendas that lay 
behind the revised narrative of pro-smallholder agriculture. 
While some tried to recast the ProSAVANA story, more candid views acknowledged a change 
in trajectory by admitting to an initial formulation oversight. In one account, ProSAVANA-PEM 
was presented as an opportunity to ‘re-balance the course of the programme’ and 
‘demonstrate its emphasis on small producers and interaction with local social actors’.153 It 
was also acknowledged that the Brazilian farmers’ visits to Mozambique had been premature 
and even the Federal Deputy Luiz Nishimori adjusted his posture and, reportedly, apologised 
to Congress for his earlier misleading testimony. Indeed, in a second televised interview, 
Nishimori was at pains to revert the image of ProSAVANA as a business endeavour and 
emphasise its sustainable development objectives: 
I was in the Nacala Corridor and other regions (…) that have indeed a great agricultural 
productive, agribusiness potential. But ProSAVANA is not exactly about that. 
ProSAVANA aims to support the economic, social, educational and also agricultural 
development in Mozambique. I would say it is one of the best twenty-first century 
products with regards to the issue of poverty and hunger eradication, with regards to 
social issues. I would say it is a sustainable development project. (Palavra Aberta 
(2013), author’s translation)154 
 
The discursive repackaging was not unanimous. Some technicians at Embrapa stayed the 
course. One of my respondents regarded the leaning of discourse towards a family farming 
narrative as a cosmetic trick without substance.155 Also, those in the frontline of ProSAVANA-PI 
continued to define the programme as geared towards large-scale farming and inspired in the 
Cerrado: 
There is no way of running away from that vision of working large areas and large 
crops. Besides producing enough food for the population, the government wants to 
produce surpluses for export, to generate foreign exchange that the country needs. 
(…) when I talk about food I mean large commodities. Not food for subsistence. Those 
are basic food items that sustain a small part of the population.156 
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It was also acknowledged that there would be winners and losers in this process and that 
small-scale farmers would only subsist as waged labourers. ‘If you have a vision of high-earning 
crops and large farming areas, little space is left for small farmers’.157 
5.3.2 Changing manoeuvres: traders side-track, priests advance, technicians splinter 
As discourse on ProSAVANA became more ambiguous and the process of dialogue failed, initial 
alliances started to fracture and the ProSAVANA policy process entered what I regard as its 
third stage. The affinity between technicians and traders in ProSAVANA became a liability for 
either side. For Embrapa, the accusation that technical cooperation was commercially minded 
challenged its claims of scientific orientation and politically neutrality and tainted its 
international image of success. For traders, the cooperation element of the Nacala venture 
had played its part (in opening the way for business) and there was mounting frustration with 
the Brazilian government’s inability to manage the political unrest, and its slow progress both 
with regards to the technological transfer as well as the mobilisation of capital to sponsor 
investments in the Corridor.158 Although united by a shared vision of modernisation inspired in 
the Cerrado transformation, technicians and traders hence broke apart, as I now illustrate. 
 Technicians and traders split and traders side-track cooperation: the discursive 
disconnection between ProSAVANA and Nacala Fund  
Embrapa removed itself from the spotlight, retreating to its pilot experiments in research 
stations. Its connections with the Master Plan, which was at the centre of the protest, were 
denied,159 and the Mozambican government’s ownership was emphasised to deflect 
responsibility.160 The general coordinator for the Embrapa programme in Mozambique, who 
had a more overtly institutional and policy engagement profile, left in 2014, never to be 
replaced. Someone noted that Embrapa’s institutional presence in Mozambique had 
weakened.161 This happened against a context of decreasing prominence of cooperation and 
foreign affairs in the Brazilian government’s agenda (Stuenkel, 2014). 
As for the traders, FGV Projetos concluded its role in ProSAVANA in 2013, with the end of its 
consultancy contract with the Brazilian government, before the Master Plan was officially 
released. When I interviewed FGV Projetos staff members in mid 2014, their attitude was one 
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of estrangement vis-à-vis ProSAVANA, claiming lack of awareness about the programme’s 
latest developments and showing reluctance to talk about their previous experience. Yet, 
FGV’s presence in Nacala had not ceased but continued through a direct interaction with the 
Mozambican government concerning the Nacala Fund. Links with ProSAVANA and with the 
Brazilian government’s cooperation programme were, however, denied. FGV Projetos and the 
Nacala Fund had broken away from ProSAVANA’s development cooperation sphere, or at least 
that was the claim by my respondents at FGV Projetos and ABC. 
The Nacala Fund was reportedly being redesigned to address a major obstacle to the 
development of competitive agriculture in Mozambique – the absence of an appropriate 
‘technological package’ comprising seeds and fertiliser.162 Without this package, investors 
would not be attracted to Mozambique, even with the incentive of free land. Hence, the 
Nacala Fund would no longer focus exclusively on agricultural production, but also on, and 
apparently more intensively in the first stage, developing an industry of seeds and fertilisers in 
the Nacala Corridor. This was a project that targeted not only the region but also neighbouring 
countries, such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.163  
Besides the change of focus, it is significant that the governments of Brazil and Japan, which 
had previously appeared as sponsors of the Nacala Fund (see logos in Figure 17), were 
allegedly no longer part of the process. FGV Projetos was in it on its own terms, as a ‘partner’ 
(not a contractor) of the Mozambican government and using ‘own resources’ to finance its 
technical inputs.164 This was part of a strategy of establishing itself as the leading Brazilian 
institution with Africa expertise: 
FGV is consolidating today as a Brazilian academic and consultancy institution, or a 
business school, whatever, that is most engaged with Africa. And there is no doubt 
that Africa is the new rising star in the world’s economic stage. Therefore, our plan is 
to be the institution with the strongest Africa expertise, capable of structuring 
projects, producing knowledge… you know, that is an investment. We understand it as 
an investment, not in the sense of a financial investment… well, also financial, 
obviously, because… it is above all about a new business and knowledge frontier.165 
 
Having built a reputation in several African countries through the Green Belt feasibility studies 
funded by development cooperation projects, FGV Projetos was now in a position to follow its 
own course in exploring the opportunities that Africa offered. Faced with the Brazilian 
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government’s resource constraints and its failure to manage ProSAVANA’s convoluted 
situation, FGV Projetos proceeded as a business partner on its own and no longer as a second-
tier contracted consultant. 
Another key development was that the Nacala Fund was now expected to set up its own 
adaptive research experiments of Brazilian varieties, led by private investors rather than by 
Embrapa. The pace of Embrapa’s research in ProSAVANA had proven too slow to serve the 
needs of private investors, who would run their own experiments. 
Traders had hence detached themselves from the domain of government-sponsored technical 
cooperation, which they no longer needed and was now regarded more as a liability. Whereas 
the anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation may have influenced this trajectory, other factors also played 
a part, not least the inability to mobilise funding to attract investors and weakening support 
from the Brazilian government to technical cooperation activities. One of my respondents at 
FGV Projetos noted: 
I left ProSAVANA largely because I saw that the situation was out of control. There was 
no communication policy from ABC, JICA or the Government of Mozambique to give 
information about ProSAVANA. (…) the current scenario is of a total lack of interest 
from Brazilians in Mozambican agriculture. And ABC has fewer and fewer resources.166 
 
In the meantime, falling international commodity prices also meant that enthusiasm about the 
Corridor’s economic development had faded. Indeed, from the end of 2014, Mozambique 
would witness a slowdown in investment activities associated with several of ambitious 
megaprojects, driving, in turn, a decline in foreign direct investment to the country (IMF, 
2015). 
 Priests advance: MDA’s role in ProSAVANA and the ATER story 
While traders bypassed the ProSAVANA obstacle to continue their business in Nacala (to the 
extent possible under a changing economic outlook), new developments unfolded within the 
programme’s technical cooperation realm, concerning ProSAVANA-PEM specifically. The 
analysis that follows emphasises the putative involvement of MDA in this component and how 
this was, I argue, connected to developments in the agricultural policy in Brazil, and the debate 
on state-private provision of extension services specifically. This illustrates not only the 
advancement of priests in the cooperation front, but also divisions within Embrapa, with some 
of its technicians activating their support to a family farming-centred agenda for cooperation. 
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ProSAVANA-PEM had initially been thought about as the operationalisation of the Master Plan. 
The Master Plan provided the guidelines, whereas PEM focused on implementation and details 
on production models and extension requirements.167 Yet, given the impasse caused by the 
contestation and lack of resources from Brazil, this sequencing could not be entirely followed 
(at least formally) and work on PEM kicked off more than a year before the Plan’s official ‘Zero 
Draft’ became public in early 2015 (MASA, 2015), supported largely by Japanese technical and 
financial inputs. On the Brazilian side, MDA was designated to lead on this component and its 
logo appeared on the ProSAVANA website for some time between 2013 and 2014 (it has since 
been removed). 
As I conducted fieldwork in 2013-14, MDA’s involvement in ProSAVANA was being discussed 
and negotiated and opinions inside the ministry on whether or not it should participate in the 
programme were divided. A high-ranking MDA official, whom I interviewed in November 2013, 
was not aware that a discussion was taking place and dismissed it as absurd, given that 
ProSAVANA was in opposition to what MDA stood for.168 Others argued, however, that 
engagement was a valid means of influencing and changing ProSAVANA’s course from 
within.169 
Yet, involvement in ProSAVANA was a manifestly sensitive issue inside MDA. An ABC 
respondent noted that the MDA’s participation had always been part of the script but the 
ministry had backtracked in the face of the civil society protest.170 MDA respondents, however, 
denied any role in the initial conception of ProSAVANA, noting their disapproval of the 
programme’s process and content.171 Negotiations between ABC and MDA were taking place 
in late 2013, notwithstanding, and MDA’s International Relations and Commercial Promotion 
(AIPC) team had prepared a proposal to focus on technical assistance and extension (ATER) to 
farmers, with family farmers as the target group. 
For my ABC respondent, who was someone closely involved in the coordination of 
ProSAVANA, MDA’s participation in the programme was seen as an opportunity to address civil 
society concerns and make space for family farming. This conciliatory position is evident in this 
account: 
The debate with civil society has been very good. Despite all the criticism, I have 
received civil society representatives more than once and we have reached an 
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agreement that the strategy should indeed be different and that they should intervene 
at a higher level to open space… like the case of CONSEA that has this agenda, or 
CONDRAF on family farming policy that has a committee that debates ProSAVANA. 
These have created a very interesting space and MDA’s participation in the third 
project, which is about rural extension and models, is undoubtedly the entry door for 
that vision, for a concerted vision with civil society inside ProSAVANA.172 
 
Besides MDA, other Brazilian entities were mobilised by ABC for operationalising ProSAVANA-
PEM, including SENAR, a private rural professional training entity linked to CNA.173 Agencies 
responsible for ATER services at the federal state level (called EMATER) were also invited to 
participate but had little involvement due to their limited capacity. The EMATER system had 
been through a process of progressive deterioration over the years and was about to be 
reformed under the new ATER agency, ANATER, whose leadership was disputed by the key 
Brazilian agriculture sector players, including the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA), CNA, 
Embrapa and MDA (Peixoto, 2014; Valente, 2014).174 These domestic disputes transposed into 
the cooperation domain, as reflected in actors’ dynamics around ProSAVANA-PEM. 
The input from each of these Brazilian institutions was negotiated on an individual basis with 
the Mozambican government, and ABC played a brokering role.175 SENAR and MDA were 
therefore brought into ProSAVANA-PEM through separate channels and there was no shared 
plan for ATER interventions. ABC’s role was essentially a procedural one, with little 
competence to grasp (or willingness to engage with) the complexity of the ATER issue in 
Brazil’s domestic politics and, specifically, the battle for control of the ATER agenda.  
This political-institutional battle was underscored by contrasting positions on the nature of 
ATER service provision and knowledge transfer – where the contrast was, in broad terms, 
between a dominant top-down model of science diffusion and an alternative bottom-up 
approach more akin to building local knowledge and agroecological practices (Valente, 
2014).176 Whereas the bulk of Embrapa was supportive of the former approach, a smaller 
group was sympathetic towards the latter, notably researchers at Embrapa’s Technology 
Transfer Department (DTT), a unit under PT influence that had been growing and gaining clout 
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professional training body providing services to its associate; and (iii) the CNA Institute, a not-for-profit association that conducts 
socio-economic studies on agribusiness (CNA Brasil, n.d.). 
174 The ATER agenda had been institutionally located inside MDA since 2003, whereas before it had been under MAPA (Peixoto, 
2014). With the creation of ANATER as an independent agency in 2014, however, the ministry’s prominent role became under 
threat, especially as the President of CNA, Kátia Abreu, who pushed for an ATER agenda directed to CNA’s broader category of 
rural producers rather than family farmers, became increasingly close to President Dilma Rousseff (Valente, 2014). Incidentally, 
Abreu would become Dilma’s minister of agriculture in January 2015. 
175 Interview with SENAR respondents, Brasília, July 2014 (SENAR#1, SENAR#2 and SENAR#3). 
176 A point made also by my Embrapa respondent EMB#19. 
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within the organisation. In the area of development cooperation specifically, DTT had been 
given the mandate for coordinating the training component of Embrapa’s technical 
cooperation programme, upon the dismantling of CECAT in 2014.177 
MDA’s proposed role in ProSAVANA reflected its domestic political advocacy for strengthening 
public ATER services to family farmers and, crucially, the battle for retaining ATER under its 
remit. Inside Embrapa, researchers at DTT were supportive of this and argued that Embrapa’s 
agronomic research should play a social function in rural areas and hence be connected to 
public policies such as ATER (Stumpf Jr., 2014; Stumpf Jr. & Balsadi, 2015).178 The need for 
ATER to serve family farmers was highlighted in the DTT director’s remark: 
ANATER was created to establish a link between research, technical assistance and 
rural extension. (…) nowadays farmers are more specialised, with higher productivity 
and income. However, there is a contingent of family farmers that need more direct 
and effective assistance. ANATER emerges to fill that gap. Ultimately, ANATER will be 
responding to demands coming from society. (Embrapa (2014), author’s translation) 
 
My Embrapa respondent at DTT stressed the alignment between Embrapa and MDA around 
ATER and claimed that the two entities had never been so close in their history. As emerges 
from the following passage, family farming was as the unifying narrative: 
We are living at the moment a good moment, for several reasons. One is the affinity 
between Embrapa and the ministry [MDA] in what concerns public policy. ANATER has, 
in theory, a major role in the innovation framework that Embrapa preaches but does 
not have the instruments to operationalise. All the technology that we produce cannot 
stay on shelves. Who could help us taking it to farmers was ATER, which was inside 
MDA. Now this goes to ANATER. That’s a first point. Another one – increasingly the 
multilateral organisations are signalling the importance of family farming. This year is 
the international family farming year. The Brazilian experience is emblematic. The last 
2006 census illustrated it. And there is growing affinity in public policy between 
Embrapa, MDA and MDS. I think this is a moment of convergence. The second point is 
evident – no matter how sensational the agribusiness message is, there are major 
problems with that export-oriented business model. That is increasingly evident.179 
 
This new domestic Embrapa-MDA comradeship spilled over into the field of international 
cooperation and ProSAVANA-PEM specifically. Three of my respondents at MDA indicated that 
MDA and Embrapa’s interventions would become integrated.180 In the absence of ABC’s 
                                                          
177 Interview with EMB#19. 
178 This view was opposed by another that regarded Embrapa’s involvement in ANATER and the ATER function as a threat to the 
efficiency of the organisation’s research agenda that compromised its neutrality by subjecting it to political and party influences 
(Navarro & Alves, 2014).  
179 Interview with EMB#19. 
180 Interview with MDA#4, MDA#6 and MDA#7. 
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capacity to coordinate on the substance of cooperation, MDA had taken the initiative to 
convene informal discussions on how to strengthen integration, with ATER as common 
denominator. The envisaged articulation concerned not only ProSAVANA-PEM, but also other 
agricultural cooperation programmes, including MFI and PAA-Africa. This initiative brought 
together MDA, Embrapa, MDS, CGFOME and others involved in these programmes.181 My MDA 
respondents mentioned specifically José Graziano’s FAO, and the regional office for Latin 
America in particular (that he had previously headed), as participants in the discussion and as 
supporters of a stronger state and public policies directed to family farming in international 
development. Mozambique was at the centre of the discussion, as the country where those 
various agricultural cooperation programmes were being implemented and where 
coordination gaps were regarded as significant. 
Inside Embrapa, this ‘movement’ was supported by an initiative seeking to establish a 
connection between Embrapa’s technical cooperation work and PAA-Africa. This initiative was 
led by Embrapa researcher Maya Takagi, a former high-ranking official in the Ministry of Social 
Development (MDS)182 and collaborator of José Graziano and Fome Zero (Graziano da Silva & 
Takagi, 2007). Takagi had obtained funding from the Brazilian National Council for Scientific 
and Technological Development to support this somewhat rebellious initiative inside Embrapa 
(Takagi, Tomchinsky, & Labranche, n.d.). The project was backed by DTT though not by SRI – 
the institutional channel for Embrapa’s international engagements and liaison with ABC. It had 
Mozambique as one of targeted countries and aimed to identify mechanisms to connect 
Embrapa’s technological innovation with the ATER needs of farmers benefiting from PAA-
Africa and school feeding programmes. In Mozambique, it targeted specifically Embrapa’s 
ProAlimentos, a project focusing on horticulture’s adaptive research (Table 1). ProAlimentos 
was closing at the end of 2014 and an extension was on the table and this envisaged making 
research outputs available to farmers through ATER services and connect the same farmers to 
PAA-Africa and the school meals programme.183 This would close the cycle of family farming-
based initiatives by connecting research, extension, food procurement and food supply to food 
insecure population (school children in this case). Takagi’s initiative mobilised Embrapa 
                                                          
181 Including the National Fund for Education Development (FNDE), responsible for the School Feeding Programme. 
182 She was the National Secretary for Food and Nutritional Security at MDS in 2011-12. 
183 Interviews with EMB#16 and EMB#17. 
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researchers more akin to family farming, food security and agroecology promotion184 and 
connected them with FAO and African research and extension organisations.185 
Hence, the initial priests’ rising against ProSAVANA, that was confined to civil society actors, 
gave way to a broader movement for an alternative family farming model that penetrated the 
Brazilian government’s cooperation programme and comprised also technicians from 
Embrapa, the icon of Brazil’s agribusiness transformation. As Fátima Mello noted in a 
published interview, there were conflicting interests in Brazil’s cooperation in Mozambique. 
Besides the agribusiness interest in exploring a Cerrado-inspired model there were also other 
experiences to draw from: 
There is today an attempt, not only by Brazilian social movements but also by some 
sectors within government, to take to Mozambique proposals in the field of 
agroecology, food production on a family and peasant basis and sustainable, 
experiences of exchange of native seeds, etc. (Mello cited in IHU (2013) author's 
translation) 
 
This movement circumvented the institutionalised channels of bilateral cooperation (including 
ABC, and SRI at Embrapa), relying instead on the sponsorship of a new and significant 
international ally – Graziano’s FAO. 
As I finished fieldwork, however, it was unclear as whether the apparent advance by the 
priests in the cooperation realm would make any substantial difference in the shaping of 
ProSAVANA and Brazil’s agricultural cooperation, in the face of the traders’ repositioning and 
the Mozambican government’s own disposition (as I will discuss in Chapter 6). 
5.4. Conclusion: hegemonic agrarian battles and disputed cooperation ethics 
ProSAVANA is an intricate story with many twists and turns. This chapter focused primarily on 
the dynamics concerning Brazilian actors and the Brazilian agricultural cooperation policy 
process. ProSAVANA is also a live story that continues unfolding as I write. This fluid policy 
process, with its changing protagonists, allegiances and disputes, illustrates the three-
dimensional perspective articulated by my conceptual framework which, in Chapter 2, I 
defined as comprising: (i) actors and their interests; (ii) discourse; both underpinned by (iii) 
social struggles, that were the product of history, geography, party-politics and class dynamics. 
The latter determine the ways in which actors deploy discourse to pursue certain interests, but 
                                                          
184 Embrapa units mentioned in the project proposal included Embrapa-Hortaliças, Embrapa-Arroz e Feijão and Embrapa-Milho e 
Sorgo, which are amongst the units where issues like family farming, food security and agroecology find most adherence inside 
Embrapa (Takagi, Tomchinsky, & Labranche, n.d.). 
185 Interview with EMB#20. 
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they also indicate how actors are themselves constituted through discourse. Hence, Brazilian 
cooperation actors coming from diverse policy areas and social groupings coalesced at times 
around similar motives, and at times around common narratives regardless of their contrasting 
identities and agendas.  
For the time interval covered by my analysis,186 I highlighted three stages of the ProSAVANA 
policy process, each defined by a particular alliance of interests and/or discursive positioning, 
as far as Brazilian actors were concerned. These were underpinned by changes in context (in 
Brazil, Mozambique and internationally) and also by some long-standing social disputes in 
Brazilian agrarian politics. The first stage of ProSAVANA was one of fairly evident alignment 
between traders and technicians, a time when interests drove action and the novelty of 
cooperation (and some naivety about what it entailed) let narratives flow freely. Traders 
sought to expand their markets while offering business to African counterparts, whereas 
technicians responded to foreign policy imperatives while seeking to benefit from 
international exposure through the cooperation experience. Traders and technicians 
converged around a similar perspective on agricultural modernisation, based on a recipe of 
success symbolised by the Brazilian Cerrado, and a presumption of parallelism between the 
Cerrado and the African savannah. Priests rose against what they regarded as a corporate 
take-over of the cooperation agenda and an ill-framed notion of affinity and this marked a 
second stage of ProSAVANA. For priests, family farming or peasant family farming was the 
common element to draw on and from where to build a developmental trajectory for 
Mozambican agriculture, similar to the one they had fought for in Brazil. The third stage was a 
stage of discursive reconfigurations as result of the priests’ contestation but also, and, I would 
argue, significantly, as a result of changing material conditions for cooperation and for 
business. The bureaucratic hurdles of Brazilian cooperation coupled with decreasing significant 
of the Africa agenda within Dilma Rousseff’s government (and in a context of escalating 
political and economic crisis) acted as constraints for action in the frontline of ProSAVANA 
implementation. This period of lull favoured multiple interpretations on ProSAVANA and 
attempts to fill the void with discursive constructions that served the actors’ competing 
agendas and replicated battles from Brazil’s own agrarian politics. For my analysis of 
interactions between priests, technicians and traders, two trends were significant in this third 
stage. One was the withdrawal of traders from the cooperation domain – which as far as 
ProSAVANA was concerned meant rather little, as progress on the Brazilian side had virtually 
stalled. The other was the rise of the family farming narrative in cooperation, supported by an 
                                                          
186 From the genesis of ProSAVANA until August 2014, when I completed fieldwork. 
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expanded coalition of actors in Brazil (no longer confined to NGOs and rural social movements 
but also involving government players, including Embrapa technicians) and in the international 
sphere. 
On a broader level, and beyond the minutiae of the ‘plot’ narrated in this chapter, the big 
picture story about ProSAVANA could be framed as one concerning the unremitting 
hegemonic battle between two competing framings of agricultural development and of 
Brazilian cooperation – and this recalls an even bigger story about global agrarian change and 
the concept of development assistance which I will come back to in the concluding chapter. 
The priests-versus-traders’ interaction embodies such a battle in ways that not only reflect 
Brazil’s agrarian dualism, but combines it with contrasting conceptualisations of SSC, 
concerning whether Brazilian cooperation should be about solidarity or also about business in 
the ‘win-win’ or ‘mutual advantage’ ethic (cf. Chapter 4)?  
Yet, even solidarity has a purpose and the priest-traders’ duality should not be reduced to a 
simplistic Manichaean framing of good-versus-evil or altruistic-versus-selfish. The priests’ 
alternative to ProSAVANA may be a struggle for communities’ self-determination, sustainable 
and people-centred development, but it is also a battle for political space, power and 
resources, either within the state apparatus or within civil society. Indeed, the following 
chapter illustrates, with reference to the MFI case, that priests also forged alliances of 
convenience with traders. It also exemplifies how the family farming agenda came to embody 
more than just a progressive agrarian agenda and how the notion of dualism itself became 
equivocal, as suggested in my previous discussion about the multiple significations of dualism 
(cf. Chapter 3). 
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Chapter 6. The discourse-politics of MFI 
From the perspective of Brazil’s agricultural dualism in its conventional framing of family 
farming versus agribusiness, MFI appears to stand, on a preliminary reading at least, on the 
opposite side of ProSAVANA – and this was, in effect, one of the reasons for selecting it as a 
case study. As MDA’s flagship cooperation programme, MFI embodies the family farming 
paradigm of Brazil’s agricultural development. It is rooted in Brazil’s increasingly celebrated 
domestic trajectory that has been consolidated by the PT-led government since 2003.  
Despite being a relatively discreet agricultural cooperation initiative, overshadowed by 
ProSAVANA’s ample advertising (positive as well as negative), MFI is a noteworthy programme 
in Brazil’s cooperation portfolio. Its significance stems not only from what it symbolises in the 
agricultural policy debate, but also from the volume of resources mobilised (US$ 640 million) 
relative to Brazil’s overall modest cooperation budget – worth US$ 1.6 billion in the period 
2005-2009 (IPEA & ABC, 2010). MFI also introduced a new modality of Brazilian development 
cooperation. Its combination of technical cooperation with a concessional loan to finance the 
export of Brazilian agricultural machinery represented an explicit connection between 
solidarity and mercantile dimensions, making MFI the most unequivocal expression of the 
claimed ‘mutual benefit’ attribute of Brazil’s SSC. 
The questions are what MFI stands for exactly, beyond the rhetoric of family farming-based 
Southern solidarity, and what the process of its formation and practice reveals about the 
politics of agricultural cooperation, the influence of Brazil’s domestic setting and the way this 
influence operates and travels through the development cooperation channel. 
My exploration of MFI follows an analytical scheme analogous to that used for ProSAVANA in 
the previous chapter. My approach is, once again, to dissect the programme into its discursive 
components, drawing on the narrative storylines of its main protagonists, thereby shedding 
light on the politics of Brazil’s agricultural cooperation. I take into account dynamics occurring 
in Brazil and in Mozambique and feeding each other. I review contemporary developments, 
unfolding at the time of fieldwork – including the gradual disconnect between the commercial 
and political dimensions of the programme and the re-energising of MFI’s technical 
cooperation component – and discuss what these mean for the trajectory of the programme 
and Brazil’s agricultural cooperation portfolio more broadly. The fragmentation of MFI into a 
bifurcated programme, which I argue has taken shape, reflected the reconfiguration of 
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alliances in Brazil’s agricultural cooperation that extended beyond this individual programme 
and indeed was also noticeable for ProSAVANA. 
For MFI specifically, the programme started off as an alliance between priests and traders, 
reflected in the combination of agricultural machinery sales with family farming policy 
advocacy (as I discuss in Section 6.1). The sales component and its associated agricultural 
modernisation push gained prominence, not least because of the reception the programme 
had in Africa (Cabral, Favareto, Mukwereza, & Amanor, 2016). At the same time, the dualism 
politics that characterised Brazil’s domestic agriculture started permeating development 
cooperation, stirred largely by ProSAVANA (Section 6.2). As a result, the family farming 
coalition showed signs of more vigorous assertiveness in the international sphere, energised 
by support from a key international broker, FAO (Section 6.3). Yet, within this apparently 
cohesive coalition, lay concealed disputes over the meaning of family farming and it remained 
unclear what version of family farming the technicians, called into the picture by a revamped 
technical cooperation component, would take forward. 
6.1. The priests and traders of MFI 
MFI was established as a cooperation programme soon after the 2010 Brazil-Africa Talks on 
Food Security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development (cf. Chapter 4), where its model of 
reference, Brazil’s domestic More Food programme (cf. Chapter 3), was introduced as an 
instrument of agricultural modernisation to delegations of more than 40 ministries of 
agriculture from across Africa. President Lula made the following remark at the event: 
I remember that when we launched the More Food programme, at the height of the 
food crisis, we created in 18 months a credit line for small producers; we sold here, 
domestically, 25 thousand tractors for people who had never imagined they would 
have a tractor. That programme would have ended by now but we are going to extend 
it because… [unfinished sentence in the original transcript] and I want to see if we 
extend the same credit line from Brazil to Latin America and the African countries that 
want to modernise their agriculture. (Lula da Silva (2010, p. 13), author’s translation) 
 
The programme’s food focus, at a time of the global food prices crisis, and its emphasis on 
agricultural machinery, particularly tractors, a typically popular modality of assistance 
(Scoones, 2013), generated much enthusiasm and some African delegations promptly came 
forward to signal their interest.187 The programme was initially called More Food Africa and 
was formalised later in the year through a ministerial ordinance (M. A. Leite, 2014). In early 
2011, the Brazilian Chamber of Commerce (CAMEX) approved a loan of US$ 640 million to 
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finance the export of Brazilian agricultural machinery and implements to African countries 
(Presidência da República, 2011a). The signature of loan agreements and technical 
cooperation protocols with individual beneficiary countries in Africa followed suit. 
By the end of 2013, five countries had formally subscribed to the programme (MDA, 2013b). 
These countries were Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Each contracted a 
loan of US$ 80 to 100 million to procure agricultural equipment, supplemented with the 
donation of in-kind technical cooperation inputs. Cuba also joined the programme, and other 
countries in Latin America showed interest. More Food Africa was hence re-baptised as More 
Food International to reflect its broader geographical scope. 
With its medley of trade and technical cooperation, MFI constituted an example of the 
‘Brazilian way’ of combining business with development promotion in Africa (White, 2010). 
Through the export credit facility, Brazil sold its own agricultural technology to African farmers 
and contributed to the trade objective of diversifying Brazil’s exports and increasing the share 
of manufactured products.188 Yet, MFI was not an ordinary export credit facility. Its lending 
conditions were concessional189 and the post-sales assistance190 and technical cooperation 
package that supplemented the loan gave a socially responsible tag to the commercial 
operation. Moreover, MFI was not a conventional Brazilian technical cooperation project that 
typically consisted of training and technology and knowledge transfer provided by Brazilian 
experts. Besides technical cooperation, centred on strengthening partner countries’ rural 
extension systems, MFI also included ‘exchanges on public policy experiences’,191 which meant 
a dialogue between MDA and African government counterparts centred on public policies 
geared specifically towards family farmers. 
The Brazilian government’s portrayal of MFI typically highlighted the programme’s 
contribution towards strengthening family farming production and food security through 
increases in productivity supported by suitable Brazilian technology (MDA, 2012, 2013a, 
2014a). Family farming, food, mechanisation and the export of Brazilian technology were, 
hence, the common ingredients used to describe the programme, as the following passage 
illustrates: 
                                                          
188 Interview with CAMEX respondent. 
189 For the five African countries, the loan has a term of 15 years, with a 3-year grace period and has an interest rate of up to 1% 
(or Libor if lower) paid by semester. Interest rate ceilings vary across countries: Zimbabwe and Kenya have a set rate of 1% (or 
Libor), and Mozambique, Senegal and Ghana a rate of 0.5% or Libor (M. A. Leite, 2014, p. 6). 
190 Post-sales assistance consists of repair and maintenance services guaranteed by the companies selling the equipment. Post-
sales conditions are established by MFI’s sales component guidelines (República Federativa do Brasil, 2013). 
191 Interview with MDA#3. 
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The programme’s objective is to establish a line of technical cooperation that 
highlights food production by family farmers as a pathway towards food and nutrition 
security in participating countries. Alongside technical cooperation, the intervention 
includes financing for technology adapted to the socio-environmental conditions of 
local family farming, as a way of increasing production and productivity of rural units. 
The idea is that countries can produce more and better. (…) we hope these countries 
will become regular clients of Brazilian agricultural technology, thereby stimulating 
production by the national industry further. (MDA (2013a, p. 108), author’s 
translation) 
 
With this particular formula, MFI marked some important changes in Brazil’s agricultural 
cooperation. The association between business and solidarity, implicit in ProSAVANA but never 
officially acknowledged, was explicit in MFI and indeed materialised through the combination 
of an export credit with in-kind technical cooperation. Furthermore, MFI’s direct inspiration in 
a concrete policy implemented in Brazil took Brazilian agricultural cooperation beyond the 
business of technology and expertise transfer and into the domain of policy advocacy – the 
same could be argued to some extent for ProSAVANA, although in that case different elements 
of Brazil’s modernisation trajectory were invoked; in the case of MFI, however, there was a 
direct adaptation of a concrete and confined programme. Finally, MFI enabled MDA to instil 
the notion of family farming as a distinctive agricultural development model into Brazilian 
development cooperation and add a contrasting experience to the imaginary of modernisation 
at scale hitherto carried along by Embrapa and a programme such as ProSAVANA.192 Much as 
ProSAVANA, however, MFI also had a strong business rationale and its own traders. Yet, while 
priests represented the opposition to corporate agribusiness in ProSAVANA, they were aligned 
with corporate industry in MFI, thus posing the query as to who the priests and traders of MFI 
were as well as their views about the programme’s intent. 
6.1.1 MFI’s protagonists and their narratives about the programme 
MFI mobilised a range of Brazilian actors, many of who joined the field of development 
cooperation for the first time. MDA, for which MFI constituted a debut in cooperation, was the 
leading player and was responsible for the programme’s design and technical coordination. 
Within MDA, two different units were involved: AIPC was in charge of the programme’s overall 
conceptualisation and MDA’s Executive Secretariat (Secretaria Executiva) performed an 
operational role and focused specifically on the hardware component (i.e. the agricultural 
machinery and implements to be exported). AIPC had an overtly policy advocacy role. It had, 
since 2003, represented MDA in international and regional fora, particularly in trade 
                                                          
192 The family farming alternative was also emphasised by PAA-Africa, also on display at the 2010 Brazil-Africa Talks and equally 
taken on by several African countries. 
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negotiations, where it focused on consolidating South-South alliances around a family farming 
agenda.193 By contrast, MDA’s Executive Secretariat had managerial and technical functions, 
the same it performed for the Brazilian version of the programme, where it defined the 
equipment suitable for the programme and liaised with the industry for sourcing this 
equipment. For MFI specifically, whereas AIPC coordinated the high-level interaction and 
negotiation with African counterparts, the Executive Secretariat had operational 
responsibilities that included: specifying the menu of items available through the programme 
and identifying firms supplying them; setting price ceilings by typology of items; and 
supporting beneficiary countries in item selection.194 
With regards to the hardware component specifically, besides MDA, other governmental and 
private sector actors were involved and together formed the MFI Technical Group (Grupo 
Técnico Mais Alimentos, also known as GT Mais Alimentos). The GT was established in 2013 
inside CAMEX, the institution that oversaw the export credit facility that funded the hardware 
sales operation. Other state agencies included in the group were the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Commerce (MDIC), MAPA, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, the 
Executive Office of the Presidency (Casa Civil, in Portuguese), MRE and the state bank Banco 
do Brasil (CAMEX, 2013). Furthermore, the representative bodies of the Brazilian industry of 
agricultural machinery and equipment – including ABIMAQ, ANFAVEA and SIMERS195 – acted as 
intermediaries between the GT and manufacturing companies that already operated as 
contractors in the domestic version of the programme. 
More than 30 companies had been linked to the programme and were in the process of 
exporting their agricultural equipment to African countries (M. A. Leite, 2014, p. 11). These 
companies, from across the country, included national brands, such as Agrale, Baldan and 
Guarany, but also Brazil-based firms integrated in multinational conglomerates, such as John 
Deere, LS Mtron and Tatu. They comprised firms specialised in high-powered farming engines 
such as tractors, trucks, excavators and combine harvesters (for example, Agrale, John Deere 
and LS Tractor, the Brazilian affiliate of LS Mtron), companies specialised in tractor implements 
such as tillers, precision planters and harvesters (Baldan and Tatu), and companies specialised 
in small-scale equipment such as sprayers or motor pumps (Guarany). All the equipment was 
part of the menu of items suitable to Brazilian family farmers. 
                                                          
193 Interview with MDA#3. 
194 Interviews with: MDA respondent, Brasília, November 2013 (MDA#2), MDA#3 and MDA#4. 
195 These acronyms stand, respectively, for Brazilian Machinery and Equipment Association (Associação Brasileira de Máquinas e 
Equipamentos, in Portuguese), National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de 
Veículos Automotores) and Union of the Industries of Agricultural Machinery and Implements from Rio Grande do Sul (Sindicato 
das Indústrias de Máquinas e Implementos Agrícolas do Rio Grande do Sul). 
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Unsurprisingly, I found distinct interpretations and expectations about the programme across 
the selection of actors interviewed, which included people at MDA, MRE, CAMEX, ABIMAQ, 
ANFAVEA, APEX and Guarany (cf. Appendix II). The importance attributed to the various 
ingredients mentioned earlier – family farming, food, mechanisation and technology export – 
varied across my respondents. The sharpest contrast was between a perspective on MFI as an 
export operation and another that viewed it as a political and developmental project. 
 MFI as business with a legacy 
The Brazilian industry regarded Africa as an important market to be opened up (Comex Brazil, 
2012; MDIC, 2013) and for trade promotion agencies, MFI was an instrument to promote the 
diversification of Brazilian exports.196 MDA press releases also emphasised the machinery 
component and its business rationale (MDA, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2015c). One of my MDA 
respondents put it bluntly that MDA’s technical cooperation was ‘a commercial agenda’, 
aiming to establish Brazil as a world ‘reference in exporting agricultural technology’ and not 
just soybeans.197 This point of view had already been conveyed in public:  
The programme is consolidating itself as a policy for the export of machinery and for 
contributing to food production, especially in African countries. We are exporting to 
Africa agricultural technology produced in Brazil. (MDA (2014a, para. 8), author’s 
translation) 
 
MFI was not a conventional export operation though, rather it was portrayed as an example of 
Brazil’s responsible approach to business, particularly towards Africa. Post-sale services and 
technical cooperation were the extras that the programme offered to clients, and these were 
regarded as contributions to Africa’s development process. They also gave Brazilian exports a 
comparative edge vis-à-vis more ruthless competitors such as China.198 An industry 
representative articulated the ‘business with a legacy’ perspective as follows: 
Can we think of Africa as a place where to extract advantages, or suck out advantages? 
No. Africa is a place for you to make an investment from A to Z. It is about training 
labour, including African labour force in projects, preparing the African for growth. 
There is no point in having that old perspective of ‘let’s take advantage’, or in my case, 
‘let’s sell the machinery and run off’. That does not exist any more. If someone still 
thinks like that, such person is slightly... well, significantly out-of-date. In reality our 
business model entails a lot of training of locals, a lot of knowledge transfer, know-
                                                          
196 Interviews with CAMEX, APEX#1 and APEX#2. 
197 Interview with MDA#2. 
198 Interviews with CAMEX, APEX#1 and APEX#2. 
  
141 
how transmission (…) it is about helping them to organise themselves and develop in a 
correct manner.199 
 
This resonated with President Rousseff’s pragmatic perspective on cooperation (cf. Chapter 4), 
which emphasised commercial and investment opportunities for Brazilian enterprises while 
urging these to leave a ‘legacy’ to Africans through the transfer of technology, training and 
social programmes (Leo, 2011). 
 MFI as family farming policy advocacy 
Yet, the view that MDA’s technical cooperation was a commercial agenda, even if with social 
responsibility, was not widely shared inside MDA. In fact, the argument that MFI was about 
business was firmly refuted by those claiming MDA’s relation with Africa to be ‘an entirely 
political agenda’.200 This agenda focused on helping Africa build a development trajectory 
centred on the notion of family farming, similar to Brazil’s own experience. It concerned 
establishing an institutional framework for family farming and strengthening state institutions 
and public policies supporting such a framework. It was also regarded as a counter-hegemonic 
movement against a ‘neoliberal logic’ seen as favouring agribusiness; MFI’s political thrust was 
instead supportive of a ‘logic of income distribution, public policy and affirmation of the role of 
the state’, argued to promote food production and be mainly concerned with domestic 
markets.201 This perspective put the emphasis on MFI’s policy dialogue and technical 
cooperation components, while the hardware component was seen as subsidiary and 
instrumental to the family farming political strengthening agenda.202 
Besides the business versus politics contrast, I also found variations in the perceived role of 
MFI-sponsored mechanisation in strengthening family farming. Some talked of mechanisation 
as part of a process of modernisation that would make farms more productive and 
commercially viable, whereas others saw it as an effort to reduce drudgery and retain young 
people in rural areas. 
 Mechanisation for raising productivity and opening new commercial avenues 
In its most technocratic enunciation, MFI was framed as a technical fixing endeavour, driven by 
South-South solidarity and premised on the need of African agriculture to modernise. This 
narrative emphasised productivity gains enabled by technological modernisation which, in 
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African countries, was expected to make a major difference as, according to one view, they 
had no relevant agricultural technology and were on the margins of agricultural 
modernisation.203 Besides increasing productivity, mechanisation was also expected to open 
new commercial possibilities for African farmers, as suggested by an industry representative: 
Mechanisation will generate, let’s say, much greater production. Technical assistance 
itself will also help production. And then you will have a situation that offers options: 
‘Well, what are we going to do? Are we going to export this as commodity or are we 
going to process within the country? How do we guarantee a market? Am I going to 
produce oranges and sell them in the local fair, or am I going to make also juice? Shall I 
do jam or only sell in the fair? Shall I export my grain or shall I process it?’ More Food 
has created an array of opportunities in food production.204 
 
 Mechanisation as means to reproducing family farming as social category  
By contrast, others inside MDA perceived mechanisation as a means towards reducing the 
drudgery of farming and providing incentives for younger generations to remain in rural areas, 
including by turning farming into a more dignified activity. One respondent put it as follows: 
Let’s take the business of machinery, that is, the More Food programme. I had the 
chance of participating in debates several years ago when the programme was set up 
(…) and I went to several regions to talk to people about what they thought about it, 
especially the tractors, where there is some criticism. (…) The most common answer I 
got and the one that impressed me the most was that it served several purposes, but 
the most important, in the head of a father and a mother, was that it offered the 
possibility that their children would remain in the activity, for two main reasons. First, 
the hardship of farm labour (…) and, second, social recognition. Hard work is [seen as] 
poor people’s job, it is a job for people with no brain.205 
 
Mechanisation therefore played a function of social reproduction and of supporting an 
alternative trajectory for rural areas where opportunities were offered for poorer farmers and 
their children. This perspective expressed a particular conceptualisation of family farming – 
taken less as a productive activity and more as a social milieu and a ‘mode of life’.206 It echoed 
the peasant family farming perspective (cf. Chapter 3), although being supportive of 
modernisation and its contribution towards improving the harsh conditions facing the 
peasantry. 
The different motivations and perspectives underlying MFI would reveal themselves during 
implementation. The remainder of this section will consider the initial stages of the 
                                                          
203 Interview with MDA#2. 
204 Interview with ABIMAQ respondent. 
205 Interview with MDA official, Brasília, November 2013 (MDA#5). 
206 Interview with MDA#1. 
  
143 
programme on the Brazilian side, and specifically, the protracted implementation that resulted 
from bureaucratic hurdles as well as political battling. The next section will then consider the 
reception the programme had in Africa and in Mozambique. 
6.1.2 Bureaucratic hurdles and politics 
Following the programme’s first introduction to African delegations in 2010, it took about four 
years for MFI’s hardware to arrive in Africa. Brazilian agricultural machinery and implements 
started arriving in Zimbabwe at the end of 2014 (Matambanadzo, 2014),207 and were shipped 
to Mozambique and Senegal during the first quarter of 2015 (MDA, 2015a, 2015b). Some 
respondents explained the implementation lag on the Brazilian side as resulting from the 
novelty of the programme and, specifically, the need for a legal framework to regulate the 
unconventional export credit operation.208 After two years of working on the programme set 
up, a breakthrough was finally reached in 2013 with the creation of a GT for the programme at 
CAMEX, as a follow up to the establishment of Grupo África by President Rousseff (cf. Chapter 
4).209 The approval of a ministerial ordinance detailing the conditions for the sales component 
followed suit (República Federativa do Brasil, 2013). 
Besides the procedural hindrance, contrasting positions within the Brazilian government, 
regarding the combination of solidarity diplomacy with trade, were also reported to have 
delayed progress. One respondent noted:  
[MFI] is not a traditional operation of export promotion. It is not. Timeframe, interest 
rates, guarantees, these are all different. It is outside the standard for Brazilian 
exports. There was resistance inside the Brazilian government to that model of export 
financing. The economists argued against. (…) There are sectors within the state 
bureaucracy that think that Brazil does not have to do cooperation but it has to do 
exports. (…) [These are] sectors that are disconnected to the government’s social and 
public service delivery policies.210 
 
The same respondent also described the difficulties faced by MDA for being new to the field of 
export financing, an area dominated by actors used to standard export operations. I also 
learned that the type of difficulties met by MFI mirrored those More Food (the domestic 
version) had previously encountered in Brazil, where financial institutions had initially resisted 
the idea of providing credit to small producers and had to be persuaded through ‘considerable 
pressure from government’. 
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Therefore, the difficulties that we faced with More Food international were similar to 
those that we had experienced in structuring differentiated policies [for family 
farmers], with the difference that the theme [of international cooperation] was new 
for MDA, so the difficulties for us were even greater.211 
 
The way these different forces played out on African soil and in Mozambique in particular is 
now considered. 
6.2. The reception of MFI in Africa  
6.2.1 Africa’s tractorisation by MFI  
During the first four years of MFI, the hardware component was not only the prevalent agenda 
item on the Brazil side of programme management, but it also dominated press releases and 
news coverage on the programme, both in Brazil (Agência Brasil, 2015; MDA, 2012, 2014b, 
2015a, 2015b; Valor Econômico, 2013) and in African countries (Joy Online, 2012; Kadzere, 
2011; Notícias Online, 2015; Share, 2015). Tractors received most of the limelight, with the 
media displaying pictures of bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen posing next to shining 
new vehicles. MFI-Zimbabwe attracted much attention, being the first of the five African 
countries to strike a deal with Agrale at the 2014 Agrishow, a business fair for agricultural 
technology in Brazil, for the provision of 344 tractors (Figure 18) (MDA, 2014b). A few months 
later, Miguel Rossetto, the Minister of Agrarian Development at the time, posed with the MFI 
entourage in front of the first batch of Agrale tractors ready for shipment, lined up in an 
orderly fashion in two rows extending into the horizon (Figure 19). Six months on, President 
Mugabe himself inspected the same batch (Figure 20). At his side was the Brazilian 
Ambassador, Marcia da Silva, who emphasised the programme’s food security concerns in her 
official handover speech, in case the programme’s development credentials had gone 
unnoticed. 
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Figure 18. Tractors for Zimbabwe I 
 
In the picture: Agrale firm strikes tractor deal with Zimbabwe in business fair in Brazil, May 2014 (Agrale, 2014a). 
 
Figure 19. Tractors for Zimbabwe II 
 
In the picture: MDA minister and officials and Agrale workers display tractors for Zimbabwe, August 2014 (Agrale, 
2014b). 
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Figure 20. Tractors arrive in Zimbabwe 
 
In the picture: official hand over of tractors by Brazilian Ambassador Marcia da Silva to President of Zimbabwe 
Robert Mugabe, May 2015 (Share, 2015). 
 
The appeal of tractors was also found in other African countries and by the end of 2014, 2,560 
tractors were in the process of being exported through the programme, representing around 
5% of Brazil’s tractor production (M. A. Leite, 2014, p. 9). These were all four-wheeled tractors 
(with power ranging from 50 to 90 HP), despite the availability of smaller-scale machinery in 
Brazil’s More Food menu (Cabral, 2016a). Brazilian tractors added to a wave of tractorisation 
in Africa that was also supported by countries such as India and China that sold tractors under 
their own South-South cooperation programmes (Diao, Cossar, Houssou, & Kolavalli, 2014). 
Tractors had long fit African governments’ modernisation ambitions, while also working as 
instruments of power that provided ample scope for political patronage (Amanor, 2015; 
Scoones, 2013, 2016). MDA officials told me that, because they have to abide by Brazil’s SSC 
principles of non-interference and demand driven cooperation, they could not object to the 
preference for tractors or other relatively sophisticated equipment, even if they thought these 
were not the most appropriate for African family farmers.212 Yet, tractors certainly provided a 
powerful marketing expedient for MDA as the various parades and press releases illustrate 
(MDA, 2013a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015c). 
As for the non-hardware elements of the programme, my research found limited, or at least 
less tangible, progress. This was explained to me as matter of administrative sequencing of 
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activities, rather than as a question of lower priority vis-à-vis the machinery.213 Once the 
mechanisms for operating the sales were in place and the lists of items to be exported agreed, 
the focus of MDA’s AIPC team would be ready to move to the programme’s technical 
cooperation activities. Yet, given the time lag since the programme’s initial launch, technical 
cooperation protocols that had already been signed needed to be reviewed and updated. As 
for public policy exchange focused on MDA’s family farming policy experiences, some of this 
had reportedly taken place as part of preparatory missions carried out by MDA officials and 
meetings with African delegations held in Brazil.214 
All in all, MFI’s early days in Africa showed an unequivocal bias towards tractors, and the 
family farming political message seemed lost on the way, as the experience in Mozambique 
further illustrates. 
6.2.2 MFI in Mozambique: more tractors and the modernisation ideal 
MFI was formally established in Mozambique in October 2011, when a Technical Cooperation 
Project (TCP) was agreed between the governments of Brazil and Mozambique, represented 
by ABC and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (then called MINAG), respectively. 
MDA and MINAG were set to be the programme’s executing agencies. The TCP specified MFI’s 
technical cooperation element that aimed to increase productivity of small farmers, increase 
production of selected crops (grains, legumes and horticulture, in particular), share 
experiences with public policies targeting family farmers, and strengthen extension systems 
(República de Moçambique & República Federativa do Brasil, 2011). Planned activities focused 
largely on technical assistance and rural extension (ATER) and included: training of extension 
agents, small producers and private entities on family farming methodologies (such as family 
farming certification and databases), in Mozambique and through field visits to Brazil; 
knowledge exchange on ATER for family farming; and training on the operation and 
maintenance of agricultural machinery and equipment. An amount of US$ 400,000 was 
committed to support these activities, with contributions from ABC, MDA and MINAG. The 
programme’s target group was the Mozambican ‘family sector’, comprising farmers with 
farming areas of up to 2 hectares and small to medium farmers with areas of up to 10 hectares 
(República de Moçambique & República Federativa do Brasil, 2011, p. 8). 
Although MFIs’ mechanisation component was mentioned at the time as complementary 
action, which had yet to be formalised, it was highlighted by the TCP document: 
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The increase in production and productivity levels cannot be reached without special 
attention to agricultural mechanisation and irrigation. The supply of suitable 
machinery and equipment is a critical element for timely production, use of fertilisers, 
pesticides and herbicides, and harvesting at the right time, therefore minimising losses 
in farming and cattle breeding. (…) Given the importance of suitable agricultural 
machinery and irrigation equipment for the effective implementation of this project’s 
activities, and the commitment from the Government of Mozambique to procure 
these, a list of requested agricultural Machinery and Equipment [original capitals] will 
be annexed to this project. (República de Moçambique & República Federativa do 
Brasil (2011, pp. 7-8), author’s translation) 
 
A few months later, in January 2012, CAMEX approved a loan of US$ 98 million to finance the 
export of agricultural machinery and equipment to Mozambique, under the umbrella of MFI. It 
then took nearly two years for the two countries to formalise the corresponding bilateral 
export credit agreement, reflecting the lengthy process of setting up a legal mechanism on the 
Brazil side. A Memorandum of Understanding was eventually signed at the end of 2013 by the 
Brazilian MDIC and the Mozambican Ministry of Finance (República Federativa do Brasil & 
República de Moçambique, 2013). MDA remained the executing agency for the sales 
component.  
When I interviewed MDA officials in late 2013, an initial list of items, produced by Mozambican 
authorities, had been discussed and was undergoing revisions. Some items on the list were 
considered inappropriate for the aims of the programme and targeted farmers – hydraulic 
excavators were an example pointed out to me.215 Despite this, the allure of heavy machinery, 
tractors in particular, persisted and in early 2015, the first batch of 250 tractors eventually 
made their way to Mozambique (MDA, 2015a). Overall, a total of 513 LS tractors (Figure 21) 
and 2,600 implements are reported to have been sold to Mozambique under the programme’s 
first (of three) tranche of US$ 33 million (M. A. Leite, 2014; MDA, 2015a, 2015c). 
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Figure 21. Tractors for Mozambique 
 
In the picture: LS tractors for Mozambique being loaded to container in Brazil (LS Tractor, 2015). 
 
This tractor-dominated mechanisation fitted the Mozambican government’s commitment to 
agricultural modernisation and the Green Revolution (Guebuza, 2009) and its preference for 
large scale equipment (Hanlon, 2015). It also fitted the Mozambican government’s perception 
of Brazilian agriculture, where the Cerrado transformation remained the prevalent image. The 
perceived similarities between the Cerrado and the Mozambican savannah nurtured the hope 
that the Brazilian ‘miracle’ could be replicated and that Mozambican rudimentary and 
subsistence farming could be transformed into a successful commercial activity, provided 
farming machinery became available.216 MFI was therefore regarded as a mechanisation 
programme that would contribute to raising productivity, with tractors providing the symbolic 
representation for the desired mechanisation process: 
In this programme we are trying to bring large mechanisation, large commercial 
agriculture. We will bring large machines, tractors, etc.217 
 
One respondent went as far as associating MFI with developments in the Nacala Corridor, 
noting that the Nacala Fund and MFI were ‘siblings’ as one complemented the other.218 MFI’s 
tractors were expected to support agro-industrial investments along the Corridor: 
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We are thinking of putting in the Corridor around 380 tractors, 320, something around 
300 tractors, to provide services.219 
 
Indeed, according to the focal points for MFI at MINAG, half of the tractors would be sold to 
medium (50-100 hectares) or large farmers, whereas the other half would be allocated to 
Service Provision Centres, spread across the country, that would rent them out to small 
farmers.220 The Mozambican government intended to direct the programme to all types of 
farmers and not just family farmers. 
The Mozambican government, therefore, perceived MFI in quite a different way from MDA’s 
family farming advocates who had hoped to help building an alternative development 
trajectory based on family farming. Brazil’s trajectory concerning the political and institutional 
assertion of family farming as a mode of production and, for some, a way of life, had been 
broadly missed. One respondent, who was someone close to the implementation of the 
programme on the Mozambican side, even referred to family farming as a condition that 
Brazilian farmers had managed to overcome, failing to capture the political and symbolic value 
of the concept in Brazil and within MFI itself: 
What we have been witnessing regarding Brazil’s development is very interesting. I 
think Brazil in the last 10 years increased its production significantly. It transformed its 
family farmers to almost commercial farmers. We want to benefit from that 
experience.221 
 
It is therefore unsurprising that while tractors were enthusiastically received, the family 
farming technical cooperation element stalled. The 2011 TCP expired at the end of 2013 
without seeing the start of implementation. Also, although within MDA there was a perception 
that policy dialogue centred on Brazil’s family farming policies had been incorporated in the 
programme’s preparatory missions,222 on the Mozambican side, the technical cooperation 
project remained ‘just an idea’. 
The technical capacity building component foresees a policy formulation element but 
we have not made progress in this regard. There has not been work on this. (…) We 
will consider that the programme is actually running, with arms, legs and head, when 
we are actually working. While it is on paper and not materialised, we will continue 
thinking of it as just an idea. Therefore, at this moment, all that is happening is, let’s 
say, preparation of the programme, and there is nothing concrete on the ground.223 
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The African translation of MFI and MDA’s family farming advocacy into a tractorisation 
programme prompted criticism by Brazilian social actors, as I now analyse, and was followed 
by an attempt to restore of the lost family farming dimension, as I discuss in Section 6.3. 
6.2.3 The priests’ incredulity 
Although politically aligned with MDA and broadly supportive of its programmes, Brazilian 
rural social movements and non-governmental actors interviewed were unanimous in 
questioning the extent to which MFI, as practised, was geared towards strengthening family 
farming in development cooperation. Although, and unlike with ProSAVANA, no repudiation of 
MFI had been made in public, my interviews consistently captured a degree of criticism across 
the most active social actors in the field of cooperation. This criticism was often toned down 
by a sense of political loyalty towards MDA, seen as an ally in domestic hegemonic struggles 
against agribusiness.  
MDA’s attempt to increase the weight of family farming in Brazil’s agricultural cooperation was 
broadly commended but it was PAA-Africa that was highlighted as the star initiative. Instead, 
MFI was seen as requiring a great deal of adjustment that would render it aligned with the 
needs of small farmers and less of an agribusiness instrument, as suggested by the perceived 
allocation of tractors to operate large scale properties in the Nacala Corridor.224 
MFI was also condemned for serving Brazilian industry interests, rather than being driven by 
developmental objectives.225 It was also seen as an erroneous replication of the Brazilian More 
Food version – whereas in Brazil the programme was part of a package of complementary 
policies targeting family farmers, the exported version was narrowly focused on 
mechanisation, thought to arrive prematurely in beneficiary countries: 
More Food in Mozambique is a part of an error. In Brazil, More Food is important 
because we family farmers already access other policies that improve our conditions 
and enabled us to access the More Food programme. (…) If farmers and peasants in 
Mozambique have a different form and have fewer public policies, such policy is going 
to arrive before its time. What we should try to build through cooperation in 
Mozambique is the strengthening of family farming, using a collection of policies: 
technical assistance, credit, organisation of production, cooperative organisation and 
commercialisation.226 
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Furthermore, the Brazilian version was questioned for its failure to reach small peasant 
farmers, serving instead in many regions as ‘an instrument of a second Green Revolution’,227 
and for promoting machinery suitable mainly for agribusiness and agricultural commodities. 
If you look at the menu of machinery, it is machinery suitable for grain production and 
for some other value chains. But all of them are value chains extremely concentrated 
by agribusiness, concentrated by the agribusiness complex. Therefore, even if it is to 
increase productivity of a small farmer, it is to increase productivity of soybean, to 
increase productivity of maize, which in practice will lead to a process of specialisation 
and loss of productive diversity. In reality, there is always a contradiction. In a certain 
way mechanisation reduces the hardship of labour. It can even bring a certain level of 
wellbeing for the family in a first instance. But there is the contradiction that it will 
benefit certain production chains that are centralised by agribusiness.228 
 
Hence, MFI was on the whole regarded as an instrument of modernisation, driven by business 
interests and favouring agribusiness rather than small farmers and doing little to advance the 
family farming agenda in Africa. Notwithstanding the critique, direct confrontation with MDA 
over MFI never erupted. 
Inside MDA, criticism to the course followed by MFI was also shared. The hardware 
component had gained a life of its own at the hands of implementers and countries’ 
authorities and was no longer in the hands of the original masterminds, who had envisaged a 
different outcome.229 One respondent noted that, amongst many of those working on family 
farming cooperation programmes in Africa, the name MFI was avoided because of 
embarrassment at the programme’s metamorphosis into a tractor-trading deal.230 
This dissatisfaction prompted a reaction by a coalition of Brazilian actors, including AIPC at 
MDA and other working on other family farming development cooperation initiatives, such as 
PAA-Africa and the School Feeding Programme. Mozambique was the stage for its initial 
manoeuvres and this was related to the particular moment for Brazilian cooperation in the 
country, a moment when ProSAVANA dominated headlines and had prompted intense 
argumentative battles between competing perspectives on agricultural development and the 
rural sphere. 
The social movements’ emphasis on agricultural dualism and calls for family farming-based 
alternatives to ProSAVANA appear to have encouraged a movement inside MDA for reinstating 
the family farming narrative, while safeguarding distance from ProSAVANA and MFI’s 
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commercial agenda. Hence, ProSAVANA was described to me as a ‘model not to be followed’ 
and as ‘contrary to the interests of family farming’,231 while MFI’s TCP, or the ‘idea’ behind it, 
grew seemingly detached from the sale of tractors and implements.232 
6.3. Reinstating family farming through a broader coalition: priests, technicians and FAO 
 MFI priests meet (anti-)ProSAVANA priests 
Several initiatives by Brazilian government actors hence unfolded as part of strengthening the 
family farming alternative in development cooperation, as discussed in the previous chapter 
with regards to ProSAVANA-PEM. These were all centred on ATER and aimed to build a 
stronger connection between research, extension and other services for family farmers, and 
focused on food and nutrition security objectives. FAO emerged as a key ally in such process. 
ProSAVANA and MFI had therefore become connected in a movement that countered the co-
optation of Brazilian cooperation by business and an agricultural modernisation narrative. 
By mid-2014, at the height of the ProSAVANA contestation,233 the non-hardware component of 
MFI had embarked on a process of redefinition.234 This envisaged re-affirming ATER activities 
focused on family farming as well as connecting MFI’s technical cooperation element with 
other cooperation projects in Mozambique equally driven by a family farming paradigm, 
notably PAA-Africa and the School Feeding Programme (cf. Chapter 3). This adjustment was 
expected to improve coherence and effectiveness across Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique 
and strengthen the family farming agenda. 
Within MFI itself, however, coherence across components was admitted to be a challenge. The 
Brazilian government could not, as a matter of principle, interfere with the Mozambican 
government’s selection of equipment, from the range of 4,500 items made available through 
the programme, and there was no mechanism to ensure farmers accessing equipment would 
be the same targeted by MFI’s technical cooperation, let alone other Brazilian cooperation 
projects. 
There will not be a direct marriage between the machinery and the ATER activities or 
other Brazilian government programmes. We leave the marrying of the credit 
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component with the other activities to the country’s discretion. There is no 
interference, although MDA recommends articulation.235 
 
Hence a widening gap between the MFI’s hardware and non-hardware components started to 
become noticeable, pointing towards the emergence of a bifurcated programme – with 
machinery and equipment, on one side, and ATER-focused technical cooperation, on the other. 
This was happening at the same time as MDA’s involvement in ProSAVANA-PEM was being 
discussed with ABC, where MDA’s role would also focus on ATER for family farming (cf. 
Chapter 5). 
 Enter the technicians 
As noted in the previous chapter, MDA had taken the initiative of convening a discussion on 
development cooperation in Mozambique and had gathered around the table all the 
governmental players involved in family farming-related initiatives, including researchers at 
Embrapa. The introduction of a family farming ATER component in Brazilian cooperation would 
build linkages between the various agricultural cooperation initiatives and this would, in turn, 
strengthen the movement for a family farming development alternative. 
Besides ProSAVANA-PEM, PAA-Africa and the non-hardware element of MFI, there were also 
ongoing discussions about extending Embrapa’s project ProAlimentos though an additional 
ATER component and links to PAA-Africa and school meals. Concurrently, there was the 
initiative led by Maya Takagi at Embrapa to strengthen these linkages (cf. Chapter 5). A group 
of researchers inside Embrapa had hence mobilised around the ATER agenda and was 
supportive of MDA’s reinstatement of the family farming agenda in the development 
cooperation front. 
 All roads to Rome 
Faced with resource constraints from ABC’s budget, MDA actively set out to mobilise resources 
elsewhere to revamp MFI’s technical cooperation component and eventually got FAO on board 
(MDA, 2015c). In early 2015, a new project, supported by FAO’s Regional Office for Africa and 
the Brazilian government, was created to complement MFI with initiatives focusing on 
‘capacity building and exchange of experiences in family farming and rural development 
policies’.236 The project, named ‘Exchange of Experience and Dialog about Public Policies for 
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Family Farming in Africa’, had a timeframe of three years (2015-17) and a budget of US$ 4 
million and covered all five MFI countries in Africa.237 
FAO had therefore become a key supporter of the family farming coalition, contributing to 
reinforcing the family farming narrative in the development cooperation sphere, at a time 
when Brazil’s foreign affairs channel was significantly weakened and traders were carrying 
their own business. While supporting Brazilian actors, FAO was also building its own position in 
promoting the family farming agenda in international development, and the Director-General 
had called for a paradigm shift in agriculture centred on family farming, food and agroecology 
(United Nations News Centre, 2015). With Brazil regarded as an exemplar case for public 
policies targeting family farmers (FAO, 2014), it is unsurprising that Brazilian agricultural 
professionals started converging to FAO’s headquarters. During the course of my research, at 
least four of my respondents (from MDA, Embrapa and CGFOME) moved to Rome to join José 
Graziano’s team. 
6.4. Conclusion: the counter-hegemonic alternative and its uncertain future 
MFI initially emerged at the intersection of political and business motivations or as an alliance 
between priests and traders. The programme provided an opportunity to raise the political 
profile of family farming internationally, in the context of a burgeoning cooperation agenda – 
at the end of Lula’s mandate, when the programme was launched, there was an expectation 
that development cooperation would become increasingly prominent in Brazil’s international 
affairs. MFI also offered a way of expanding the market for Brazilian manufacturers and 
diversifying the country’s exports. Yet, although united by a common family farming discourse 
that the programme conveys, the contrasting narratives identified by my research expose 
divergent understandings on the programme’s rationale.238 The alliance between merchants 
and policy advocates, nevertheless, offered a chance for each of them to pursue their own 
objectives. Yet, as in the ProSAVANA case, any one particular conceptual perspective seems 
insufficient to account for the MFI’s practice in full or for the programme’s transformation 
over time. Again, the relevance of the agency of actors and pre-determined agendas (being 
business, geopolitics or bureaucratic politics) as the explanatory factors at times becomes 
superseded by the discursive nature of Brazil’s agricultural cooperation, where visions, ideals 
and interpretations of agricultural development, rooted in Brazil’s history and society, become 
more relevant guides. 
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As the programme took shape, the traders’ interests prevailed, as illustrated by the primacy of 
the hardware component in MFI’s early implementation. This was the element of the 
programme that attracted most interest on the Mozambican government side, especially 
tractors. The social reproduction of family farming idea had, hence, lost space to ‘business 
with a legacy’ and mechanisation. At the same time, the focus on hardware favoured a view on 
the role of mechanisation that emphasised modernisation of an economic sector framed in 
terms of production and productivity increases. This view contrasted with another that 
regarded family farming as a social category, placed in a wider rural development agenda 
rather than a narrower agricultural growth perspective. Two distinct understandings of family 
farming were therefore discernible in the actors’ interpretations of MFI. They reproduced the 
disputed conceptualisation of family farming found in Brazil and long-standing social struggles. 
The calls by Brazilian civil society actors for a family farming alternative to ProSAVANA’s 
corporate agribusiness had little to do with MFI’s family farming mechanisation and found in 
PAA-Africa the archetypal instrument of cooperation. Hence, while welcoming the presence of 
MDA in Brazilian cooperation, for MDA was the champion of family farming in Brazil, there was 
a sense of frustration on the part of social actors regarding the nature of the agenda taken 
forward by MFI, seen as compromising the ‘territories of life’ ideal. Notwithstanding, Brazilian 
social actors refrained from publicly condemning MFI as they had done for ProSAVANA. MDA 
was an ally in a heterogeneous family farming coalition. Although some of its policies were at 
odds with the family farming ideal that some members of the coalition nurtured, these 
policies, no matter how controversial, were still regarded as contributions to the family 
farming coalition’s political strengthening. 
For MDA, while social movements were crucial allies in the opposition to agribusiness, both at 
home and abroad, tractors and machinery came in handy for the ministry to affirm its stance 
as a player in international affairs and hence build muscle for domestic disputes. Yet, the 
exacerbation of dualism in Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique, revealed by the ProSAVANA 
contestation, made it increasingly difficult for those within MDA moved by the family farming 
advocacy agenda to sustain the alliance with MFI’s commercial element and the business 
dimension of Brazilian SSC. MDA’s priests found themselves at a crossroads as this alliance 
with traders had started to erode the political thrust of its cooperation initiative and a change 
of tactics was required. 
While the fracturing of MFI into two seemingly separate components initially happened in 
Mozambique, where the dualistic battle had been exposed by ProSAVANA, FAO’s 
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complementary support of the programme was set to expand the ATER initiative and 
associated dialogue on family farming public policies to all five countries. 
As I concluded the fieldwork, this process was unfolding as it was unclear what route MFI’s 
renewed technical cooperation would follow in Mozambique or in other MFI countries. FAO’s 
engagement would certainly reinforce family farming advocacy, by adding visibility to the 
family farming agenda and asserting a positive link with the food and hunger agenda. It would 
also strengthen connections with initiatives such as PAA-Africa and the School Feeding 
Programme, which FAO supported equally across Africa and were well received by rural social 
actors in Brazil and in Mozambique. Several questions remained unanswered, including what 
version of family farming would be taken forward through MFI’s ATER and the alliance with 
rebellious Embrapa technicians and FAO. Also, it was unclear what elements of MFI would be 
of interest to the Mozambican government at a time where mechanisation and large scale 
seemed so well entrenched in the elites’ imaginary of economic progress, and programmes 
such as PAA-Africa remained, as suggested by one of my respondents,239 a confined pilot-
project with limited governmental engagement. And, finally, there was the question of 
whether the family farming narrative would manage to assert itself as an alternative 
development trajectory for Mozambican agriculture or whether it would remain confined to 
the realm of well meaning but inconsequential aid-funded cooperation projects. 
The following chapter assembles the pieces by bringing together my empirical analyses of MFI 
and ProSAVANA and discussing these experiences more explicitly in the light of my discourse-
politics framework.
                                                          
239 Interview with FAO respondent, Maputo, February 2014 (FAO#1). 
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Chapter 7. Brazil’s agricultural cooperation as multi-layered policy process 
7.1. Assembling the pieces I: what I set out to investigate and where it leads me  
In this research, I set out to investigate the ways in which Brazilian cooperation policy and 
practice in Mozambique were shaped by politics at home. I aimed to shed light into how 
Brazilian solutions for agricultural development were formulated and put into practice through 
cooperation projects and what role domestic actors, institutional histories, discourse and 
power relations played in this process. I was particularly interested in understanding the 
discursive manifestations of Brazilian agricultural cooperation – including looking into the 
genesis and functions played by narratives such as Brazil’s natural vocation towards Africa or 
the promises of winning recipes for African agriculture, such as the ‘Cerrado miracle’ or the 
family farming alternative. I also wanted to understand how these discursive constructions 
related to the actors’ motivations for engaging with cooperation – how discourse was 
instrumentally used in the pursuit of certain agendas and how those agendas and the 
identities of the actors carrying them were also constructed through discourse. I thereby 
engaged with a classical debate within policy process theory regarding the role of interests 
versus ideas (either framed as knowledge, beliefs, norms, ideology or discourse) in shaping 
policy change (John, 1998) (cf. Chapter 2).  
While seeking answers to these overarching empirical and theoretical interrogations, I posed a 
number of subsidiary questions in relation to ProSAVANA and MFI in Mozambique. I asked 
questions about who the key actors were, about their historical trajectories and institutional 
settings, and about their discursive framings of agricultural development and cooperation; I 
also asked how actors and discourse interacted and whether this changed over time; and what 
made certain narrative storylines dominate at particular moments and how these storylines 
travelled between Brazil and Mozambique. 
From the onset, I found Brazilian agricultural cooperation to be a domain populated by a 
diversity of players – from governmental departments, public research bodies, political parties, 
business outfits, think tanks, civil society organisations, social movements, academic 
institutions and a range of individuals – with different motivations for engaging in cooperation 
and contrasting ideas about cooperation and agricultural development. The priests, 
technicians and traders metaphor captured this diversity as well as tensions within it. The 
metaphor also mapped onto Brazil’s agricultural policy and politics: the traders of the ‘Cerrado 
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miracle’ and its corporate agribusiness dimension; the technicians of Brazil’s agronomic 
revolution and the tropicalisation of soybeans; and the priests of the family farming sector 
with its own institutional spaces and public policies. Hence, priests, technicians and traders in 
ProSAVANA and in Brazil’s SSC engagements in Mozambique more broadly (Chapter 4) could 
be linked back to priests, technicians and traders of Brazil’s agricultural history and politics 
(Chapter 3). 
The metaphor was not just analytically useful as a means of classifying and characterising 
distinct categories of players. It was also helpful in analysing how actors related to one another 
and, thus, unveiling alliances and frictions in agricultural cooperation politics. Indeed, a 
common thread running through the case studies concerned the alliances between priests, 
technicians and traders, which emerged, fractured and were reconfigured over the period 
analysed (Chapters 5 and 6). 
Taking the two cases together, how could I make sense of the unfolding of events and of how 
priests, technicians and traders interacted over time? To what extent did the alliances 
described reflect the concerted action of interest groups? What brought actors together, or 
set them apart? What exactly was the basis for agreement or disagreement – was it about 
material incentives, political interests, shared beliefs or common discourse? How, in short, can 
my argument about the shifting intermingling between priests, technicians and traders be 
conceptualised with reference to my integrative discourse-politics framework?   
Drawing on the empirical material provided in the previous two chapters, I now take 
ProSAVANA and MFI together to discuss the multifaceted dynamics of the Brazilian 
cooperation policymaking process. In this chapter, I highlight the workings of interest groups 
and networks inside and outside the state and consider how institutional and operational 
conditions constrained or enabled action. I also consider the evolution of argumentative 
disputes within agricultural cooperation in Mozambique and discuss whether actors’ 
positioning converged around shared beliefs (advocacy coalitions) or around common 
discourse (discourse coalitions). Furthermore, I shed light onto hidden discursive struggles and 
discuss what they suggest about the nature of disputes. Finally, I argue that Brazilian 
agricultural cooperation politics encounters Mozambican politics, with its own ideas about 
agricultural development, interests and state-society dynamics. Although my research does 
not analyse the Mozambican context and adoption of Brazilian cooperation in detail, I 
emphasise that this encounter prompted new action on the Brazilian side, the effects of which 
were yet to be determined as I concluded fieldwork. 
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7.2. The discourse-politics of Brazilian priests, technicians and traders 
7.2.1 Policy networks and actors’ interests 
In the Embrapa researcher’s formulation, priests, technicians and traders represented first and 
foremost different stakes in Brazil’s agricultural cooperation. Priests were those advocating a 
family farming paradigm and regarded as ideologically driven; traders were those seeking 
business opportunities in Mozambique; and technicians, those such as the Embrapa researcher 
himself who were motivated by the technical dimension of the cooperation exchange and the 
impulse to share agricultural science and benefit from international recognition. ProSAVANA 
and MFI became channels for these Brazilian actors to pursue their individual 
internationalisation agendas. These agendas came together in the medley of solidarity and 
business that President Lula promoted through his ‘solidarity diplomacy’ towards Africa.  
Yet, ProSAVANA and MFI represented distinct alliances that combined different stakes from 
Brazilian agriculture, business and diplomacy imperatives. ProSAVANA preceded MFI as a 
manifestation of ‘solidarity diplomacy’. The Cerrado ‘model’ at its root not only responded to 
the international push for an African Green Revolution (Morris et al., 2009) at a time of global 
food security frenzy, but also addressed the national interest of expanding (agri)business and 
building Brazil’s prestigious image as a source of policy recipes for other countries in the Global 
South. The trader-technician alliance in ProSAVANA was a natural one that represented an 
extension of a well-established policy network in Brazil. Actors in Brazil’s agribusiness ‘iron 
triangle’ comprising the governmental bodies, farmers’ representatives and the lobby group in 
Congress (bancada ruralista) were either represented in ProSAVANA or gravitated around it, as 
attested by the presence of individuals such as Roberto Rodrigues, Kátia Abreu, Luiz Nishimori 
and institutional actors such as Embrapa, SENAR, GV Agro and FGV Projetos (as described in 
Chapter 5). The network extended beyond agriculture, as it had in Brazil; Vale’s prominent 
stake in the Nacala Corridor (with its mining and rail transport business) mirrored the ‘Greater 
Carajás’ mega-project in the Brazilian Amazon, where Vale had stimulated investments in 
export-oriented agriculture to add cargo for its rail operation, much as it sought to do in 
Mozambique (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). 
In the context of a favourable global market for agricultural commodity expansion (up until 
2014), Brazilian politicians, lobbyists and entrepreneurs saw in the African savannah an 
opportunity to be explored. Development cooperation provided a safeguard for such 
exploration both by strengthening diplomatic relations with African governments and by 
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providing technology and research experiments that could be taken up by Brazilian 
entrepreneurs.  
In launching MFI, however, Lula’s government brought into Brazil’s foreign affairs another set 
of interests from within Brazilian agriculture, and specifically those associated with the family 
farming ‘policy community’, which, in Chapter 2, I defined following Marsh and Rhodes (1992) 
as a network formed on the basis of a shared belief system. As ProSAVANA, MFI forged an 
alliance of convenience, this time combining MDA’s political advocacy and institutional 
strengthening agendas with the interests of the Brazilian industry seeking to expand markets 
for its farming machinery. The same alliance had taken shape in Brazil through the More Food 
programme but it gained a different light in the international domain, particularly as the 
mechanisation element of the programme overshadowed the family farming advocacy 
component and fit a modernisation ideal held by Mozambican governing elites, who seemed 
more aligned with the Cerrado model. 
The family farming policy community was not only represented in MFI but also in PAA-Africa, 
which was contemporaneously launched by Lula’s government. It was also embodied in the 
movement opposing ProSAVANA, which mobilised several actors from Brazilian civil society, 
from 2011 onwards. Nevertheless, despite being united by a common support for a family 
farming-based agricultural paradigm supported by public policies, the actors in this policy 
community were moved by a range of interests (cf. Chapter 3). The following section suggests, 
indeed, that the family farming policy community is best defined as an actor-coalition in which 
individual actors’ interests are varied, but there is either common underlying beliefs or 
common discursive positioning, even where there are contrasting ontologies. The diversity of 
interests at stake within the family farming coalition becomes apparent by contrasting MFI’s 
practice with the ProSAVANA protest and by contrasting perspectives within the protest 
movement itself. 
Both the trader-technician alliance in ProSAVANA and the priest-trader alliance in MFI 
eventually fractured. Traders distanced themselves from the ProSAVANA cooperation sphere 
and priests distanced themselves from the MFI mechanisation component. The anti-
ProSAVANA protest movement played a role, but so did changes in circumstances. From the 
moment Brazilian cooperation stalled (in terms of political backing and financial support) and 
ProSAVANA became too controversial, traders followed their own track, seeking alternative 
business partnerships (with the Mozambican government) outside the increasingly 
dysfunctional framework of Brazilian cooperation. As for priests in MFI, the criticism that 
ProSAVANA represented the corporate takeover of cooperation demanded a clearer 
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demarcation from the business thrust of MFI and a revival of the family farming advocacy 
agenda. The opportunity for such revival came from sponsorship from FAO, in the absence of 
resources from the Brazilian government to support such an agenda. The connection with FAO 
also served to strengthen links with PAA-Africa, which was well regarded by critical civil 
society. At the same time, developments back in Brazil concerning rural extension systems 
(ATER) and the role of the state in them represented a new driver for action and 
reconfiguration of alliances – including between priests and a selection of technicians from 
Embrapa, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
As progress in implementing cooperation projects in Mozambique slowed down or stalled, the 
argumentative dispute between competing visions of agricultural development became the 
main locus of action. Brazilian agricultural cooperation had turned into a space for discourse 
interplay, where narrative storylines – on successes, complementarities or dualistic 
antagonism – offered different actors a means to pursue their own agendas, as I now discuss. 
7.2.2 The argumentative interplay: advocacy and discourse coalitions 
While contributing to fracturing the original programme-based alliances, the ProSAVANA 
protest gradually developed into another key alliance in Brazilian cooperation. This was 
situated outside the formal sphere of Brazilian cooperation but defined itself in relation to it, 
or, to be precise, against it. This alliance had the contours of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) in that: (a) it was defined by a set of normative 
positions or ‘policy core beliefs’; (b) it brought on board a range of policy actors, comprising 
non-governmental organisations, rural social movements, activists and researchers; and (c) 
there was a degree of coordinated activity among them. 
With regards to its normative standing, this coalition was confrontational in nature in that it 
manifested itself as an anti-ProSAVANA initiative. It labelled ProSAVANA as a government-
sponsored process of land grabbing and corporate domination claimed to be harmful for 
peasant farming communities and the environment they inhabited in the Nacala corridor. It 
also voiced a strong anti-foreign investment and anti-agribusiness narrative – where 
agribusiness was associated with monocropping, export orientation, and corporate integration 
across value chains, such as soybeans. Finally, it emphasised how ProSAVANA was exporting 
the dualistic nature of Brazilian agriculture, where a hegemonic agribusiness model threatened 
the existence of a more socially just family farming model, to Mozambique.  
This set of normative positions or core beliefs were shared by a range of players in Brazil and 
Mozambique (and later also Japan) who converged around the series of manifestos that 
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became public from 2012, including joint statements and the widely endorsed Open Letter to 
the heads of state of the three countries (cf. Section 5.2). ProSAVANA-focused events, notably 
the 2013 and 2014 civil society conferences (Conferência Triangular dos Povos) (cf. Appendix 
VII), provide further evidence of active coordination amongst coalition members. This coalition 
comprised a range of actors from civil society and academia which, for Brazil, included: rural 
social movements such as MST, CONTAG and MPA; non-governmental organisations such as 
FASE and REBRIP; and a range of academics and activists. Although coming from different 
advocacy spheres – notably the agrarian and the social development sphere – they came 
together on the basis of a similar ideological positioning around the internationalisation of 
Brazilian agriculture and the development cooperation agenda.  
As a protest movement, the anti-ProSAVANA advocacy coalition united around a relatively 
confined set of normative positions concerning, chiefly, the threats of land grabs and 
environmental degradation posed by ProSAVANA. Its stance matured into constructive 
opposition, or at least a new stance emerged that suggested a counter-solution to the 
perceived corporate agribusiness agenda in ProSAVANA was formulated. The alternative was 
framed as family farming-based development – as analysed in Chapter 5, the Open Letter 
illustrates this and specifically, the permeation into the critique of a language of family farming 
and dualism distinctively associated with Brazil’s agrarian politics. With this mutation, the 
coalition’s positioning became broader and more elusive and, as I now argue, lost the 
attributes of an advocacy coalition and gained those of a discourse coalition in that shared 
discourse (concerning family farming), rather than shared normative positions on a well-
defined set of issues, became the main basis for the coalescence of a broader group of actors. 
This does not mean that an anti-ProSAVANA advocacy coalition ceased to exist as such – it 
could be argued that the protest advocacy coalition was appropriated by Mozambican civil 
society actors who persisted with confrontational opposition, as the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ 
campaign testifies (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). Yet, another coalition, formed by a shared 
family farming narrative storyline, took shape. This discourse coalition had a broader base, as 
discussed below.  
While this mutation was happening on the protest side, ProSAVANA implementers – including 
ABC, EMBRAPA and FGV Projetos – countered the anti-ProSAVANA positioning, and its implicit 
argument about dualism, with the narrative that family farming and agribusiness were 
complementary parts of a complex but integrated agricultural system. With this counter-
narrative, they sought to dissolve the family farming identity and present the Brazilian 
agricultural model as a medley of distinct yet convergent forms of production. The 
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combination of ‘all categories of agricultural producers’ (MASA, 2015, pp. 3-4) was the formula 
put forward by the Master Plan, where large, medium and small-scale farmers were 
harmoniously accommodated. 
Since the 2010 Brazil-Africa Talks in Brasília (cf. Chapter 6), however, the family farming 
narrative had gained space in Brazil’s agricultural cooperation in Mozambique, and Africa more 
broadly, nurtured by multi-country programmes such as MFI and PAA-Africa. Also, the idea 
that Brazil’s family farming concept and its associated public policies were the suitable 
Brazilian model for African agriculture and the food and nutrition security challenge in Africa 
started to gain traction (CONSEA, 2013; Patriota & Pierri, 2013; Pierri, 2013). Actors linked to 
these programmes regarded ProSAVANA as antithetical to the model of agriculture they 
envisaged, which centred on food production for domestic markets by peasant family farmers 
supported by the state – as indicated by the testimonies of MDA respondents, discussed in 
Chapter 5. The following passage of CONSEA’s 2013 statement on development cooperation is 
also illustrative: 
In Brazil, historical conflicts have been generated by the preponderance of public 
support to the model of export-oriented monocropping that has promoted land 
concentration and the intensive use of chemicals, to the detriment of family and 
peasant farming, the main provider of jobs in rural areas and producer of the large 
proportion of food in the country. International cooperation reflects the political and 
economic weight that agribusiness has in domestic and foreign policy. ProSAVANA is 
the most emblematic example of this. (…) the development models promoted by 
Brazilian cooperation in the field of food security and nutrition security should be 
guided by the promotion of human rights to food and food sovereignty, with emphasis 
given to strengthening family, peasant and indigenous farming, with agroecological 
and organic based production, while promoting gender equity, traditional practices 
and knowledge, and local culture of modes of living. (CONSEA, 2013, pp. 6-7) 
 
Discursive disputes regarding Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique hence reproduced disputes 
in Brazil, where two narrative storylines competed for hegemony – one emphasising dualism 
and family farming (Sauer, 2008; CONTAG, 2014) and another defending the complementary 
coexistence of different farming systems within a unified agricultural sector (Presidência da 
República, 2006a, 2011b). The ‘argumentative struggle’ between two opposing discourse 
coalitions henceforth becomes noticeable in Brazil’s agricultural cooperation policy process.240 
                                                          
240 This type of struggle is described by Hajer (1995) as taking place when ‘actors not only try to make others see the problem 
according to their views but also seek to position other actors in a specific way’ (p. 53). 
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The family farming discourse coalition comprised all those who shared a common narrative 
storyline typically containing three elements, which drew directly from family farming 
discourse in Brazil: 
 The identification of family farming as a social identity241 corresponding to a distinctive 
mode of production and/or living (there are significant variations in focus on 
production vs mode of living, as discussed in Section 7.2.3); 
  The emphasis put on food items as family farmers’ predominant output; and 
 The endorsement of a role for the state in delivering public policies for family farmers, 
through credit, technical assistance and public procurement. 
 
In the international cooperation realm, these combined with the claim that Brazil’s family 
farming concept and public policy experience were relevant for African countries in supporting 
their dominant smallholder sector and addressing food and nutrition security challenges 
(Clements, 2015a; CONSEA, 2013; Schlesinger, 2014). References to agroecology farming 
practices and food sovereignty were sometimes present, although this was more variable 
across actors.242 
This same family farming-centred storyline was deployed both in criticism to ProSAVANA and 
in portrayals of MFI by its implementers. Yet, this does not mean that all those articulating this 
storyline – which, on the Brazilian side, included individuals from civil society organisations and 
rural social movements, the MDA, the industry representatives involved in MFI and even 
Embrapa – were united by a shared belief system or were moved by the same interests. 
Instead, these diverse Brazilian individuals and institutional actors used a common family 
farming storyline for different reasons and on the basis of their distinct interpretations of 
family farming as a concept. This is in essence the difference between advocacy and discourse 
coalitions – whereas the former are based on shared normative beliefs, the latter are based on 
discursive affinities (cf. Chapter 2). The family farming storyline with the elements described 
above provided that discursive common ground in Brazilian cooperation. 
Within this heterogeneous discourse coalition, individuals from civil society organisations and 
rural social movements had much in common in that they were already part of the same 
networks and spaces in Brazil, such as CONDRAF and CONSEA. Moreover, in the international 
sphere, they were equally moved by a sentiment of solidarity towards their Mozambican civil 
society peers. Also, with some at MDA, they shared the drive of building an internationally 
                                                          
241 Patriota and Pierri (2013) refer to family farming as a ‘national development actor’ in Brazil (p. 137). 
242 Members of civil society organisations and rural social movements tended to emphasise these more. 
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relevant family farming concept as a means of reinforcing their domestic struggles against 
agribusiness domination. Yet, for some at MDA (and certainly for the industry), MFI was also a 
business agenda. Furthermore, the programme validated a modernisation trajectory that was 
not in line with the ways in which some rural social movements imagined family farming 
development and was indeed seen by these as a threat to family farming reproduction. 
Nevertheless, divisions within the family farming storyline were never part of the 
‘argumentative struggle’ (Hajer, 1993) that went on in the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, Lennox, 
& Lennox, 1974) and remained concealed within a shared storyline that glued the discourse 
coalition together.  
Although priests may be seen as the embodiment of the advocacy coalition described earlier, 
the discourse coalition also comprised some technicians and traders, who also deployed the 
family farming storyline. Traders did so to the extent that they used the family farming 
narrative to justify their socially responsible business via MFI. Technicians at Embrapa 
reproduced the same storyline in the context of the ATER agenda, which I argue was a driver 
within Brazilian politics of the convergence between parts of MDA and Embrapa towards a 
common family farming positioning. Hence individuals from across institutional entities and 
from across my three categories of priests, traders, and technicians coalesced around the 
family farming coalition – and though they may have had different agendas and come from a 
distinct normative position, they nonetheless shared a common discursive construction. 
7.2.3 Hidden fractures in the family farming coalition 
The anti-ProSAVANA mobilisation was instrumental in instigating an argumentative struggle in 
Brazilian cooperation, whereby contrasting perspectives on agricultural development were 
brought into confrontation and different Brazilian agricultural models and experiences were 
invoked. This struggle reproduced the terms of an unresolved dispute in Brazil, where the 
family farming identity fought to be recognised as an alternative to agribusiness. Yet, although 
family farming was a firmly established concept in Brazil’s agricultural lexicon, institutions and 
politics, its interpretation was far from settled, with differences in perspective rooted in 
historical divisions related to class and geography (Fernandes et al., 2012; Wolford, 2005) as 
well as competition for representation by the sector’s social actors (Favareto, 2006) (cf. 
Chapter 3). Indeed, the views on the More Food programme conveyed by my respondents 
from CONTAG, MST, FASE and MDA were all slightly different, with variations in emphases put 
either on social reproduction, productivity or commercial prospects, although all shared the 
common political objective of strengthening family farming (cf. Chapter 6). 
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These differences concerned contrasting ways of understanding the reality of farming and the 
rural space. One view conceptualised agriculture as a productive sector that needed to be 
modernised. An alternative view regarded agriculture as part of a diversified set of social 
activities in the rural sphere that were a mode of life that ought to be safeguarded. It is this 
ontological fracture that distinguishes priests in MFI (those linked to the hardware component 
at least) from priests in the ProSAVANA contestation. Hence, whereas MFI’s mechanisation put 
the emphasis on modernisation and the productive efficiency of farming activity, the 
ProSAVANA contestation movement emphasised the importance of land as a space of social 
reproduction and food production as an issue pertaining to national sovereignty. 
Therefore, the practice of Brazilian cooperation in Mozambique, and the two case studies in 
particular, shed light onto this dispute for meaning. Hajer’s discourse coalition’s perspective is 
less useful in this regard, as divisions within the family farming coalition did not emerge into 
the public sphere but remained hidden. That they remained hidden can be explained by the 
fact that making them visible would undermine the family farming identity and political 
project, as was indeed conceded by some of my respondents.243 
These fractures within family farming, both in the Brazilian context and in development 
cooperation in Mozambique, suggest that dualism is, at best, a partial representation of 
hegemonic struggles in Brazil’s agrarian politics. The division within family farming between a 
focus on production and modernisation versus a focus on the territory as a place of social 
reproduction remains hidden in the family farming-versus-agribusiness formulation as an 
intrinsic element of coalition politics. Therefore, it is unclear what version of family farming 
will be advanced by recent attempts to revamp family farming advocacy in Brazilian 
cooperation with the focus on ATER and support from FAO (cf. Sections 5.3 and 6.3). As for the 
Mozambican government, it seemed unaware of the intricacies of family farming politics in 
Brazilian cooperation and had, indeed, interpreted family farming in a very particular way. 
7.3. Brazilian politics encounter Mozambican politics 
With MFI reduced to a mechanisation programme and little attention given to PAA-Africa, 
which remained a pilot programme in the hands of FAO and WFP, the Mozambique 
government’s interest in Brazil’s family farming policy (and political) trajectory was rather 
limited. Instead, MFI brought in tractors and some of these were destined for the Nacala 
corridor, where modern agriculture was expected to develop, much as it had done in the 
Cerrado. My respondents at the Mozambican ministry of agriculture regarded agricultural 
                                                          
243 Interviews with: FASE respondent and Brazilian academic, São Paulo, July 2014 (BRAC#6). 
  
168 
modernisation as a transition of family farms into commercial farms. They did not perceive 
family farming as a way of life to be preserved and socially reproduced. 
The Mozambican political elite had a strong commitment to modernisation and the African 
Green Revolution and the donor community in the country had long pushed for the 
dismantling of the state’s role in agriculture and the promotion of private sector development. 
As the majority of Mozambican farmers were severely resource constrained and had very 
limited access to modern inputs and the domestic private sector was poorly developed, it was 
up to foreign investors to lead the Mozambican agricultural modernisation – and this was 
reflected in the surge in concessions of large tracts of land to foreign companies from the mid-
2000s for biofuels, food crops and plantation forestry (Locke, 2014). 
Yet, the model favouring large-scale foreign investments in agriculture was contested within 
Mozambican society. Land concessions to foreign or domestic capital led to conflicts with local 
communities (Norfolk & Hanlon, 2012). Mozambican civil society organisations and peasant 
movements resisted land grabbing and joined forces with their Brazilian peers in opposing 
what they regarded as a corporate-led Green Revolution. The Brazilian narrative of family 
farming, especially when emphasising peasants’ rights to land, agroecology and food 
sovereignty, found acceptance by the domestic protest movement and ProSAVANA was turned 
into a symbol of the model to be fought. 
However, whereas Brazilian CSOs had gained considerable space in public policymaking in 
Brazil, in Mozambique state-society relations were quite different. The influence of 
Mozambican CSOs in policymaking remained limited, partly because of their capacity 
constraints and thin social base within Mozambican society (Francisco, Mucavele, Monjane, & 
Seuane, 2008). Most were heavily dependent on international donor aid and often operated 
within the framework of the state as implementers of government programmes (Ilal, Kleibl, & 
Munck, 2014). Since the end of the civil war, they had also become largely detached (at least 
publicly) from domestic party-politics (Francisco et al., 2008). They therefore hardly 
represented a threat to the hegemonic Frelimo elite. 
It remains to be seen whether Brazil’s family farming alternative can find any space within 
Mozambican agricultural politics without strong incentives for Mozambican governing elites to 
address the calls of the country’s (still confined, fairly unthreatening and at times co-opted) 
organised civil society. The escalation of the conflict with Renamo in the countryside, coupled 
with the increasingly likely bankruptcy of the Frelimo state, could create such incentives. 
Meanwhile, FAO and other international donor agencies may continue supporting pilot 
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initiatives such as PAA-Africa or the new ATER element of MFI. Yet, these are likely to remain 
in the somewhat separate world of donor-funded projects (with a limited reach and lifespan) 
and at the margins of domestic politics and state-society interaction. 
7.4. Conclusion 
ProSAVANA and MFI help to reveal the ‘complex and multi-layered nature of the political 
world’ (John, 1998, p. 166) where actors seek to pursue their material or institutional interests, 
while influenced by particular conceptions of the world that are shaped, in turn, by the 
discourse they are attached to and help to reproduce. If Brazilian cooperation sometimes 
seemed to be driven by the agenda of dominant interest groups or policy networks within the 
state – being that of business corporations riding on the solidarity rhetoric of Brazilian 
technical cooperation to pursue business opportunities in the Nacala Corridor, or the family 
farming network deploying MFI tractors to advance their political agenda – at other times, the 
reality of Brazilian cooperation on the ground appeared as a muddle of disjointed 
interventions which, in part, reflected the institutional fragmentation of Brazilian cooperation 
and the absence of a centre of policy direction. The slow progress in implementation, the 
contradictory messages on the programmes by implementers themselves, the awkward 
management of the ProSAVANA crisis and ambiguity regarding links between business 
enterprises and technical cooperation in both ProSAVANA and MFI revealed a domain where 
the fragmented institutional setting limited the action of seemingly well-organised interests 
and neat alliances. One could argue that such fragmentation had a purpose – that of allowing 
the influence of a spectrum of societal interests in a government sustained by a 
heterogeneous party coalition. 
The political significance attributed to development cooperation by the Brazilian government 
naturally mattered in the course of events and the ability to respond to the increasingly vocal 
anti-ProSAVANA coalition. As the relevance of cooperation in the government’s agenda 
deteriorated, reflecting the domestic economic and political turmoil since 2014, the ground 
became more permeable for actors (whether bureaucrats, civil society and social movement or 
private operators) to operate on their own (either individually or through alliances) and 
construct or deconstruct cooperation in their image. The advance of the family farming 
narrative in Brazilian cooperation can be seen in this light, as a discursive construction of a 
coalition of actors that became reinforced regardless of the material conditions on the ground 
(no change in resources or policy directives towards family farming-centred initiatives). 
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Furthermore, the separation between technical cooperation and business within Brazilian 
cooperation did not express a reframing of Brazilian cooperation policy or of its ‘mutual 
benefit’ principle in the face of civil society pressure, but rather the fact that private operators 
no longer required the government channel of cooperation as broker of their business deals. 
Indeed, this channel became more of a liability as result of civil society criticism about 
cooperation and the poor functioning of cooperation mechanisms. 
Beyond the dynamics between priests, technicians and traders, my analysis also looked at the 
triadic portrayal as a discursive construction on its own. The opposition between priests and 
traders maps onto the dualism of Brazilian agriculture and the argument that family farming 
and agribusiness stand in direct opposition. Yet, this framing of the debate takes the focus 
away from the hidden fracture within the family farming coalition, which has its roots in 
historical and geographical class-based struggles within the Brazilian context. 
Overall, understanding Brazil’s agricultural cooperation policy process requires an analytical 
framing that is broad and malleable enough to capture its multiple expressions. A perspective 
focused on the agency of actors and their material interests is useful to account for the drivers 
of action and understand the impulse that pushed Brazilian actors – whether governmental, 
business or civil society actors – into Africa. These actors did not operate in unison but were 
part of distinct policy networks in Brazil, some of which were in direct competition with one 
another. This competition travelled with the actors as was clear from the argumentative 
disputes. Actors deployed narrative storylines in the pursuit of their interests and to affirm 
their own identity or ideological standing. Alliances took shape (and broke apart) – either 
based on convenience, shared positions or the reproduction of common narratives – and these 
actors’ dynamics influenced the making of cooperation, on the Brazilian side at least. Brazilian 
politics also confronted Mozambican politics and this prompted particular reactions and 
discursive adjustments. 
My integrative discourse-politics framework allowed me scope to capture the different 
dimensions of a policy process in flux and whose key explanatory variables changed as part of 
that flux. Interests are drivers of action and are at times pursued by groups of actors through 
advocacy and argumentation, as in Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions. Yet, the political economy of 
Brazilian cooperation is rendered complex by the discursive nature and symbolism of SSC and, 
specifically, by Brazil’s claims of agricultural successes, tropical solutions and solidarity 
diplomacy. Discourse shapes Brazilian actors, their agendas and how they relate to one 
another, as in Hajer’s discourse coalitions. Also, discourse in the practice of agricultural 
cooperation can be connected to, as in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theorisation, hegemonic 
  
171 
and antagonistic power struggles in Brazil’s agrarian society, which can be traced back through 
history and related to the country’s long-standing social class and regional imbalances. All 
these matter to understand Brazil’s agricultural cooperation as it travels between origin and 
destination. 
Brazil’s agricultural cooperation is, therefore, a policy domain in motion and one that is being 
shaped by both action and inaction and by material resources and interests as well as 
discourse interplay. The imagined three-pronged coherent strategy of the Brazilian state 
(Visentini, 2009; White, 2010) that may have illuminated Lula’s original drive towards Africa 
has been challenged by practices on the ground and the competition between actors, actor-
networks and actor-coalitions. The implications this has for Brazilian cooperation and its 
South-South paradigm, as well as for the conceptual understanding of SSC, are discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 8. ‘So what?’ for Brazil’s development cooperation and the SSC 
paradigm 
8.1. Assembling the pieces II: my take on Brazilian SSC and where it leads me  
I formulated my research under the premise that Brazil’s domestic politics mattered to 
understand its foreign policy and, within this, its international development cooperation. This 
followed from a perspective in the field of international relations that had been applied to the 
study of foreign aid (Lancaster, 2007) and of Brazil’s foreign policy specifically (Cason & Power, 
2009; I. Leite, 2013; Pinheiro & Milani, 2012). I therefore approached Brazil’s development 
cooperation as a domain where policy issues were regarded as inseparably domestic and 
international, as in Manning’s ‘intermestic’ sphere (1977). From this standpoint, my aim was to 
make sense of how domestic influences permeated and intermingled with international 
relations to shape development cooperation practice, focusing for that purpose on the 
agricultural domain. With agriculture as a particularly convoluted and deeply polarised policy 
area in Brazil (Chapter 3), and a sector at the core of Africa’s development and disputes over 
natural resources (Bassett & Crummey, 1993; Cotula, 2013; Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2015), 
Brazil’s agricultural development cooperation in Mozambique provided a rich field for my 
enquiry into the political dynamics at play in the ‘intermestic’ policy sphere. Yet, the analysis I 
carried out contrasts with the literature on the domestic politics of foreign policy and aid in 
several ways.  
I drew on an integrative theoretical framework that combined elements of conventional 
political economy analysis of policymaking (centred on actors, their agency and interests) with 
a focus on discourse and its social underpinning in the Brazilian context. My discourse-politics 
perspective puts discourse at the centre of the analysis of the domestic politics of Brazilian 
cooperation policy, as discursive constructions on solidarity, recipes for success and 
transferability of those recipes across the South are prominent elements of the Brazilian SSC 
model, particularly vis-à-vis Africa and African agriculture. The significance of discourse in 
Brazilian cooperation, its domestic roots and its interaction with the realpolitik of international 
relations is, indeed, a distinctive contribution of my research that speaks also to the study of 
SSC more broadly, adding empirical depth to the point raised by Mawdsley (2012) in her 
analysis of emerging powers in international development:  
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discourse and performances should not be seen as simply masking or supporting the 
‘real’ geopolitical and commercial strategies that motivate [emerging powers] as 
donors, but are essential to understanding the social relations they seek to create and 
those they seek to obscure in their constructions of themselves and their partners. (p. 
171) 
 
My analysis emphasises the discursive character of the Brazilian cooperation policy process to 
reveal complex dynamics between the ‘real’ and the performative where interests, beliefs, and 
narratives intermingle. Narratives are used to pursue certain agendas – as MDA has used MFI’s 
family farming narrative for institutional strengthening. Yet, they also construct the agendas 
and the identity of the actors that articulate them – the institutional, political and ideological 
identities of MDA are founded on the notion of family farming as a model distinctive from 
agribusiness. Compared to the literature on the domestic politics of aid, my research highlights 
the interplay between interests, institutions and discourse (ideas or worldviews, as Lancaster 
labels them) in the policy process of Brazilian cooperation. Whereas Lancaster treats these as 
separate influences, each playing their own role over foreign aid, my integrative framework 
treats them as variables in dynamic interaction. It places actors and actors’ interests in the 
context of institutional processes but also against policy narratives that are the product of 
historical policy trajectories, state-society interactions and class-based struggles. The latter 
are, in turn, at the root of those institutional processes and actors’ identities. The dynamic 
nature of the policy process is reflected in how actors relate to one another and how coalitions 
emerge and break down on the basis of either shared interests, beliefs or discourse.  
Furthermore, the discursive character of cooperation exposes a degree of vitality in Brazilian 
cooperation that contrasts with the apparent sluggishness on the ground. Developments 
happen even when progress seems to be slow. MFI took a long time to get going and only 
managed to get partially started, whereas ProSAVANA, or at least its Brazilian contribution, 
apparently halted in the face of contestation and lack of funding. Yet, the policy process was 
rolling with Brazilian actors interacting in a game where interests were pursued, narratives 
built, consolidated and then modified, and alliances were formed to then break apart and later 
be reconfigured. 
My analytical approach also contrasts with the conceptualisation of the Brazilian state as a 
unitary actor in foreign policy that is implicit in some international relations literature 
(Carmody, 2013; Lima & Hirst, 2006; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Visentini, 2009). It questions 
the understanding of Brazilian cooperation as a single model or part of a unified strategy. 
White (2010), for example, describes Lula’s engagements in Africa as a case of ‘refreshing 
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coherence’ in Brazil’s foreign policy where a three-pronged strategy combined diplomacy, 
business and cooperation/solidarity intents (Chapter 4). Although my research confirms the 
presence of these three orientations – the priests, technicians and traders framing is, indeed, a 
metaphor of those different drivers – I also argue that this mix, rather than being part of a 
premeditated coordinated formula, is the outcome of the intersection of interests and ideas 
that are not always coherent with one another and often clash. 
Finally, my analysis underlines the inter-spatial or travelling dimension of the cooperation 
policy sphere, with flows occurring forwards and backwards. This is particularly relevant for 
the foreign policy field of development cooperation where policy gets implemented in another 
country – Mozambique, in the case analysed by my research. Actors, discourse and coalitions 
travel between Brazil and Mozambique (driven in part by domestic politics) but the agendas, 
narratives and practices they carry with them do not remain unchanged. They reach another 
context (Mozambique) that interprets Brazilian cooperation and its inherent agendas, 
narratives and practices in particular ways and absorbs them selectively – the reduction of MFI 
into a tractor-importing scheme is a case in point (Chapter 6). There is thus a process of 
negotiation in the encounters between the two sides of the cooperation relationship that 
often results in the reconfiguration of the original recipe, package or idea – Scoones, Amanor, 
Favareto and Qi (2016) make this point in relation to Brazilian and Chinese engagements in 
African agriculture more broadly. This, in turn, has repercussions back to the point of origin – 
the mobilisation of Brazilian civil society actors and policy spaces (such as CONSEA) in reaction 
to ProSAVANA and attempts by a team at MDA to revamp the family farming policy advocacy 
element of MFI are both outcomes of a flow backwards into the domestic sphere. 
In the light of these findings, therefore, what are the implications for the Brazilian 
development cooperation ‘model’ and for the South-South paradigm more broadly? This 
concluding chapter reflects on the policy implications of my research. It is a response to 
questions that cropped up through the course of my research, such as: so what? Why does it 
matter? What value does it add? Whereas the previous chapter tackled this type of 
interrogation from a conceptual viewpoint (discussing what the contribution of my research 
was to the understanding of policy processes), this chapter addresses it from a more topical 
and policy-oriented perspective. This perspective is particularly relevant for Development 
Studies, an academic field that is intimately connected with development policy debate and 
practical action on the ground.  
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8.2. A turning point for Brazilian SSC? 
In discussing implications, I first need to acknowledge the significant changes in the context 
under which Brazilian development cooperation has unfolded since the time I started my 
research in September 2012. The golden moment of Brazil in international development, a 
time when promises of Southern solidarity and of an alternative model of cooperation looked 
encouraging, albeit somewhat rhetorical, seems remote today. Over the course of my 
research, I witnessed the gradual crumbling of the Brazilian SSC brand. Today, Brazil in 
international development is regarded as a failed promise or an unfulfilled opportunity 
(Stuenkel, 2015; Cabral, 2016b; Simon, 2016). As I reach the conclusion of this thesis, the 
future of Brazilian cooperation and its Africa and agricultural dimensions look uncertain. The 
domestic framework for agricultural policy in Brazil has also been shaken by recent political 
development. A turning point may have been reached for Brazil’s SSC and the discursive-
politics of agricultural development. 
8.2.1 Trouble at home and the end of presidential diplomacy 
The departure of Brazil from the limelight of international development and the erosion of its 
SSC brand have to be situated, first of all, against the changing political and economic 
circumstances at home. The presidential activism in foreign affairs that marked the 
administration of Lula da Silva (Cason & Power, 2009) is firmly over. Since around 2013, 
President Dilma Rousseff was too busy tackling successive political and economic crises to 
have time or resources for overseas undertakings. Development cooperation was an 
indulgence that Brazil could afford at a time when the government had solid political backing 
and the economy was prospering, such as during the Lula administration. Also, unlike her two 
predecessors, President Rousseff never expressed particular interest in or an aptitude for 
international affairs (Stuenkel, 2014). 
Brazil looks rather different today, compared to when I started my research in 2012. Against 
the backdrop of a troubled economy undergoing its deepest recession in more than a century 
(Pearson, 2016), the Brazilian government has been wrestling with a massive political crisis. 
President Rousseff has been temporarily removed from office whilst undergoing an 
impeachment trial. She is charged with breaking budget rules to boost spending as she 
campaigned for re-election in 2014. An interim government, led by Michel Temer from the 
PMDB party (formerly Rousseff’s main coalition ally), has been in office since May 2016 and 
has already made significant changes in government. These include the merging of MDA and 
MDS under a single Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (Ministério do 
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Desenvolvimento Social e Agrário), led by a PMDB appointment. This change potentially puts 
an end to the dualistic configuration of agricultural governance, which is now entirely under 
the influence of the PMDB party.244 
A major corruption scandal involving the state-controlled oil company Petrobras, nicknamed 
Petrolão,245 weakened Rousseff’s position and that of her coalition government, although the 
PMDB has managed to restore its influence. The ensuing criminal investigation ‘Operação 
Lava-jato’ (Operation Carwash, in English) has prosecuted high-ranking politicians and 
businessmen across political parties, including several of the leading champions of Brazil in 
Africa. Besides senior figures at Petrobras, this includes top managers of Brazil’s main 
constructing companies – Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez, Queiroz Galvão and 
OAS. They all have business operations in Mozambique and in other African countries (Chapter 
4). There are also allegations that former President Lula da Silva is himself connected to the 
scandal (Addley, 2016; Romero, 2016). In addition, the Lula Institute, another key Brazilian 
player in Africa, is also being investigated for benefiting from gifts offered by companies linked 
to the bribery scheme (Gonçalves, 2016). These developments, particularly Lula’s alleged 
involvement, may well have irremediably tainted the glowing image of Brazil that the former 
President had sold to the world. 
The evolution I traced for the two programmes to some extent reflects these changing 
circumstances and the gradual dimming of foreign policy (and its high degree of presidential 
interventionism) and weakening of development cooperation. The latter was noticeable in the 
inability to secure alliances and ensure concerted action, as in the government’s 
mismanagement of the ProSAVANA contestation or the fracturing of both ProSAVANA or MFI 
into two separate purposes – solidarity and business – no longer portrayed as part of a win-
win formula. Furthermore, in the absence of support from the central bodies of Brazilian 
cooperation (MRE or ABC), individual actors set off in the search for alternative allies. FAO 
came to the rescue of MDA’s family farming international advocacy agenda, while the 
Mozambican government entered into a direct partnership with FGV Projectos, the leading 
operator of the Nacala Fund.246 
                                                          
244 The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supplies (MAPA) continues being led by a PMDB candidate and Michel Temer’s 
appointed ministry is Blairo Maggi, Brazil’s largest soybean producer. 
245 The scandal concerns a bribery scheme where senior figures at Petrobras conspired with construction companies to inflate the 
value of contracts. Its nickname recalls another major corruption scandal, mensalão, that erupted in the mid-2000s and eventually 
let to the arrest of Lula’s chief of staff for a bribes-for-votes scheme in Congress (Hunter & Power, 2007). 
246 The partnership between the Mozambican government and FGV Projectos has been interrupted in the meantime, in the face of 
Mozambique’s debt crisis. 
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Brazil’s domestic woes have not only posed a threat on the Brazilian brand, but also affected 
capacity to manage existing programmes. At the same time, and in a context of growing 
pluralisation of foreign affairs and development cooperation (Cason & Power, 2009; Pinheiro & 
Milani, 2012), the agency of individual actors has sustained action on the ground, although 
challenging the unity and coherence of the Brazilian cooperation narrative. While Lula had 
managed to blend political calculation and business interests – or, as argued by Cason and 
Power (2009), a petista foreign policy strategy with a business-friendly trade policy – and fit 
them under the conciliatory label of solidarity diplomacy, Rousseff was less skilful in managing 
the mix. The rollback of presidential diplomacy under Rousseff removed the glue that held 
together unlikely alliances within foreign policy, exposing their internal tensions and 
inconsistencies. 
8.2.2 Brazilian cooperation narrative and governing principles under pressure 
In addition to the changing domestic context for foreign policy, the crisis the Brazilian South-
South paradigm is confronting is also the outcome of the actual practice of development 
cooperation by Brazilian actors. Their development encounters overseas proved harder to 
manage than suggested by the presumed affinities and claims about cordial horizontal 
relations in Brazilian cooperation. The experiences of ProSAVANA and MFI illustrate the 
challenges facing the Brazilian cooperation narrative and its governing principles. 
 Suitable own solutions 
A dominant element in the narrative is the idea that Brazil has suitable ‘own solutions’ to share 
with developing countries (ABC, 2011a, p. 3), or, for the African context specifically, that for 
each African problem there is a Brazilian solution (Amorim, 2011). Within the two 
programmes, Brazilian actors have advocated several Brazilian agricultural solutions as 
appropriate for African countries, including: the Cerrado transformation, Embrapa’s tropical 
technology, the family farming identity and policies, and farming machinery manufactured in 
Brazil. Yet, my analysis documented that the suitability of these solutions was disputed on the 
Brazilian side, and that the recipient side interpreted and absorbed them in ways that did not 
entirely correspond to the original intent. An example of this is the failure of MFI’s family 
farming political advocacy to find resonance in Mozambique (Chapter 6). 
These findings challenge the premise of transferrable solutions, even if the transfer occurs 
within the tropics. Notwithstanding a relative similarity of physical landscape in Brazil and 
Mozambique (though, as discussed by Shankland and Gonçalves (2016), even this is 
questionable), transferability is defied by differences in social, institutional and political 
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settings. For example, population densities in Northern Mozambique are not comparable to 
those of the Cerrado in the 1970s and this has implications for the types of models of 
agricultural production that are socially viable. Also, Brazil’s More Food programme is not just 
about supporting family farmers, but also about promoting the development of the national 
manufacturing industry – hardly the case in MFI, which is about expanding markets in Africa 
for Brazil-made mechanical solutions. Furthermore, the average small-scale and resource-
constrained African farmer barely resembles the average Brazilian family farmer, and family 
farming advocacy in Brazil is not replicable in Mozambique’s institutional and political context 
where a home-grown family farming coalition does not exist. As for the tropical attribute often 
used to characterise Brazilian solutions, this is hardly more than a ‘marketing gimmick’, similar 
to that described by Dávila (2010) in his analysis of Brazil’s trading of home appliances in 
Nigeria in the 1970s. 
 Solidary ethic 
Another salient feature of Brazil’s SSC narrative, concerning relations with Africa specifically, is 
the claim that cooperation is driven by a solidarity ethic and that there are no links with 
economic or commercial interests (ABC, 2011a; Abreu, 2013a). Both ProSAVANA and MFI 
contradict such claims. Connections between development cooperation and business interests 
have been fairly obvious for both programmes, as acknowledged by several Brazilian actors 
operating the programmes (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). Despite the widespread solidarity rhetoric, 
traders have been a prominent presence in ProSAVANA and MFI in Mozambique and they 
have used cooperation as a channel for their business endeavours.  
Besides business, other motivations have driven individual Brazilian actors into cooperation. 
They include reinforcing actor-networks (as the agribusiness network connecting FGV with 
MAPA and Embrapa), strengthening bureaucratic power and political capital through 
international exposure (evident in the case of MDA and also CONSEA), or building international 
experience (as claimed by Embrapa researchers). There are also the interests of non-
governmental actors that have been active not only in the contestation of ProSAVANA but also 
in the promotion of programmes such as PAA-Africa, thereby seeking a role for themselves in 
the flourishing field of South-South relations. Furthermore, my research emphasised that 
these interests mingle with ideas, ideology and beliefs to generate competing narratives on 
agricultural development and cooperation where solidarity is subject to multiple 
interpretations – such as sharing political struggles, modernisation ambitions, business 
opportunities or technological solutions. 
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Rather than being part of a coherent orchestration by the Brazilian government, actors’ 
interests and the discourse that was mobilised make an assorted collection with inherent 
tensions and contradictions. The pluralisation of development cooperation practice has, 
therefore, challenged any original unitary petista vision of foreign policy marked by views 
supportive of Southern solidarity and the strengthening of progressive and counter-hegemonic 
alliances (Almeida, 2006; M. A. Garcia, 2010). This has been further challenged by the decline 
of presidential activism in foreign policy under Rousseff and the absence of the master of 
oratory and compromise that was Lula da Silva. 
 Neutrality and non-interference in partner countries 
ProSAVANA and MFI also illustrate the weakness of the argument about Brazilian neutrality 
and non-interference with the internal governance of partner countries. This may serve as a 
high-level diplomacy principle, but the reality of cooperation reveals that neutrality is easier to 
preach than to practice. Despite claiming to be driven by partner countries’ demands, Brazilian 
cooperation actors carry into the development encounter particular visions about agricultural 
development and packages of solutions that inevitably have an impact locally, even if 
negotiation and reinterpretation occurs. By engaging in cooperation and advocating for 
particular solutions, Brazilian actors get involved with development processes in recipient 
countries and their inherent politics. ProSAVANA has impacted the local political economy by 
opening up a new topic of policy debate, activating civil society confrontation to government’s 
action and stimulating political activism in the country, irrespective of how far concrete 
interventions actually reached. MFI has, somewhat inadvertently, fed a wave of high-powered 
mechanisation in the context of the African Green Revolution hype (Cabral, 2016a; Diao et al., 
2014; Hanlon, 2015). 
Therefore, the Brazilian government can hardly be regarded as a neutral player in partner 
countries. It inevitably engages with local context, policies and politics through the practice of 
cooperation and the sponsorship of particular development recipes, notwithstanding their 
subsequent reconfiguration. 
8.2.3 Trends that could shape the future of Brazilian cooperation 
Brazil’s cooperation rhetoric and governing principles are therefore under question and will 
need to be revisited if the country is to make a credible comeback into the international 
development realm. In the meantime, there are some noteworthy trends worth highlighting 
and could shape the course of Brazilian cooperation and its future framing. One is the 
pluralisation of actors itself, resulting in the enlargement of space for cooperation policy 
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debate and scrutiny. The other is the expansion of alliances beyond the South and their role 
filling the gap left by the withdrawal of Brazilian government’s financial and political support. 
 Pluralisation of actors and enlargement of policy debate and public scrutiny 
Brazil’s development cooperation is a prime example of the pluralisation of actors in foreign 
policy, which has contributed to the rollback of Itamaraty from its earlier hegemonic position 
(Cason & Power, 2009; Pinheiro & Milani, 2012). Pluralisation concerns the provision of 
cooperation, where a diversified collection of entities from the public, private and not-for-
profit sectors have become involved in development cooperation activities, often in a 
relatively self-governing fashion. It also concerns the influencing and scrutiny of such provision 
and this is, indeed, where the opening up of foreign policy from its traditional insulation from 
domestic politics is most noticeable. Experience with agricultural cooperation reveals a whole 
range of players from the domestic sphere, from GV Agro to CONSEA, that have gathered 
around cooperation and have sought to influence it. 
There is also the noteworthy emergence of a collective of actors – particularly from civil 
society organisations, social movements, academia and the media – who have started to 
scrutinise and debate Brazilian cooperation policy and practice. During the course of my 
research, I witnessed an outpouring of studies, masters’ dissertations, media reports, and 
public debates about Brazilian cooperation conducted by Brazilians in Brazil and Mozambique. 
Much of this focused on ProSAVANA and was largely stimulated by the mobilisation of non-
governmental organisations, such as FASE, and rural social movements, such as MST, MPA and 
CONTAG, against the advancement of corporate agribusiness interests in Brazilian 
cooperation. Yet, beyond the politics of social mobilisation around ProSAVANA, space for 
analysis, information sharing and discussion on Brazilian cooperation and foreign affairs have 
been created. An example is Observatório Brasil e o Sul, established in 2014 to promote the 
production of evidence and debate about Brazil in the Global South.247 Another is the BRICS 
Policy Centre, whose focus is broader on foreign affairs and includes Brazil and other BRICS 
countries.248  
Although this collective of actors interested in Brazil’s engagements abroad is still relatively 
confined within domestic politics, it could be regarded as the beginnings of a domestic 
constituency for Brazil’s international development policy. This builds on the broader push for 
                                                          
247 The Observatory is coordinated by the Centro de Estudos e Articulação da Cooperação Sul-Sul, a non-governmental entity, with 
support from Oxfam-Brazil. 
248 The BRICS Policy Centre is a partnership between the Rio de Janeiro City Council and the Pontifícia Universidade Católica of Rio 
de Janeiro (PUC-Rio).  
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accountability and democratisation of decision-making in foreign affairs that has demanded 
the creation of an institutionalised space for social consultation (Mello, 2012; Xavier, 2013). 
For development cooperation specifically, there is the demand for the creation of a national 
policy of international development cooperation to strengthen the institutional framework, 
promote social participation and increase the transparency and accountability of Brazilian 
cooperation (CONSEA, 2013). 
The emergent Brazilian constituency constitutes a source of pressure on the government to 
improve accountability and turn development cooperation into a de facto policy domain 
subject to public scrutiny in Brazil. It signals a change in the way development cooperation is 
perceived that challenges the principles of non-interference and demand-driven cooperation 
that the Brazilian government has deployed to justify the absence of a policy strategy (Farani, 
2012). The demand for a national policy on cooperation is precisely a call to modify this 
uncompromising stance and generate a basis against which Brazilian cooperation practice can 
be scrutinised. 
Yet, calls for improved accountability in development cooperation remain confined to a 
network of like-minded social actors (Cabral & Leite, 2015). For example, CONSEA’s request to 
the Presidency for a cooperation policy on food and nutrition security conveys a particular 
stance on agricultural development that is critical of large-scale monocropping and supportive 
of a model of state-subsidised family farming and of the food sovereignty ideal (CONSEA, 
2013).249 
For the time being, however, any demands for accountability in development cooperation 
policy in Brazil are effectively on hold due to the ongoing domestic unrest. They could, 
however, resume once the political situation becomes sufficiently stable. What particular 
views on cooperation and agricultural development will be championed then and what 
influence they will have over foreign policy will very much depend on the political 
configuration emerging from the crisis. 
 Trilateral cooperation and recasting Brazil’s South-South distinctiveness 
Brazil’s engagement in trilateral cooperation with ‘Northern’ donors is also a noteworthy trend 
and one that raises questions about the ability to maintain a narrative of South-South 
distinctiveness. The Brazilian government’s stance on trilateral cooperation has long been 
ambiguous (Costa Vaz & Inoue, 2007; Rowlands, 2008). Although emphasising horizontal SSC 
                                                          
249 As discussed in Chapter 6, ProSAVANA is explicitly mentioned in the CONSEA statement as an example of a damaging 
cooperation initiative for Mozambican peasant communities (CONSEA, 2013). 
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as an alternative to vertical North-South cooperation, it has also highlighted the role of 
trilateral cooperation with ‘Northern’ bilateral donors and multilateral development agencies 
for complementing and scaling up Brazilian interventions (Abreu, 2013a). Over the years, 
although voicing the politically motivated South-South narrative, the Brazilian government has 
pragmatically engaged with trilateral cooperation with a number of agencies from the 
established and ‘Northern’ development community.  
In Mozambique, where, remarkably, all Brazilian agricultural cooperation projects are 
trilateral, Brazilian actors have partnered with agencies such as: JICA in ProSAVANA; USAID in 
ProAlimentos and Plataforma; WFP and FAO in PAA-Africa; and, later, FAO in MFI (Table 1). 
Although they are often clustered together as Northern donors, these agencies make an 
assortment of contrasting perspectives on cooperation and agricultural development that have 
inevitably influenced (and have been influenced by) their Brazilian counterparts. These 
influences have happened in different degrees for different projects – Fingermann (2014), for 
example, notes that the relationship with USAID in ProAlimentos was one of complementarity, 
whereas the relationship with JICA in ProSAVANA was difficult and led to a clear demarcation 
and duplication of work.   
Therefore, the pluralisation of Brazilian cooperation has been further expanded as result of the 
different alliances forged with other development agencies through trilateral cooperation. 
These are becoming relatively more important in the current context of diminishing financial 
and political support from the Brazilian champions of the South-South narrative, such as the 
Presidency, MRE and ABC. This is likely to weaken arguments about South-South 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis North-South cooperation and increases the threat of replicating old 
patterns of Northern hegemony where Brazilian actors are co-opted by Northern agencies 
(Mawdsley, 2012). A reframing of Brazil’s South-South narrative is therefore inevitable and will 
be shaped by the diverse experiences with trilateral cooperation, as well as the new 
government’s predisposition towards the South. 
8.3. Brazil vis-à-vis other ‘emerging powers’ in international development 
The issue of Brazil’s distinctiveness also arises in relation to comparisons with other ‘emerging’ 
or ‘rising powers’ in international development. Although the diversity of approaches within 
groupings such as the BRICS is increasingly emphasised in the literature (Carmody, 2013; 
Mawdsley, 2012), the use of terms such as ‘rising powers’ and SSC remains common and have 
in fact become mainstream in international development. 
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Some commonalities justify the bundling. Although individual powers insist on differences 
among themselves,250 the narrative of South-South alliances as a geopolitical (and discursive) 
strategy for rebalancing the world order remains strong. The recently established New 
Development Bank BRICS (NDB BRICS), formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank, which 
aims to support global growth and development through the financing of infrastructure 
projects, introduces itself as ‘an alternative to the existing US-dominated World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund’ thereby stressing the counter-hegemonic narrative (NDB BRICS, 
n.d.). 
Furthermore, the blurring of boundaries between development cooperation and business is 
likely to remain a common feature among the emerging powers (Mawdsley, 2012). Although 
such blurring is now also echoed by the changing aid orthodoxy – not least in the replacement 
of the notion of ‘aid effectiveness’ by that of ‘development effectiveness’, in a recognition of 
the multiple channels to promote development (Kharas, 2012) – the emerging powers still 
distinguish themselves by an explicit emphasis on reciprocity and mutual benefit partnerships 
that contrasts with the symbolic regime of charity and moral obligation that typically 
characterises Western donors (Mawdsley, 2012). Brazil, however, has been slightly ambiguous 
in this regard, particularly in its relationship with Africa where, due to historical ties, the moral 
obligation has been a strong element of discourse. 
Besides the symbolic value of the win-win formulation, the blurring of boundaries is also the 
product of competing domestic agendas and perspectives at play, particularly where countries 
do not have a consolidated and emancipated aid sector, such as in the case of the emerging 
powers. The pluralisation of Brazilian cooperation and the competing influences it is subject to 
at home is not very different from what has been found for China (Bräutigam, 2009; Scoones 
et al., 2016) and India (Mawdsley, 2014). In Brazil, however, with its dynamic civil society and 
consolidating tradition of participatory public policy, there could be a push for turning 
development cooperation into a better-scrutinised policy area where the debate on 
cooperation purposes is opened up. Trilateral cooperation may also push for a clearer 
separation of aid and commercial purposes to prevent unfair competition and ensure a level 
playing field among cooperation providers (Mawdsley, 2012). How the Brazilian government 
will manage these pressures will depend on a range of factors, not least the composition of 
interests influencing government, the space conquered by Brazilian progressive civil society 
                                                          
250 Mawdsley (2014) discusses ‘boundary making’ in that Indian public perceptions have indicated a distinction commonly made 
between the Indian development cooperation model vis-à-vis that of China as recklessly selfish and exploitative. Many of my 
Brazilian respondents, inside and outside government, have expressed a similar perception about the China approach and Brazil’s 
distinctive approach. 
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within foreign policy, and the economic performance that can increase or decrease the 
government’s capacity for cooperation (and indeed public support for it).  
The future of Brazilian development cooperation and how it will relate to the other emerging 
donors in international development is uncertain. Thus far, the study of Brazilian cooperation 
has been confined to a particular historical moment of Brazilian politics (and diplomacy) that 
has led to the categorisation of Brazil as an unquestionable Southern power. It remains to be 
seen whether our understanding of Brazil’s position in international development – with its 
Southern turn, its solidarity diplomacy discourse, its SSC principles and cosy relationship with 
other emerging powers – will change as the PT’s era in power comes to a close, as at present 
seems inevitable. 
8.4. Future research directions 
My research aimed to understand Brazilian development cooperation policy processes in their 
multiple dimensions and make sense of how the domestic and international intertwine to 
produce a particular framing and practice of cooperation. My contribution concerned the 
theorisation of development cooperation politics, the unpacking of Brazil’s multiple drivers, 
models, narratives and aspirations concerning agricultural development, and, finally, the 
contextualisation of the Brazilian cooperation experience at a particular point in time of 
Brazilian politics and international development. 
My analysis suggests several routes for future research. On the domestic front, tracing the 
evolution of societal demands for the opening up of development cooperation to debate and 
scrutiny, once the political situation is stabilised and foreign policy resumes, would contribute 
to advancing our understanding of Brazil’s democracy and the degree of maturity of 
development cooperation as a public policy domain.  
Concerning experiences in recipient countries and in Mozambique in particular, there is scope 
for continued study of the evolution of Brazilian actors’ engagements, their further 
reconfigurations and new directions that may be pursued. A case in point is the second 
generation of Brazilian agricultural investments in Mozambique focused on agro-processing by 
small-to-medium enterprises, recently announced by a Brazilian diplomat in Mozambique, 
which is expected to help the Mozambican government to make small farmers more market-
oriented (Notícias Online, 2016). Time will tell whether a different stage of Brazilian 
engagement with Mozambican agriculture is imminent. Yet, despite the chaos and apparent 
stalemate of foreign policy at home, action abroad is taking place and Brazil’s image is 
undergoing constant reinvention and appropriation. 
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Regarding Brazil’s insertion in the international development system, there is plenty of scope 
for in-depth analyses of Brazil’s evolving relationship with emerging and traditional donors, 
particularly under the political reconfiguration at home. An area that requires investigation 
includes the experience of trilateral agricultural cooperation with actors as diverse (in terms of 
their current framings of agriculture and development cooperation) as DFID, FAO and USAID. 
Another, needless to say, will be the experience of partnering with other emerging donors 
through the NDB BRICS. 
Finally, tracking the evolution of Brazil’s cooperation discourse-politics in the post-PT era will 
be a fascinating undertaking for future research that will shed new light into the historical 
moment covered by my research. 
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Appendices 
I. Key events attended during fieldwork 
Title of event Type of event Host Date Location My role 
CECAT Debates on SSC Seminar Embrapa 26 Nov 
2013 
Brasília, Brazil Speaker 
SSC Seminar Series Seminar BRICS Policy 
Centre 
27 Nov 
2013 
Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil 
Speaker 
52nd SOBER Conference: 
‘Heterogeneidade e 
suas implicações no 
rural brasileiro’ 
Academic 
conference 
Brazilian 
Economics, 
Administration and 
Rural Sociology 
Society (SOBER) 
27-30 July 
2014 
Goiânia, Brazil Observer 
Second Brazil-Africa 
Forum: Infrastructure, 
Partnerships and 
Development 
Private sector and 
government 
gathering, with 
guests from Brazil 
and several 
African countries 
Instituto Brasil 
África 
28-29 Aug 
2014 
Fortaleza, 
Brazil 
Observer 
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II. Anonymised list of respondents 
#  Institutional affiliation Place of interview Date of interview Code 
1 FGV São Paulo 12-Nov-13 BRAC#1 
2 State University of São Paulo (UNESP) São Paulo 12-Nov-13 BRAC#2 
3 Lula Institute São Paulo 13/11/13 and 16/7/14   
4 MDA, Secretaria Executiva Brasília 18-Nov-13 MDA#1 
5 MDA, Secretaria Executiva Brasília 18-Nov-13 MDA#2 
6 MDA, Assessoria para Assuntos Internacionais e de Promoção Comercial (AIPC) (ex - ministerial adviser) Brasília 19-Nov-13 MDA#3 
7 MDS, WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger Brasília 19-Nov-13   
8 MRE, Africa Department Brasília 19-Nov-13 MRE#1 
9 ABC Brasília 20-Nov-13 ABC#1 
10 ABC Brasília 20-Nov-13 ABC#2 
11 MST Brasília 20-Nov-13   
12 CAMEX, Grupo Técnico Mais Alimentos Brasília 21-Nov-13   
13 MDA, Secretaria de Agricultura Familiar (SAF) Brasília 21-Nov-13 MDA#5 
14 MRE, CG Fome Brasília 21-Nov-13 MRE#2 
15 MRE, CG Fome e FAO Brasília 21-Nov-13 MRE#3 
16 Embrapa (CECAT) Brasília 22-Nov-13 EMB#1 
17 Embrapa Brasília 21-Nov-13 EMB#2 
18 CONTAG, Secretaria de Política Agrária Brasília 21-Nov-13   
19 Embrapa, SRI Brasília 22/11/13 and 22/7/14 EMB#3 
20 Embrapa, SRI, Coordenadoria de Projetos Estruturantes Brasília 22/11/13 and 25/7/14 EMB#20 
21 ABC Brasília 25-Nov-13 ABC#3 
22 Embrapa, SRI, Coordenadoria de Projetos Estruturantes Brasília 26-Nov-13 EMB#4 
23 Embrapa, SRI, Coordenadoria de Cooperação Técnica Brasília 26/11/2013 and 23/7/2014 EMB#5 
24 PUC-Rio Rio de Janeiro 27-Nov-13 BRA#C3 
25 FASE / REBRIP Skype 4-Dec-13 BRCSO#4 
26 Embrapa Skype 11-Feb-14 EMB#6 
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#  Institutional affiliation Place of interview Date of interview Code 
27 FAO Maputo 19-Feb-14 FAO#1 
28 Justiça Ambiental Maputo 20-Feb-14 JA#1 
29 Justiça Ambiental Maputo 20-Feb-14 JA#2 
30 Universidade Politécnica e Observatório do Meio Rural Maputo 21-Feb-14 MOZAC#1 
31 UNAC-Maputo Maputo 21-Feb-14 UNAC#1 
32 UNAC-Maputo Maputo 21-Feb-14 UNAC#2 
33 Vale S.A. Maputo 21-Feb-14 MOZPS#1 
34 Vale S.A. Maputo 21-Feb-14 MOZPS#2 
35 MSU  Maputo 24-Feb-14 MOZAC#2 
36 MINAG - DNEA Maputo 25-Feb-14 MINAG#1 
37 Fórum Mulher Maputo 25-Feb-14   
38 MINAG - Departamento de Extensão Agrária Maputo 26-Feb-14 MINAG#2 
39 Fundo de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Departamento de Planificação e Finanças) Maputo 27-Feb-14 MINAG#3 
40 Fundo de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Departamento de Planificação e Finanças) Maputo 27-Feb-14 MINAG#4 
41 MINAG - Direcção Nacional de Serviços Agrários Maputo 28-Feb-14 MINAG#5 
42 Open University Maputo 28-Feb-14   
43 Direção de Investimento e Cooperação, MPD Maputo 28-Feb-14 MPD#1 
44 MINAG-IIAM Maputo 1-Mar-14 MINAG#6 
45 ORAM Maputo 3-Mar-14 ORAM#1 
46 Embrapa Agroenergia (posted in Nampula) Nampula 4-Mar-14 EMB#7 
47 ORAM - Nampula  Nampula 4-Mar-14 ORAM#2 
48 DPA-Nampula Nampula 5-Mar-14 MINAG#7 
49 DPPF-Planificação Descentralizada Nampula 5-Mar-14 MPD#2 
50 DPA-Nampula Nampula 6-Mar-14 MINAG#8 
51 Plataforma de Nampula da Sociedade Civil Nampula 6-Mar-14 MINAG#9 
52 Ikuru Nampula 6-Mar-14   
53 Campo Nampula 7-Mar-14   
54 NTC-I Nampula 7-Mar-14   
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#  Institutional affiliation Place of interview Date of interview Code 
55 Gapi, Sociedade de Investimento Nampula 7-Mar-14   
56 Gapi, Sociedade de Investimento Nampula 7-Mar-14   
57 Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, UFRJ Rio de Janeiro 19-Mar-14 BRAC#4 
58 Embrapa Solos Rio de Janeiro 19-Mar-14 EMB#8 
59 Embrapa Solos Rio de Janeiro 19-Mar-14 EMB#9 
60 Embrapa Solos Rio de Janeiro 19-Mar-14 EMB#10 
61 Embrapa Agroindústria de Alimentos (CTAA) Rio de Janeiro 20-Mar-14 EMB#11 
62 Embrapa Agroindústria de Alimentos (CTAA) Rio de Janeiro 20-Mar-14 EMB#12 
63 Embrapa Agroindústria de Alimentos (CTAA) Rio de Janeiro 20-Mar-14 EMB#13 
64 AS-PTA Rio de Janeiro 20-Mar-14   
65 CPDA/UFRRJ  Rio de Janeiro 8-Apr-14   
66 ex-MDA, Assessoria para Assuntos Internacionais e de Promoção Comercial (AIPC) Roma 16-Apr-14 FAO#2 
67 ANFAVEA Skype 14-Jul-14   
68 FGV Projetos São Paulo 17-Jul-14 FGV#1 
69 Partido dos Trabalhadores, Secretaria de Relações Internacionais São Paulo 17-Jul-14   
70 CEBRAP São Paulo 17-Jul-14 BRAC#6 
71 Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Máquinas e Equipamentos (ABIMAQ) São Paulo 18-Jul-14   
72 Freelance journalist São Paulo 18-Jul-14   
73 Academic without institutional affiliation at the time of interview Brasília 21-Jul-14 BRAC#7 
74 MRE, Divisão de Investimentos (DINV) Brasília 21-Jul-14 MRE#4 
75 Secretaria Geral da Presidência da República Brasília 21-Jul-14   
76 Embrapa, SRI Brasília 22-Jul-14 EMB#14 
77 Embrapa, Secretaria de Inteligência e Macroestratégia (ex-CECAT) Brasília 22-Jul-14 EMB#15 
78 Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural (SENAR), Departamento de Inovação e Conhecimento Brasília 23-Jul-14 SENAR#1 
79 Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural (SENAR), Departamento de Inovação e Conhecimento Brasília 23-Jul-14 SENAR#2 
80 Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural (SENAR), Departamento de Inovação e Conhecimento Brasília 23-Jul-14 SENAR#3 
81 MRE, Divisão de Operações de Promoção Comercial (DOC) Brasília 23-Jul-14 MRE#5 
82 MRE, Divisão de Inteligência Comercial (DIC) Brasília 23-Jul-14 MRE#6 
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#  Institutional affiliation Place of interview Date of interview Code 
83 MRE, Divisão de Inteligência Comercial (DIC) Brasília 23-Jul-14 MRE#7 
84 MDA, Assessoria para Assuntos Internacionais e de Promoção Comercial (AIPC) Brasília 23-Jul-14 MDA#7 
85 MDA, Assessoria para Assuntos Internacionais e de Promoção Comercial (AIPC) Brasília 23-Jul-14 MDA#4 
86 MDA, Assessoria para Assuntos Internacionais e de Promoção Comercial (AIPC) Brasília 23-Jul-14 MDA#6 
87 CNA - Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil Brasília 24-Jul-14   
88 ANCEABRA Brasília 24-Jul-14   
89 Embrapa Hortaliças Brasília 25-Jul-14 EMB#16 
90 Embrapa, DTT (ex-CECAT, área de capacitação) Brasília 25-Jul-14 EMB#17 
91 Embrapa Hortaliças Brasília 25-Jul-14 EMB#18 
92 MDA, Secretaria de Agricultura Familiar (SAF) Brasília 30-Jul-14 MDA#8 
93 CONSEA, INESC Brasília 30-Jul-14   
94 Embrapa, DTT Brasília 31-Jul-14 EMB#19 
95 Apex, Núcleo África e Oriente Médio, Gerência de Inteligência Comercial Brasília 31-Jul-14 APEX#1 
96 Apex, Núcleo África e Oriente Médio, Gerência de Inteligência Comercial Brasília 31-Jul-14 APEX#2 
97 Embrapa Cerrados Skype 19-Aug-14 EMB#21 
98 Embrapa, Secretaria de Inteligência e Macroestratégia (ex-CECAT) Brasília 19-Aug-14 EMB#22 
99 FGV Projetos Brasília 20-Aug-14 FGV#2 
100 Private entrepreneur Fortaleza 28-Aug-14   
101 BNDES Fortaleza 28-Aug-14   
102 MRE, Africa Department Brasília 29-Aug-14 MRE#8 
103 Instituto Brasil África Fortaleza 29-Aug-14   
104 FAO Regional Office for Africa Skype 8-Jul-15 FAO#3 
105 Guarany Fortaleza 29-Aug-14   
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III. Profile of respondents 
(a) Respondents by category and country of origin 
Category of respondent Brazil Mozambique Other Total 
Government  42 10 0 52 
Private sector  15 5 1 20 
NGO/social movement/ non-profit orgs 7 8 0 15 
Academic organisation/researcher 7 3 0 10 
International organisation 2 1 2 5 
Press 1 0 0 1 
Political party 1 0 0 1 
Total 75 27 3 105 
 
(b) Brazilian government respondents by institutional affiliation 
Brazilian government respondents Total 
Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) 22 
Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) 8 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) 7 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) 3 
Chamber of Commerce (CAMEX) 1 
General Secretariat of the Presidency 1 
Total 42 
 
(c) Brazilian private sector respondents by institutional affiliation 
Brazilian private sector respondents Total 
National Apprenticeship Service (SENAR) 3 
Getúlio Vargas Foundation - Projetos (FGV-Projetos) 2 
Industry federations (ABIMAQ and ANFAVEA) 2 
Trade Promotion Agency (APEX) 2 
National Agricultural Confederation (CNA) 1 
National Development Bank (BNDES) 1 
Campo* 1 
National Association of Afro-Brazilian Entrepreneurs (ANCEABRA) 1 
Guarany 1 
Investor and farmer 1 
Total 15 
*Brazilian consultancy company. 
 
(d) Mozambican government respondents by institutional affiliation 
Mozambican government respondents Total 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG**) 6 
Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (DPA) 2 
Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD***) 1 
Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance (DPPF) 1 
Total 10 
** Relabelled Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA) in 2015. *** Dismantled and merged with Ministry 
of Finance in 2016. 
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(e) Mozambican private sector respondents by institutional affiliation 
Mozambican private sector respondents Total 
Vale S.A. 2 
GAPI 2 
IKURU 1 
Total 5 
 
(f) Civil society respondents by institutional affiliation and country of origin 
NGOs, social movements and other non-for-profit 
organisations Brazil Mozambique Total 
AS-PTA 1 
 
1 
CONSEA  1 
 
1 
CONTAG 1 
 
1 
MST 1  1 
FASE 1  1 
Lula Institute 1   
Brazil Africa Institute 1   
UNAC  2 2 
JA!  2 2 
ORAM 
 
1 1 
ORAM-Nampula 
 
1 1 
CSOs Nampula Platform 
 
1 1 
Fórum Mulher 
 
1 1 
Total 7 8 15 
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IV. Sample interview guide 
This guide was used for an interview with an MDA government official in Brazil. 
1. MDA, family farming public policies and politics 
 Evolution of MDA and its role in agricultural public policies, from Lula da Silva to 
Dilma Rousseff 
 Current strength of family farming in the ruling coalition and in the government of 
Dilma Rousseff vis-à-vis her predecessor 
 Family farming vs agribusiness? Technical distinction or politics? 
 Perspective on criticism to PRONAF that claims it is an instrument of conservative 
modernisation and dissemination of technological package that threatens future 
of family farming 
 
2.  MDA in development cooperation in Africa 
 Origins and motivations of MDA’s involvement in international development 
cooperation 
 Significance of 2010 event Diálogo Brasil-África sobre segurança alimentar and 
details about the event  
 Perspective on advantages for MDA in participating directly in development 
cooperation in Africa 
 Priorities for MDA in development cooperation 
 Models, expertise, experience that MDA can offer to African agriculture 
o Ask about challenges of African agriculture 
o Ask about relevance of Brazilian experience/models (family farming and 
other) 
 
3. Experience with concrete development cooperation programmes  
 Genesis and motivations for selecting More Food as a template for cooperation 
 MFI – similarities and differences vis-à-vis Brazilian domestic version (More Food 
programme) and implementation challenges of cooperation programme in 
Brazilian and African context 
 Interaction between MDA and other Brazilian actors in agricultural cooperation, 
particularly in Mozambique – e.g. Embrapa, FGV, CNA? 
 Perspective about future of MDA in Brazilian cooperation – resources and capacity 
to deliver on commitments and expand 
 Possibility of complementarity between family farming and agribusiness 
interventions in African countries – perspective on controversy about ProSAVANA 
in Mozambique and supposed involvement of MDA in the programme 
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 V. Informed consent form  
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 VI. Coding tree from data analysis 
1. Brazil’s agricultural models and experiences 
 Agrarian reform 
 Embrapa and public research 
 Environment, production frontier and Forestry Code dispute 
 Food production, security, sovereignty 
o Fome Zero 
o PAA 
 PRONAF and More Food Brazil 
o Conservative modernisation 
o Lending policy – not product specific 
o Tractors 
 The Cerrado development 
 Modernisation 
o Genesis of modern agriculture 
o Green Revolution 
o Mechanisation and labour substitution 
 Role of the state in agriculture 
 Social contestation and participation in public policy 
 Imaginaries of agricultural modernisation and development 
 Brazilian agricultural politics (domestic political economy) 
o Lula versus Dilma 
o Agribusiness lobby 
o Family farming coalition 
 Dualism 
o Agribusiness concept 
o Family farming concept 
 Personal roots and trajectories in Brazilian agriculture 
2. Brazil’s foreign policy 
 Africa focus 
 International trade negotiations 
 Lula versus Dilma 
3. Internationalisation of Brazil’s agriculture (business, policy and politics) 
 Embrapa’s internationalisation 
 Internationalisation of business 
 MDA’s internationalisation 
 Food and agriculture policy councils’ internationalisation 
 Social movements’ internationalisation 
4. Brazil’s development cooperation 
 Coordination and coherence 
 Demand-driven principle 
 Institutional setting and reform 
 Management constraints (legal, financial, institutional) 
o Limited responsiveness to demand 
 Motivations (broader than Africa) 
 Mutually beneficial cooperation 
 Structuring cooperation 
 South-South cooperation 
 Technical cooperation 
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5. Brazil in Africa 
 Motivations for cooperation with Africa 
o Altruistic, solidarity, developmental 
o Geopolitics (national) 
o Political (counter-hegemonic) alliances 
o Business 
 Brazil-China comparison 
 Commercial interests 
 Investment interests 
o Graziano’s election 
o Research opportunities 
 Brazilian portraits of African agriculture 
o Land grabbing 
 Brazil-Africa affinities and contrasts 
 Brazilian models, experiences and technologies relevant to Africa 
o Brazilian visions of agricultural development in Africa 
 Cooperation programmes and initiatives 
o Lula Institute’s Food Security Initiative  
o FAO-Brazil food-focused partnership for cooperation in Africa 
o PAA Africa 
o More Food International 
 Concessional export credit 
 Tractors and equipment 
o Nacala Fund 
o ProSavana 
 Governance 
 Links to investment 
 Envisaged agriculture development model 
 Criticism and social contestation 
 ProSavana Master Plan 
 ProSavana PEM 
 ProSavana PI 
 Agricultural technology and knowledge transfer, adaptation and exchange 
o Embrapa units in cooperation 
o Personal experiences in the field 
o Portraits of local counterparts 
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VII. ProSAVANA timeline: key events and occurrences (December 2004 – September 2015) 
Date  Key events and occurrences Scope Sources 
Dec-2004 Vale gains mining concession in Moatize, Tete Related (Vale, 2004) 
2005 President of Embrapa announces strategic technical cooperation operation in Mozambique and partnership with Vale Related (Rádio Nacional, 2005) 
Jul-2009 Presidents of Brazil and Japan commit to cooperation programme in Mozambican savannah at L’Aquila Summit ProSAVANA (JICA et al., 2009) 
17-Sep-2009 Tripartite memorandum of understanding signed by governments of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan for ProSAVANA ProSAVANA (JICA et al., 2009) 
2010 FGV Projetos starts biofuels feasibility study in Mozambique sponsored by Vale Foundation and supported by 
government of Brazil and European Commission 
Related (Cunha & Matos, 2012; Paiva, 
2013b, 2014) 
Nov-2010 Senator Kátia Abreu, President of CNA, heads visit to Mozambique to explore opportunities for Brazilian farmers Related (CNA, 2010) 
Apr-2011 ProSAVANA officially launched in Maputo ProSAVANA (@Verdade, 2011) 
Apr-2011 Embrapa starts ProSAVANA-PI activities ProSAVANA (ProSAVANA, n.d.-a) 
Apr-2011 Tripartite seminar in São Paulo ‘Agronegócio em Moçambique: Cooperação Brasil-Japão e Oportunidades de 
Investimento’ 
ProSAVANA (Embrapa Monitoriamento por 
Satélite, 2011; JICA, 2011) 
Aug-2011 Folha de S. Paulo article suggesting Brazilian land grabs in Mozambique Related (Folha de S. Paulo, 2011) 
Mar-2012 FGV Projetos starts work on ProSAVANA-PD ProSAVANA FGV interviews and 
(ProSavana-PD, 2013b) 
Apr-2012 Federal Deputy Luiz Nishimori visits Mozambique alongside agribusiness entrepreneurs  Related (Palavra Aberta, 2012) 
Jul-2012 ABC consultant assigned to Mozambique to monitor ProSAVANA and other technical cooperation projects in 
agriculture and food security 
Related Consultant’s page on Linked in!  
4-Jul-2012 Fundo Nacala launched in Brasília Related (FGV News, 2012; FGV 
Projetos, 2012b; Valor 
Econômico, 2012) 
20-Jul-2012 Fundo Nacala launched in Maputo Related (Moçambique TV, 2012) 
Sep-2012 JICA-GoM set up Fund for ProSAVANA’s Development Initiative to support quick-impact agricultural projects Related (ProSavana-PD, 2013a) 
Oct-2012 UNAC publishes damning statement on ProSAVANA, marking the start of the public contestation ProSAVANA (UNAC, 2012) 
Jan-2013 JA! Publishes position paper on ProSAVANA ProSAVANA (JA!, 2013) 
Mar-2013 ProSAVANA tripartite team meets civil society representatives in Nampula to discuss ProSAVANA-PD ProSAVANA Meeting notes shared by 
respondent participating in 
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Date  Key events and occurrences Scope Sources 
meeting 
29-Mar-2013 International seminar on Nacala Corridor development in Maputo Related (JICA, 2013) 
Apr-2013 ProSAVANA-PD draft leaks to the public ProSAVANA (JA! et al., 2013) 
Apr-2013 Joint civil society statement on ProSAVANA ProSAVANA (JA! et al., 2013) 
May-2013 ProSAVANA-PEM activities start ProSAVANA (ProSAVANA, 2013a) 
28-May-2013 Open Letter from Mozambican civil society organisations and social movements to the presidents of Mozambique and 
Brazil and the Japanese prime minister 
ProSAVANA (UNAC et al., 2013) 
Aug-2013 Civil society conference in Maputo (Conferência Triangular dos Povos) to discuss ProSAVANA calls for programme’s halt ProSAVANA (Macua blog, 2013) 
30-Sep-2013 Japanese civil society statement on ProSAVANA ProSAVANA (CADTM, 2013) 
5-Dec-2013 CONSEA debates ProSAVANA at its annual assembly meeting in Brasília Related (CONSEA, 2013) 
6-Dec-2013 Lula Institute hosts meeting on ProSAVANA with UNAC and Brazilian rural social movements, including CONTAG, MST, 
FASE and MPA 
ProSAVANA (CONTAG, 2013) 
9-Jan-2014 ADECRU publishes statement on ProSAVANA ProSAVANA (ADECRU, 2014) 
11-Jan-2014 Japanese Prime Minister visits Nacala corridor region Related (Sugiyama & Ono, 2014; 
Vunjanhe, 2014) 
13-Jan-2014 Press release by Nampula Civil Society Organizations’ Provincial Platform condemning Japanese PM visit ProSAVANA (The Nampula Civil Society 
Organizations’ Provincial 
Platform, 2014) 
Apr-2014 Launch of video ‘ProSAVANA e a face oculta do Prodecer’ by UNAC & ORAM ProSAVANA (UNAC & ORAM, 2013) 
May-2014 No to ProSAVANA! Launch of national campaign ProSAVANA (UNAC et al., 2014) 
23-Jul-2014 Tripartite declaration on private investment in the framework of ProSAVANA ProSAVANA (ProSAVANA, n.d.-a) 
24-Jul-2014 Civil society conference in Maputo (Conferência Triangular dos Povos) calls for ProSAVANA halt and demands inclusive 
and sustainable agricultural policies 
ProSAVANA (Suzete, 2014) 
31-Mar-2015 Zero Version of ProSAVANA Master Plan published by GoM ProSAVANA (ProSAVANA, n.d.-a) 
Apr-Jun 2015 Public consultation on Zero Version of Master Plan across provinces and districts in Nacala corridor and Maputo ProSAVANA (ProSAVANA, n.d.-a) 
4-Jun-2015 Mozambican civil society calls for the cancellation of the Master Plan consultation process ProSAVANA (ADECRU et al., 2015) 
1-Sept-2015 ADECRU launches documentary ‘ProSAVANA: Terra Usurpada, Vida Roubada’ (‘ProSAVANA: Grabbed Land, Stolen Life’) ProSAVANA (ADECRU, 2015) 
 
